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Middle East and North Africa 
By Alexandra Pittman 
Dissertation Advisors: Ali Banuazizi and Sarah Babb 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation focuses on the intersection of global and indigenous advocacy strategies 
in feminist women’s movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). I explore 
strategies of resistance and innovation in three contexts: (1) Globally, I analyze a sample 
of MENA NGOs in a transnational women’s rights network, Women’s Learning 
Partnership (WLP) and their interactions in the international funding sphere; (2) 
Domestically, I examine a local Moroccan NGO’s strategy development process and their 
domestic and regional partnerships when organizing to reform the Moudawana (1999-
2004); and (3) Regionally, I analyze inter-organizational collaboration and coalition 
building between three NGOs in the Campaign to Reform Arab Women’s Nationality 
(2001-2008). I locate the dissertation in a feminist activist framework and draw from 
diverse data sources, including years of fieldwork with WLP (2004-2008); participant 
observation and notes from five transnational women’s rights meetings (2005-2008); a 
content analysis of a sample of international funders’ and MENA feminist NGOs’ 
websites; and two in-depth case studies with data derived from historical analysis, three 
months of fieldwork in Morocco, interviews with Moroccan, Lebanese, and regional 
activists, and secondary document analysis. The findings provide deeper clarity into the 
strategic action of MENA feminist movements and the variety of social, political, and 
economic forces that shape their discourses and practices for achieving social change and 
gender equality. The findings contribute to the scholarly literature on transnational 
feminism and social movements and its intersection with the law. 
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PREFACE 
 
As a scholar-activist from the Global North, my entrance into the Women’s 
Learning Partnership (WLP) network came about through an invitation to apply my 
technical evaluation and capacity building skills. I was responsible for developing a 
participatory evaluation model for WLP’s women’s leadership program, Leading to 
Choices (LTC), and for conducting a two-year, collaborative pilot evaluation in Morocco 
with activists at Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM).1  
Having the privilege to engage in fieldwork since late 2004 with WLP and with 
the research and evaluation work at ADFM in Morocco has allowed me the unique 
opportunity to annually interact with high profile leaders in the Middle Eastern and North 
African women’s rights movement, such as Mahnaz Afkhami, Rakhee Goyal, Asma 
Khader, Lina Abou-Habib, Sakeena Yacoobi, Amina Lemrini, and Rabéa Naciri. This 
personal contact over an extended period of time has facilitated a distinctive learning 
environment, which has offered me a unique and intimate lens into the successes and 
struggles of an elite group of activists.  
Over the years, I have learned of the diverse efforts of feminist strategizing and 
implementing campaigns for gender equality. Some of the achievements of activists in 
the WLP Partnership include the 2004 Islamic Family Law reform in Morocco, the 
Nationality rights reform in Egypt in 2004, Algeria in 2005, and Morocco in 2007, and 
the lifting of reservations on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in Morocco in 2008. Yet, these pioneering 
feminist efforts of reform are too often not the primary focus of Western public discourse 
                                                 
1
 I was in Rabat, Morocco for three months of those two years.  
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and media accounts of women in the MENA. The public omissions and the gaps in the 
scholarly literature, particularly in the well-developed social movement area, led me to 
this study.  
In my case, given my limitations as a Global North scholar without knowledge of 
Arabic (only French) and native knowledge and experience of the region, the type of 
engaged scholar-activist fieldwork, I carried out over four years (2004-2008) was the 
only way to get to the heart of my research questions. My fieldwork was driven by an 
activist research approach, which placed me in the WLP network and in the field in 
Morocco.  Given my acute interest in better understanding the unique and innovative 
strategies of the MENA activists I was interacting with, I chose to utilize my existing 
connections, placement in the WLP network, and access to prominent activists as a 
resource in my studies. My ongoing interactions with NGO activists in the WLP network 
essentially socialized me into the world of activism in the region. 
 In this dissertation, I try to bring to life the experiences of activists in the field, 
attending to transnational and local feminist discourses and practices. From their diverse 
experiences, I attempt to draw out theoretical and practical implications, which could be 
of use to scholars and activists alike in the Global North and South. I draw from multiple 
methods of social scientific inquiry in order to gain deeper insight into the strategic 
interactions that activists encounter in their international, regional, and local contexts. At 
its heart, this study offers a snapshot of women’s rights NGO activism, detailing MENA 
feminists’ journey to affecting change in women’s rights and status. 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overview 
 This dissertation focuses on the intersection of global and indigenous advocacy 
strategies in feminist women’s movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
with a specific focus on Morocco.2 I explore the nuances of nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) advocacy strategy development for the purpose of gender equality, 
largely through legislative reform.3 NGO strategy is intriguing to study as NGO activists 
provide a bridge between global spheres of interaction and local communities (Merry 
2006). The study is grounded in an examination of the transnational organizing work of 
the Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP) and its local NGO allies. Within the WLP 
network, particular attention is placed on a Moroccan NGO, Association Démocratique 
des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), and their engagement in the campaigns for Personal 
Status Code reform (or Moudawana) of 2004 and the Nationality Code Reform of 2007; 
Collective for Research and Training on Development Action (CRTDA), a Lebanese 
NGO also involved in the regional Nationality campaign; and WLP International, the 
coordinating NGO for the transnational network. The progressive feminist activists 
involved in these reform efforts are often referred to as liberals in their contexts; they 
most often subscribe to secularist democratic ideals.4 However, the feminists draw from a 
                                                 
2
 Social movements are no longer just local; instead, activists navigate complex global and political 
environments. 
3
 This analytical focus is beneficial as legislative reforms provide concrete and measurable evidence of 
movement outcomes (Gamson 1990; Rochon and Mazmanian 1993).  
4
 The term feminist is used in this case as the activists in the WLP network self-identify as such. It is 
important to note that there is a wide range of feminist positionings, which are explored later on in the 
chapter. The shorthand use of feminist is not meant to obscure the diversities that exist with this identity; 
rather, it is used for the sake of brevity.    
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diverse set of secular and religious discursive principles depending on the goals of their 
campaign and their political positioning.5   
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to show how global and local 
influences, both ideological and institutional, can shape and are shaped by feminist 
movement dynamics and synergies in reform contexts. I explore feminist NGO activists’ 
global and local negotiations, translations, and adaptations to better understand how they 
navigate multiple contexts in the effort to increase women’s status and equality. Of 
course, the exploration of MENA feminist social change work cannot be accomplished 
without attending to the cultural meaning making work of activists in movements; 
therefore, considerable attention is placed on the strategic actions that activists undertake 
to frame, communicate, and mobilize their messages for gender equitable reform.  
Specifically, I focus on two major aspects of NGO advocacy—navigating 
international resources and implementing legislative advocacy efforts. At the resource 
level, I am particularly interested in how human rights and empowerment discourses are 
used and contextualized by NGOs and funders. The line of inquiry is appealing as often 
women’s rights organizations using human rights discourse in the MENA face 
complications as local opponents paint human rights argumentation as conflicting with 
local cultural or religious values. Better understanding how activists negotiate these 
diverse challenges provides a foundation for the deeper exploration of activists’ global-
local strategy development in specific cases of legislative reform.  
                                                 
5
 I attend to the diversity of activists’ experiences throughout the analyses. Yet, I have struggled with how 
to best depict diverse feminist perspectives in a movement, given multiple and varied experiences, while 
also highlighting the collective movement strategy. I have resolved this conflict by doing my best to speak 
about activists as a collective when detailing movement decisions and strategy. I integrate individual 
activist’s voices to explain, contrast, or further illuminate personal experiences related to movement 
decisions.  
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At the advocacy level, I explore the varying discursive and mobilization strategies 
used by Moroccan feminist activists in a religious and a secular law reform effort. I pay 
attention to the ways that fragmentary binaries, such as “secular versus religious” and 
“Western versus culturally authentic reform,” have been used by political actors in the 
Moroccan context and explore their influence on feminists in this sample. The first case 
study analyzes a domestic effort to reform the Moudawana as carried out by liberal 
Moroccan feminist NGOs and their allies from 1999-2004. I detail feminist NGO 
activists’ efforts to formulate a comprehensive discursive strategy to argue for 
Moudawana reform in a contentious political setting characterized by a powerful 
religious countermovement. The case explores how global norms, such as human rights 
and democracy, were differentially drawn from and interwoven with local frames.  The 
second case I analyze is a regional study of collaboration and coalition building between 
three MENA NGOs in the Campaign to Reform Arab Women’s Nationality from 2001-
2008. The Nationality Code, in contrast to the Moudawana, is a secular law, thus 
providing an interesting case for comparison. The aim is to highlight the role of 
movement learning and the cross-fertilization of movement strategy as an important, 
adaptive feature of movement building. I also analyze how negotiated sets of localized 
norms and movement practices travel back to influence transnational spaces of MENA 
feminist organizing.  
There are multiple implications of this dissertation. In the feminist literature, this 
study adds to the increasingly diversified study of the transnationalization of feminist 
movements and the way in which global discourses are adapted and localized by NGOs 
(Alvarez 2000; Friedman 1999; Levitt and Merry 2007; Levitt and Merry 2008; Merry 
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2006; Tohidi 2002). The transfer of these localized movement strategies back to 
transnational spheres of influence also augments the literature and furthers our 
understanding of how transborder campaigns evolve (Alvarez 2000; Friedman 1999). 
This research contributes to the social movement literature on political opportunities and 
framing by highlighting important components of MENA feminists’ strategies for 
navigating oppositional ideologies and constraints that stem from the politicization of the 
legal context (Alimi, Gamson, and Ryan 2006; Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; 
Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and Meyer 1996; 
Goodwin and Jasper 2004a,b).  Finally, I hope that through this dissertation, public 
awareness of the unique and revolutionary strategies that MENA feminist activists are 
utilizing to mobilize for gender equality in their countries is heightened. The activists 
draw strength from global and local resources in order to mobilize against long-standing 
patriarchal structures and to innovate in the face of continually shifting political 
constraints and opportunities. 
Transnational Feminism in Focus: The Women’s Learning Partnership 
Overall, I am interested in understanding how the feminist activists in the 
Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP) strategize around multiple opportunities and 
constraints at the international, local, and regional levels. Specifically, how do activists 
negotiate global and local discourses and craft resonant discourses for women’s equality?  
In what ways have feminist activists navigated increasingly contentious political spaces 
in calling for gender equitable legislative reforms? Finally, what practical lessons can we 
draw from activists’ experiences of law reform and social change efforts in the MENA 
that further develop feminist and sociological theory on movement building? The data 
5 
 
collection process has been made possible through the phenomenon of globalization and 
transnational knowledge exchange.6 My fieldwork consisted of activist-scholar 
collaboration, 15 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Moroccan, Lebanese, and 
other MENA activists,7 textual analysis of important legislation and activist campaign 
material, and numerous informal conversations in a number of contexts over a four year 
period. I have participated in and taken field notes at five internal meetings (2005-2008) 
in which feminists across the MENA met to transnationally strategize: in Washington 
DC; Maryland; Bangkok, Thailand; as well as Marrakech and Rabat, Morocco. Since the 
focus of the study is on NGO strategies for social change, interviews are conducted with 
the executive leadership of feminist organizations or close allies that played a role in 
strategy development. Whenever possible, I have gone back to the activists that informed 
this study for feedback and clarifications. Feminist activists agreed that their full names 
and organizational affiliations could be used. However, I have not included information 
that members of the WLP Partnership or I have assessed as posing a potential social, 
political, or economic risks. 
The Women’s Learning Partnership 
 The Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP) is a transnational women’s rights 
network with over 20 partners from countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin 
America, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Collectively, the WLP Partnership aims 
“to strengthen a feminist movement in order to transform power relations and promote 
justice, equality, peace and sustainable development.” The feminist grassroots 
organizations in this sample are located in the Global South, in Muslim-majority 
                                                 
6
 See Appendix 1 for a further description of the WLP Partnership (pp.200-204).  
7
 See Appendix 2 for a list of the interviews. 
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countries.8 The NGO sample includes 11 NGOs in the WLP Partnership located in the 
MENA region: Aurat Foundation (AF) in Pakistan, Afghan Institute for Learning (AIL) 
in Afghanistan, Association des Femmes Chefs de Famille (ACFC) in Mauritania, 
Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) in Morocco, Bahrain Women 
Association (BWA), Collective for Research and Training on Development Action 
(CRTDA) in Lebanon, Forum for Women in Development (FWID) in Egypt, Foundation 
for the Support of Women’s Work (FSWW) in Turkey,  Sisterhood Is Global Institute 
(SIGI/J) in Jordan, and Women's Affairs Technical Committee (WATC) in Palestine, and 
WLP International in USA. Particular focus is placed on the three NGOs described 
below: WLP International, ADFM, and CRTDA.  
 WLP International is the liaison office of the WLP Partnership, based in 
Bethesda, MD. They are one of the main actors in this study as they coordinate and 
develop joint programs of women’s empowerment and advocacy for gender equality 
across the partner MENA NGOs. WLP International describes their mission:  
to develop and promote an alternative vision and practice of leadership by 
building the capacities of feminist women’s rights organizations, 
increasing the number of women in decision making positions, and 
advancing strategic collaborations, cross-national dialogues and advocacy 
efforts, particularly in Muslim-majority countries, in order to transform 
power relations. We contribute to this mission in our role of capacity 
builder, bridge-builder and innovator, using state of the art information 
and communications technologies (WLP 2006a:3). 
 
WLP International houses a small staff of eight, who act as the bridge among the partner 
organizations. They play a critical role in increasing the visibility of national and regional 
campaigns as seen in the case studies of Moudawana and Nationality reform. 
                                                 
8
 WLP Partners include NGOs from Afghanistan, Bahrain, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Palestine, Turkey, and Zimbabwe as well as a liaison office in Bethesda, MD (WLP International). 
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 Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) is an international 
human rights organization established in 1985 that is committed to advocating on behalf 
of women’s rights in Morocco. It is one of the largest and most established NGOs in 
Morocco. ADFM is one of the main organizations studied due to their strategic influence 
in the Moroccan campaign to reform the Moudawana and their efforts in implementing 
and developing regional and local strategies for the Nationality campaign. 
 ADFM defends and promotes the human rights of women through fostering 
equitable social policies. ADFM’s headquarters are in Rabat, Morocco. ADFM is an 
autonomous, non-profit, feminist NGO “which aims to promote women's rights in order 
to increase women's power and influence in the juridical, political, economic and social 
spheres to build an egalitarian society based on democracy and sustainable 
development.”9 The NGO uses four main strategies to achieve its objectives: advocacy, 
public awareness-raising, education and training, and legal advice.  
 The Collective for Research and Training on Development Action (CRTDA) 
is a Lebanese NGO founded in 1999. Based in Beirut, the NGO works across the MENA 
region, partnering with NGOs that share similar visions in order to more effectively 
implement change. CRTDA is an organization of analytical interest due to their 
coordinating role in the regional campaign to reform the Nationality laws. CRTDA serves 
as a capacity building resource for activists on a variety of issues, including poverty 
analysis and assessment, economic justice, gender equality, empowerment, and 
leadership.  
CRTDA endeavors to take actions of the highest international standards 
that reflect the needs and opportunities of a challenging and changing 
world. CRTDA aims to achieve this through conducting cutting-edge 
                                                 
9
 Source: ADFM mission and vision statement. http://www.adfm.ma/spip.php?rubrique93&lang=en 
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action-oriented research, providing quality training, capacity building, and 
informational resources, and facilitating organizational development and 
dynamic community mobilization. CRTDA works with both local and 
international NGOs, development practitioners, and academics in order to 
create informed action and promote policy dialogue on issues of poverty, 
gender equality, social exclusion and sustainable development in the Arab 
Machreq10 & Maghreb region.11  
 
CRTDA is guided by their values of gender equality, accountability, responsibility, social 
justice, and efficiency. 
Vernacularizing the Global: A Basis for Global-Local Translations and Movement 
Mobilization 
   In order to better understand the creation of MENA feminist discourses and 
strategies for social change and legislative reform, first, I provide a brief overview of 
legal contexts in the MENA. Then, I review research from the social movement and law 
literatures, which together have been understudied (McCann 2006). Finally, I explore the 
MENA feminist literature and its unique contributions to the dissertation’s main research 
questions.  
Islamic Family Law in the Middle East and North Africa  
 Legal structures in the MENA involve a complex blend of religious and secular 
codes. Most countries in the region have secular constitutions, labor, and penal codes, 
and religious, Islamic family laws (also called Personal Status Codes). There is 
considerable variation in Personal Status Codes across the MENA region. For that reason, 
I briefly describe important dimensions of Islamic family law as it relates to women’s 
                                                 
10The Machreq (also known as Mashriq) is a regional description of the area east of the Maghreb. It 
includes Arabic speaking countries from the Mediterranean Sea to Iran, including countries to the east of 
Egypt and above Saudi Arabia. The Maghreb is a regional description of North African countries. 
Typically, the Maghreb refers to the three countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Sometimes, Libya 
and Mauritania are also included. 
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 Source: CRTDA vision statement. http://crtda.org.lb/en/book/crtdas-vision.   
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rights and status. I attend to the national specificities of Islamic family law in the 
Moroccan case in Chapter 4.   
  Women’s rights and status in the MENA, excepting Tunisia and Turkey, are 
primarily determined through the Personal Status Code. Issues of women’s rights in 
autonomy, household status, divorce, marriage, and inheritance are all detailed under this 
legal structure. Women rights are not equal to men. Typically, men have primary 
responsibility over the family, provide maintenance for their wives, and act as women’s 
legal guardians. Women often do not have equal rights to inheritance, to solely initiate 
divorce, or to sign marriage or other legal documents.  
 Personal Status Codes are strongly inspired by Muslim rights, based on fiqh that 
have been created and derived from the Quran and the sunnah, or the tradition of the 
Prophet. Fiqh are social rules, as they have been independently interpreted by Islamic 
jurisprudence scholars, ijtihad, which govern men’s and women’s behavior and rights 
(Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 2003). These rules are interpreted diversely by different 
schools or traditions of Sunnite Islam, i.e., in Malikism, Hanafism, Hanbalism, and 
Shafeism and in Shia Islam.12 Over time, fiqh has transformed from merely an 
interpretive source to religious orthodoxy (Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 2003).  
    Islamic family law can be understood as a legal framework that produces “a 
normative model of the individual, the family, the society, and the relationships among 
them” (Charrad 2001:3). These laws place boundaries and restrictions on the choices that 
women and men make within the private sphere (Charrad 2001). Islamic legal scholar, 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (2002) suggests that the existence and persistence of Islamic 
                                                 
12
 In the dissertation, I place primary focus on describing trends related to Sunnite Islam and particularly 
the Malikite school as drawn on in the Moroccan case. 
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family law is due to the political will of the state. He argues that the family law was the 
only set of religious principles that survived colonialist secularization pressures and as 
such represents the heart of Islamic identity (An-Na’im 2002).  As a primary source of 
identity, the reform of the Personal Status Code is extremely contentious, fraught with 
strong emotional reactions and opposition. Thus, liberal feminist activists engaging in 
these reforms must be strategic in their modes of argumentation.  
The Interaction of Legal and Political Contexts in Social Movements 
Law is more than just a set of rules and regulations that societies use to structure 
efficient relations. Law is intricately connected to everyday meaning making and to how 
individuals understand social structure and relations (Ewick and Silbey 1998; 2002). 
Indeed, laws have both structural and normative qualities (Sewell 1992; 1996; Ewick and 
Silbey 2002). Law both shapes and is shaped by cultural and ideological interpretations 
(Ewick and Silbey 2001; 2002). These ideologies involve interpretations based on one’s 
positioning and understanding of the law, which are also shaped by broader forces of 
political and social power (Silbey 1998). This meaning making process has been termed 
legality by Ewick and Silbey (2002:152). Legality embodies the “meanings, sources of 
authority, and cultural practices that are recognized as legal, regardless of who employs 
them or for what ends.” But legality is also “a structural component of society. That is, 
legality consists of cultural schemas and resources that operate to define and pattern 
social life” (Ewick and Silbey 2002:155). The dual structural and normative levels of law 
can be drawn out using a simple example. Islamic family law is structural in the sense 
that there are institutions that ensure appropriate legal implementation and enforcement. 
But Islamic law is normative in the way that it shapes social relations and understandings 
of the roles and capacities of men and women. The legality of Islamic law is differentially 
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interpreted, often based on social location, nationality, and political ideology, which 
further complicates the debates. The distinction and connection between the structural 
and normative dimensions of law and how it interacts in the social movement playing 
field, particularly in terms of activists’ development of ‘repertoires of contention’ is an 
important focus of the study.   
 Taken together, I refer to these legal dimensions as the legal context. I suggest the 
legal context influences social movements in a variety of ways: (1) ideologically, laws 
can shape challengers and opponents’ social and political alignments and (2) 
institutionally, the type of law (e.g., secular or religious) determines the mechanisms 
through which it can be reformed. This becomes particularly important when talking 
about reforms in the MENA, where there can be separate secular and religious courts that 
make decisions on distinct issues. For example, in Morocco, there are secular courts for 
violations of the penal code and courts with religious justices for family law cases.13 
Above and beyond, separate court systems, the process through which law reforms can be 
initiated (e.g., by the public, religious authorities, or the state) drastically differs as do the 
legal principles drawn from to justify reform.  
These ideological and institutional distinctions have been parsed out in different 
ways by scholars and activists wishing to reform Islamic family law, including by making 
distinctions between the cultural and institutional influences of Islamic law (Ghazalla 
2001; Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 2003). Abdullahi An-Na’im (2002:2) makes deeper 
differentiations between the legal aspects of Islamic law, separating between the religious 
juridical aspects of Islamic law and the legal instrumentation of the state, arguing that: 
                                                 
13
 It is important to note that these family courts were developed due to the 2004 reforms. See Mir-Hosseini 
(2000) for a description of family court system before the reform and Mir-Hosseini (2007) for a review of 
courts after the 2004 reform.  
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“…Shari’a principles are legally binding by virtue of state action, through either 
enactment as law by the legislative organs of the state or enforcement by its courts” and 
not by religious mandate. An-Na’im (2002:2) argues that as a state mechanism the only 
solution is to transform the content of Islamic law in alignment with modern legal 
systems:  
There are serious risks of distortion and stagnation in maintaining the 
normative authority of IFL [Islamic family law] on the basis of a pre-
modern system that is becoming increasingly unfamiliar to legal 
professionals, policy-makers and the public at large, and applying it within 
the radically different constitutional and legal framework of the modern 
nation-state. 
 
 These legal factors shape the political context in which feminist movements are 
located. While exceedingly important, the literature on social movements historically has 
placed less attention on the role of legal contexts (McCann 2006).14  The legal context 
and specifically its interaction with the political context has likely been taken for granted 
due to primary focus on Western, secular, democratic cases for social movement 
theorizing.15 Instead, there has been a strong focus on political process theory (PPT) 
which highlights the central role of political opportunities on creating the conditions for 
social movement mobilization (Tarrow 1998).16 PPT specifies causal mechanisms for 
determining social movement mobilizations with particular focus on a structural set of 
opportunities most often linked to the state. Political opportunities can have an influence 
                                                 
14
 The political context includes the state, the political elites, the public opinion, the challengers, and the 
countermovement. 
15
 See Kurzman (2004) on the bias of the social movement literature. 
16
 See Meyer and Minkoff (2004) for as cogent review of the literature on PPT and areas for further 
development. For critiques of PPT, see Goodwin and Jasper (2004a) who argue the model is overly fixed, 
tautological, and structural, without integrating a focus on activists’ agency and strategic control over 
movement resources and strategy development. Many theorists have suggested that by introducing 
activists’ cultural meaning making and strategic decision making processes, the structural bias of PPT 
could be averted (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 2004b; 
Kurzman, 2004; McAdam and Sewell 2001; Polletta 2004). 
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on the type of movement tactics activists select and impact how activists react to shifts in 
the movement context (Kitschelt 1986).17 While I draw some inspiration from the idea of 
the political context as mediator of movement mobilizations, I also focus on drawing out 
the implications of the legal context and constraints in MENA efforts of secular and 
religious law reform. In particular, I am interested in the role of constraints on movement 
dynamics, which has been understudied and warrants further attention (Goldstone and 
Tilly 2001; King 2007; Steinberg 1999). Specifically, I aim to show that constraints can 
actually be powerful sources of strategic innovation for activists. This analysis will help 
to identify both the structural elements from which constraints flow and the agentic 
innovations and active resistance forged in light of constraining contexts. 
 Paying further attention to the normative dimensions of law, I explore the role of 
cultural or ideational forms of movement persuasion (Cress and Snow 2000).  
Specifically, I analyze the way that a movement’s discursive framing and mobilization 
strategies respond to globalized political and legal contexts. To do this, I draw from the 
well-developed social movement literature on discursive framing. Framing is one 
component of effective movement strategy, where activists “assign meaning to and 
interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential 
adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” 
                                                 
17
 The political mediation model integrates research on political opportunities (Amenta et al. 1992; 2005). 
The political mediation approach, developed by Amenta, Caruthers, and Zylan (1992) describes the 
interactive and dynamic influence that the political context has on shaping movement strategies and actions 
when law reform is sought. Amenta et al (2005:519) lay out guidelines for assessing what types and level 
of activist mobilization will be required given the political context: “In highly favorable political contexts, 
all that should be required is a certain threshold of resource mobilization and minimally plausible and 
directed framing and claims-making. In less favorable political contexts, more assertive strategies of 
collective action would be required for a social movement to have influence. In yet other political contexts, 
where powerful systemic conditions work against challengers, it may be impossible for the challengers to 
exert much influence. In short, the context must be extremely favorable and the mobilization and action 
extensive for challengers to achieve the most radical goals.” 
See Giugni 2008 for a more review of developments in PPT and political mediation approaches. 
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(Snow and Benford 1988:198).  Ultimately, the persuasiveness of movement messages 
relies on the degree of cultural resonance frames have at the local level. Resonant 
messages often draw from shared local histories, cultural traditions, historical narratives, 
or other collective beliefs (Gamson 1998; Snow and Benford 1998). Ferree and Merrill 
(2004) outline a multi-layered model for understanding the relationship between 
ideology, frames, and discourses. “The framing process is the mechanism by which 
discourses, ideologies, and frames are all connected. Framing as a process is both 
strategic and social” (Ferree and Merrill 2004:250). Ideologies and values are the shared 
underlying principles that connect individuals to a movement and movements to each 
other, e.g., the transnational women’s rights movement.  
Framing as a process challenges, even as it is constrained by, discursive 
logics. Movements confront meanings that are embedded in institutional 
discourses, but also use innovative framing tactics to challenge and change 
them (Katzenstein 1998). Such “new words” may lead to “new worlds”. 
Successful reframing then constrains the options of other actors by 
introducing a new discursive logic (Ferree and Merrill 2004:259).   
 
But discourse, framing acts, and their resonance are not unilaterally determined; rather, 
the framing and counterframing of the opposition or institutional elites has an impact on 
messages (Esacove 2004; McCaffrey and Keys 2000). This is evidenced as MENA 
women’s rights NGOs face pressure to demonstrate their authenticity as legitimate actors 
of their cultural community, especially when receiving foreign resource support. Analysis 
of movement framing is then complemented by analyses of political opportunities 
(Kowlachuk 2005; Kubal 1998; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Kurzman 1996), which 
describes how framing efforts are influenced by cultural constraints and opportunities 
(Kubal 1998). 
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 Given international and domestic pressures, NGO activists seek out ways to 
process and translate global values, such as human rights or religious principles, into 
locally resonant packages. NGO activists have been conceptualized as the actors or 
translators who fashion bridges between global spheres of international human rights law 
and local spheres of cultural application (Merry 2006). A conceptually useful way to 
describe the translation and construction project activists undertake is vernacularization 
(Merry 2006; Levitt and Merry 2007, 2008). The vernacularization process describes how 
global universal human rights frameworks or religious frameworks get translated and 
used in the local context: “These people translate up and down. They reframe local 
grievances up by portraying them as human rights violations. They translate transnational 
ideas and practices down as ways of grappling with particular local problems” (Merry 
2006:42). Merry (2006) has described vernacularization as occurring on a continuum 
which ranges from replication to hybridization. Replication occurs when a NGO takes on 
the same characteristics of the external international model without alteration. On the 
other end, hybridization occurs when external ideas and practices are integrated and 
refashioned with local norms.  
 However, power differentials are distinctly apparent in vernacularization 
processes and shape the discursive fields in which NGO activists aim to frame grievances 
(Merry 2006; Levitt and Merry 2008). Levitt and Merry (2008) focus specifically on 
women’s rights NGO’s use of human rights discourses in China, Peru, India, and the 
USA. The scholars argue that:  
… the spread of human rights is a fragmented and uneven process that 
often does not penetrate deeply into existing ideas and practices. Within 
the vastly unequal North/South power relations that shape the financial 
and organizational contexts of NGOs, individual leaders and workers 
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creatively appropriate, reshape, and reject segments of women’s human 
rights. 
 
These pressures do not only come from the international sphere, but also stem from the 
local sphere where activists easily face local charges of the inauthenticity of their 
movement as explored in Chapters 2 and 4.  
This vernacularization process is crucial for understanding the process by which 
global discourses are divided, drawn from, and adapted into resonant local messages. The 
importance of institutional power and context on activists’ strategizing cannot be 
underestimated. Ann Swidler (1995:36) notes “individuals can then come to act in 
culturally uniform ways, not because their experiences are shared, but because they must 
negotiate the same institutional hurdles.” The similarity in the types of institutional 
barriers that women across the world face when opposing discriminatory laws and 
policies may underlie the strategic decision by the transnational women’s movement to 
formulate a collective discourse for framing women’s rights issues. The following 
sections explore two global discourses that shape the MENA activists’ strategies in this 
study: secular human rights and religious legal principles. These discourses are often 
unnecessarily positioned against each other in secular and religious debates. The activists 
in this study find alternative ways of addressing this debate. 
Human Rights as Women’s Rights 
 The international movement for women’s rights has had a significant impact on 
local women’s advocacy NGOs due to its power in global agenda setting (Alvarez 2000; 
Friedman 1999; Tohidi 2002).  In the early 1990s, transnational women’s rights activists 
across the Global North and South met to strategize on ways to increase their political 
influence. One product of this global strategizing was a greater focus on using 
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international human rights language and protocols to justify changes to discriminatory 
laws within a given context, i.e., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
The global frame was introduced by members of the transnational women’s movement in 
preparing for the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. Activists decided that a 
powerful way to argue for women’s full social, political, and economic equality was by 
using a “women’s rights as human rights” frame. Linking women’s rights to human rights 
discourse was seen as a particularly effective means to transcend discriminatory practices 
on the domestic level. The collective nature of these claims could make it easier for local 
activists to leverage women’s rights and equality using supranational principles of human 
rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In these cases, transnational social movements can often 
link local groups with international NGOs or advocacy groups to help redress local 
violations of rights (Smith 2002). 
 However, the collective human rights discourse is not always perceived as 
beneficial across all contexts (Elahi 1997). While some women’s rights activists use the 
international norm framework as an opportunity to pressure states to align themselves 
with human rights standards that they have pledged to uphold, others may see the 
framework as a potential challenge to advancing their reform objectives, due to resistance 
from the state or other organized groups of opposition. For example, one of the primary 
barriers that reformist or secular women’s rights campaigns face in the MENA is the 
opposition’s charge that they are proponents of Western culture and that their goals of 
social change are unIslamic (Pittman and Naciri 2007).  MENA women’s rights activists 
may experience the brunt of this claim as there is strong sentiment regarding the Western, 
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individualist, and secular influences embedded in the UDHR. This perspective is not only 
distinctive to the MENA; rather, many activists in the Global South, among others, 
believe that the human rights frame “privileges political and civil rights, to the exclusion 
of economic, social, or cultural rights, and that in its excessive focus on the individuals 
obscures structural inequalities among classes and states” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:184). 
Thus, while rights-based discourse may be empowering for some activists in the Global 
South, and in the MENA, it can also create additional challenges, particularly as 
“resources and discourses become the object of struggle” in domestic settings (Sperling, 
Ferree, and Risman 2001:1156). The dual nature of human rights as law and norms is 
aptly described by Peggy Levitt and Sally Engle Merry (2007:30):  
Human rights law is embedded in documents, interpretation, processes of 
monitoring, while human rights social movements draw on the legality of 
human rights in a broader and more open way, focusing on how these 
ideas are adopted and transformed. Clearly, human rights law, particularly 
that part that emphasizes civil and political rights, is quite compatible with 
neoliberalism and privatization, with a focus on choice, autonomy, and 
individual agency. When social movements seize human rights ideas, 
however, they escape those textual constraints and become something 
else, more responsive to other sets of ideas about gender and justice. There 
is, in other words, a tension between human rights law as a set of doctrines 
and institutions for monitoring and pressuring governments and human 
rights as an idea mobilized in social movements. 
 
 Multiple re-shapings and re-writings of feminist meanings and practices occur as 
human rights norms in different movement settings are developed and applied (Levitt and 
Merry 2008; Sharify-Funk 2008).  
Universalism vs. Particularism 
 Often, public debate over the relevancy of international human rights norms in the 
domestic context revolves around notions of universality versus particularization, also 
described as cultural relativism. Those taking a universalist position believe that universal 
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human rights principles should be codified into law and serve as the standard across 
cultures, despite the secular (and paradoxically particular) mechanism for codifying these 
international human rights into law. On the other hand, the relativist or particularist 
position asserts that there is not one dominant and universal human rights framework due 
to the immense amount of diversity that exists in the practice and codification of law 
across the world.   
 The particularist perspective is often invoked by nation-states in which Islam is 
the explicit state religion as well as by Conservative or Islamist groups as a way to 
circumvent universal human rights. This position feeds off of stereotypes relating to 
conflict between the “East and West” and the “secular versus religious” (Baderin 2005). 
States often take an adversarial position by highlighting fundamental incompatibilities 
and conflicts between Islam and human rights (Baderin 2007). This is evidenced by 
MENA states’ tendency to place reservations on human rights declaration, excepting 
them from following all articles. Another indication of this conflict is the Cairo 
Declaration, which was created as an alternative form of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1990 by a group of Arab states. The Cairo Declaration 
highlights religious law, sharia, as the basis for all human rights.  
 Levitt and Merry (2008) suggest that hybridization of global-local norms can be a 
mechanism for negating the universal and particularistic divide. Since activists localize 
global norms, like human rights discourses, by piecing together resonant global 
discourses and melding them with local norms, they are no longer “foreign” or 
“imported,” but rather localized cultural discourses.  
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Diverse Feminist Positions on Law Reform in the MENA  
 The secular-religious nature of different Muslim identities is stereotyped in the 
popular media, scholarly texts, and within Muslim and Western nation states. The public 
debate often focuses on the tensions between these two categories and their seemingly 
oppositional ideological positions. Muslims themselves may often feel pulled between 
modernity and secularism and traditionalism and religiosity (Sharify-Funk 2008). 
However, as Meena Sharify-Funk (2008) points out there are multiple overlapping 
identities that variably shape individuals’ positionings. Sharify-Funk (2008:67) describes 
the “transnational dialogue” involved in negotiating Muslim identity, which includes 
spectrums of modernity and traditionalism, bisecting with spheres of religiosity and 
secularism. How these four spheres interact and are negotiated produces different 
permutations of identity; no one is fully determined by one sphere of influence. 
Moreover, these identities are constantly in flux and are shaped by broader transnational 
interactions. Fatima Mernissi (1987:ix) in Beyond the Veil highlights the tension between 
modernism and traditionalism:  
The fact of women’s liberation is directly linked to the political and 
economic conflicts which are tearing apart modern Muslim societies. 
Every political setback generates a new necessity to liberate all the forces 
for development in Islamic nations. But, paradoxically, every political 
setback inflicted by infidels generates an antithetical necessity to re-affirm 
the traditional Islamic nature of these societies as well. In a single blow, 
both the forces for modernity and the forces for tradition are unleashed, 
and they then confront each other with dramatic consequences for the 
relation of the sexes. 
 
Given these conflicts described by Mernissi, the legality of Personal Status Code 
reforms are particularly contentious and can be partially linked to colonial projects of 
secularizing Muslim legal systems  (An-Na’im 2002; Kandiyoti 1991; Mir-Hosseini 
2000; Sonbol 2003a). The legacy of colonialism carries over in current arguments, 
21 
 
particularly through the claim of cultural authenticity.  The notion of cultural authenticity 
has been discussed in depth by Deniz Kandiyoti (1991), who highlights the way in which 
Western colonial projects in Muslim societies created tensions around family and cultural 
values, specifically those relating to women. Colonial efforts to modernize and liberate 
women in the MENA were seen as attempts to dominate local populations and to erase 
cultural traditions and histories. The one area in which religious law continued after 
colonialism was through the Personal Status Code (Sonbol 2003a). Modern social change 
approaches that draw from discourses of gender equality and the need to reform Personal 
Status Codes is perceived by religious conservatives and traditionalists as culturally 
imperialist projects.  The notion of cultural authenticity continues to have strength today 
and feminist activists working toward Personal Status Code reform must address this 
contentious discursive arena.  
   Sometimes for purposes of identity politics, or in the scholar’s case for analysis, 
distinct feminist demarcations are made (Badran 1999). Three of the most prominent 
identities recognized include: secular, Islamist, and Islamic feminists.18 Secular feminists 
argue that nonreligious sources, including nationalist or modernist discourses that 
highlight the role of international human rights or democratic principles, should form a 
discursive strategy for arguing for social change (Badran 2005). On the other hand, 
Islamist feminists believe that conservative interpretations of Islamic law appropriately 
govern women’s rights (Christiansen 2003). Moghadam (2003:165) notes that Islamist 
feminists “… staunchly defend the veil as liberation from a preoccupation with beauty, 
call for the education of women in order that they be more competent in raising 
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 Although, it is important to note a wide spectrum of positions within each identity configuration ranging 
from liberal, center, conservative to fundamentalist. 
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‘committed Muslims,’ and argue that Shari’a and women’s emancipation are 
compatible.” Often, these feminists see Western ideology as oppressing women and focus 
on the body and education as sites to seek and achieve gender equality (Karam 1997). 
The broader Islamist goal is to instate a form of political Islam. Finally, Islamic feminism 
has been referred to as the “third way:” a modern approach combining universal and 
humanistic ethics with the humanitarian ideals of Islam.19 Islamic feminists look to the 
Quran as the ultimate source of equality (Badran 2005). They argue that there have been 
misinterpretations of women’s rights that are a result of patriarchy. They argue for a re-
reading of the Quran and religious texts and for ijtihad (the process of making an 
independent jurisprudent decision on the religious interpretation of Islamic law). This 
position is unique because typically the right to ijtihad can only be invoked by religious 
scholars.20  Yet, Islamic feminists claim that ijtihad can be used by lay people, i.e., see 
Wadud’s 1999 gender reading of the Quran.    
 While the use of these identifying terms is prominent in scholarly work, their 
demarcation has garnered considerable academic and activist debate (Abou-Bakr 2001; 
Ahmed 1992; Sharify-Funk 2008; Tohidi 2002). Many activists, including those 
interviewed for this study, reject these divisions. Scholars acknowledge that secular-
Islamist feminist demarcations may merely serve heuristic and analytic purposes (Badran 
2005).  Other prominent feminist voices have been arguing for more nuance in describing 
women’s rights in Muslim-majority countries (Ahmed 1992; al-Hibri 1999; Moghadam 
2002; 2005; Sharify-Funk 2008; Tohidi 2002). Azizah al-Hibri (1999) argues that many 
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 For a more detailed social and historical analysis of the foundations of the secular and Islamic feminist 
movements, see Margot Badran (2005). 
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 The “gates to ijtihad” were closed in Sunni fiqh (rules) in the 10th century. So these are provocative 
claims, which are discussed in more detail in later chapters. In comparison, in Shia Islam, the “gates to 
ijtihad” were never closed. 
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activists in the MENA are developing strategies that aim to democratize reform processes 
within an Islamic law framework, drawing from tenets within the religion and the broader 
international policy spheres. As such, these feminist positions are neither Western nor 
secular in nature. Mehrangiz Kar (as cited in Moghadam 2002:1147) reiterates the 
importance of not demarcating feminist claims based on a secular/religious divide: 
“reformist or women-centered interpretation of religious laws should be considered not as 
an alternative to secular and democratic demands but as a component of more holistic 
social change.” Moreover as Meena Sharify-Funk (2008:117) details in her work on 
transnational networks and Muslim women: “…Islamic discourse is not an inevitably 
conservative factor in the politics of their societies. By seeking to ‘rediscover’ Islamic 
texts and contexts, would-be reformers can establish social and political legitimacy 
through utilization of culturally appropriate vocabulary and values.” Indeed, many 
MENA feminist activists, both secular and religious, aim to demonstrate that women’s 
equal rights can be achieved in a Muslim society through Islamic law (Esposito and 
Delong Bas 2001; Lemrini 2005:Personal Interview (PI)).  
Certain women’s rights NGOs respond to the reform challenge by adapting and 
localizing human rights discourses to their context (DeFeyter 2006; Levitt and Merry 
2008), at times, drawing from religious traditions and socio-historical legacies of equality 
within their region. Diane Singerman (2005) has studied the strategies associated with an 
Egyptian women’s coalition’s goal to reform divorce laws in 2000. Singerman 
(2005:167) describes the coalition’s discursive strategy to reform the Personal Status Law 
article on divorce:  
Their position was simple: in Egypt, tradition and custom are stronger than 
religion, and a patriarchal Islamic tradition has deprived women of the 
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protections and rights that Islamic law is supposed to give them. The 
coalition argued that Personal Status Law has already been distorted by 
secular, customary, Western, and Ottoman influences and that Muslim 
women should reexamine the historical record of this body of law and 
restore the rights that Islam really affords them.   
 
    The coalition was successful in initiating reform; although, it was a negotiated 
reform at a price. A woman could initiate a no-fault divorce (khul) in exchange for 
releasing the husband of his duty to provide financial support and her rights to the 
deferred dowry. However, the Personal Status Law reform demonstrates how the 
coalition “turned religion into an asset, rather than a liability, beating the religious 
traditionalists at their own game while engaging in civil, legal, rightful collective action 
that was acceptable within the constrained space of illiberal rule in Egypt” (Singerman 
2005:165).  
 As noted, the strategy of reinterpreting Islamic law—ijtihad, is shared by other 
reformist activists in the MENA. These strategies can be very important legal resources 
to draw from in constrained movement contexts where the debate is shaped by religious 
ideology and politicized identities. Moreover, the process of religious interpretation can 
be used as an argumentative tool to uphold norms of gender equality and justice as they 
appear in the Quran (Mashour 2005). While secular and religious strategies for legal 
reform in the MENA can be used distinctively, this study aims to complicate this divide 
and explore more complex processes of adapting and vernacularizing global and local 
discourses.  
The Structure of the Dissertation  
The dissertation is divided into two substantive sections focusing on resources 
and reforms in globalized movement contexts. The resource section focuses on the bi-
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directional influence of international funding on women’s rights discourses and strategies 
for gender equality and social change. The reform section explores the interactive role of 
legal and political contexts in shaping global-local discourses and strategies in the 
Personal Status Code and the secular Nationality Code reforms in Morocco.  These two 
aspects of NGO advocacy are complementary as they reveal how MENA activists must 
be fluent in translating resonant messages for social change and gender equality across 
multiple spheres, not only the domestic context. 
Chapter 1 has introduced the main research questions and themes that guide the 
dissertation. Particular focus has been placed on the interactions between social 
movement theories and the law. I provided an overview of Islamic and secular law in the 
MENA region and highlighted a range of feminist approaches to arguing for changes in 
women’s equality and status.   
International Resources and NGO Strategy 
This section analyzes the way that international funding resources present both 
opportunities and challenges to local advocacy and campaign efforts in the MENA. I 
introduce the main discursive themes that run throughout the dissertation, with a 
particular focus on global human rights, democracy, empowerment, and gender equality 
discourses.  
 In “Chapter 2: Human Rights Discourses in the NGO and International Funding 
Spheres: Areas of Coalescence and Convergence,” I explore the different means by 
which a sample of MENA women’s NGOs articulate and communicate their strategies 
for gender equality and social change to funders and vice versa. I content code the 
mission and vision statements of the top 17 international funders to women’s rights in the 
MENA and 11 MENA NGOs in the WLP Partnership. The analysis reveals the shared 
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importance of human rights and gender equality frameworks for both funders and NGOs 
in the sample. The coalescence of these discourses for change is striking. But for NGOs, 
an additional layer remains of the upmost importance— relating the human rights 
discourse to the local setting in a culturally authentic manner. In order to bring to life 
diverse modes of discourse localization, I highlight a locally-developed curriculum, 
Claiming Our Rights: A Manual for Human Rights Education in Muslim Societies, to 
explore connections between Islamic texts and human rights. 
 In “Chapter 3:‘Transnational Funding Reversed:’ An Analysis of Funding Power 
in Women’s Rights NGOs in the MENA,” I analyze spaces of power and agency that 
exist between NGOs in the WLP Partnership and their international funding 
organizations. Using fieldwork and interview data, I explore the major enabling and 
constraining aspects of seeking international funds. Specifically, I investigate how 
activists strategize to retain power and agency in imbalanced funding relationships. I 
show how the MENA NGOs in the sample employ a variety of strategies to actively 
engage with, resist, and educate international funders in the development community.  I 
also aim to complicate and challenge the notion of funders’ power by highlighting 
women’s rights NGOs’ agency and involvement in the funding and development process.  
NGO Legislative Reforms Efforts: Bridging the Global and the Local 
This section explores two cases of legislative reform, attending to the varying 
influences of the global and local spheres on activists’ creation of culturally resonant 
mobilization strategies.   
 In “Chapter 4: Bridging Discourses: Moroccan Women’s Rights Activists 
Framing the Necessity of Islamic Family Law Reform,” I analyze the strategic and 
adaptive framing efforts of the Moroccan women’s rights movement campaign to reform 
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the Moudawana from 1999-2004. The chapter is grounded in an examination of the 
Moroccan social and political context, with a particular focus on the historical 
development of the Moudawana and the women’s movement.  The conservative religious 
and Islamist opposition was very successful in framing reformist activists as cultural 
outsiders. In order to overcome this significant constraint, activists crafted messages that 
supported the cultural authenticity and integrity of the feminist movement, while also re-
appropriating constraining local discourses. The activists drew from multiple discourses, 
such as democracy, feminism, human rights, and religious principles in arguing for 
Moudawana reform. The diverse framing strategies crafted by Moroccan activists to 
bridge differences in ideological positions offers compelling theoretical and activist 
lessons. This case exemplifies the type of global and local discursive negotiations that 
occur in the process of vernacularization, as well as highlights the development of 
context-specific mobilization strategies.  
  In “Chapter 5: Beyond the Local: Cross-Regional Strategizing and Coalition 
Building for Nationality Reform,” I explore the Campaign to Reform Arab Women’s 
Nationality (CRAWN).  I analyze issues of regional strategy and discourse development 
and implementation. I profile a multi-lateral partnership and knowledge exchange 
between Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), Women’s Learning 
Partnership (WLP), and Collective for Research and Development-Action (CRTDA). I 
assess the variety of local, regional, and international forms of transnational collaboration 
that have occurred from 2001-2008. From the case analysis, I highlight the importance of 
a movement’s adaptive reactions to radically shifting global and local conditions. I also 
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spotlight processes of innovative movement learning and cross-fertilization that occur 
transnationally between NGOs.  
 “Chapter 6: New Paths and Resources for Transnational Movement Building” 
integrates the findings of the dissertation. I pay particular attention to the adaptive 
functions of NGO strategy and its links to movement learning and strengthening. I 
highlight the diverse ways that the legal sphere can stimulate the formulation of 
politicized identities for movement mobilization. This can be important for activists 
particularly if the goal is to reduce ideological factionalism. I conclude by summarizing 
important points and propositions gained from the findings that contribute to movement 
building theory and practice.   
Limitations of the Study  
 It is important to acknowledge that I am not an Islamic legal scholar and do not 
speak Arabic. Yet, throughout my many years of fieldwork and collaboration with 
scholars in the MENA and with Muslim feminist activists, I have gained knowledge of 
important Islamic concepts, particularly as they relate to Islamic family law.  I use the 
Anglicized transcription of Arabic terms, except in cases where I am quoting individuals 
who use a different form. I use the French translation of Moudawana instead of the 
Arabic Mudawwana, as the primary texts I read were in English and French.  
The dissertation of course has other limitations. Primarily, I am studying the 
framing efforts of one transnational women’s rights network and in particular, three 
specific NGOs in the USA, Morocco, and Lebanon. Due to the limited sample size, 
generalizations about organizing in transnational settings cannot be made to other 
organizations across the MENA women’s movement. Moreover, in the reform section of 
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the dissertation, I primarily focus on organizing through the lens of ADFM. I assess 
ADFM’s discursive negotiations and networking strategies as they encountered various 
constraints and opportunities in the political setting. While, the Moroccan political and 
legal context differs from secular societies, in no way should their case be 
exceptionalized.21  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Framing contests involving religious discourses occur in contexts across the world and are by no means 
limited to the MENA region. This is most clearly evidenced by the primacy of religion in relation to 
women’s reproductive rights.  For example, many Latin American countries have outlawed abortion due to 
the strong influence of the Catholic Church. On the extreme end of the spectrum, in 2008 Nicaragua 
outlawed abortion in all cases even to save the mother’s life.  Reproductive rights’ activists in the United 
States also respond to well-organized religious frames as the conservative right mobilizes Christian values 
to promote a pro-life stance. These examples reveal the universal importance of studies that focus on how 
religious argumentation becomes politicized and applied to women’s rights issues across the globe. 
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Chapter 2:  Human Rights Discourses in the NGO and International Funding 
Spheres: Areas of Coalescence and Convergence 
 
 This chapter explores how Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) women’s 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) articulate and communicate their strategies for 
change. These strategies are analyzed in relation to the broader international development 
community, in particular funders. The international funding sphere is important to 
analyze as interactions in this sphere diversely impact local level reforms; moreover, 
interactions between NGOs and funders are often understudied. To that end, I aim to 
show spaces of connection and disconnection between feminist NGOs’ and international 
funders’ discourses of social change. I am particularly interested in the predominant use 
of human rights discourses, in seeing how rights discourses are differentially addressed in 
the public presentation of mission, and in understanding how rights language is adapted 
to local NGO contexts. There are three main goals of the chapter: (1) to contextualize the 
international funding contexts in which women’s rights NGOs in the MENA work; (2) to 
highlight the main philosophies of social change from an international funder and 
women’s rights NGO perspective, particularly attending to human rights and 
empowerment approaches; and (3) to present examples of how global discourses, such as 
human rights and Islam, get adapted to local settings by MENA NGOs.  
In order to achieve these goals, I draw from a wide range of data sources 
including participant observation, interview and archival data in order to explore the 
opportunities and constraints in the international funding context.22 Specifically, I analyze 
a sample of MENA NGO (n=11) and international funder (n=17) mission and vision 
statements to identify the main social change philosophies being used respectively by 
                                                 
22
 For more detailed information on the methods, see pp. 204-206 in Appendix 1. 
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each group.23 I also use interview data with prominent activists in the WLP Partnership, 
participant observation of three international women’s rights meetings from 2006 - 2008, 
and textual analysis of a core human rights curriculum that the WLP Partnership uses, 
Claiming Our Rights: A Manual for Human Rights Education in Muslim Societies to 
explore discourse localization and vernacularization.  
The Funding Context in the MENA 
 This analysis comes at a unique historical moment when the international funding 
landscape for women’s rights work is shifting. In the past several years, research has 
demonstrated that funding for international women’s rights work is decreasing (Clark, 
Sprenger, VeneKlasen, Durán, and Kerr 2006). Overall, it appears that these decreases 
are due to shifting international priorities, which include the integration of gender issues 
into broader policy agendas along with increased pressure to show measurable forms of 
organizational impact (Clark et al. 2006). Accountability pressures have intensified since 
March 2005 with the signature of the Paris Declaration, which created an explicit 
foundation for managing aid relationships with a strong focus on measurable outcome 
management.24  
 In the MENA there are additional funding pressures.  At the domestic level, many 
states have passed legislation that restricts external funding from being accepted in the 
                                                 
23
 The women’s rights NGOs in the sample are members of the WLP Partnership as described in Chapter 1. 
I selected the funding sample by drawing from a list of the top 20 global funders in the MENA region 
found in a recent report by Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) (Clark et al. 2006). 
The funding organizations included in the sample are The European Commission, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), United Nations 
Population fund (UNFPA), European Youth Foundation, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),  
United Nation’s Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Open Society Institute (OSI), Sigrid Rausing 
Trust, Ford Foundation, Oxfam, HIVOS, CORDAID, Heinrich Boll, Equality Now, Global Fund for 
Women (GFW), and Mama Cash. 
24
 For more information on the Paris Declaration see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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nation-state boundaries. In Jordan, the Regulation of Non-profit Companies (No. 
60/2007) law was passed in the fall of 2008. The law restricts foreign funding of NGOs 
and gives the government permission to grant or reject NGOs’ foreign funds. Moreover, 
the law places barriers on free organizing and civil society by allowing ministry officials 
the right to refuse to grant an NGO organizational status. This trend is not only evident in 
Jordan, but is a reality in many other contexts, such as Egypt and Lebanon. Due to these 
domestic challenges, many women’s rights NGOs seek resource support from the 
international development community. 
 However, international funding also carries its own set of advantages and 
constraints.  In the international development community, there are sustained calls for 
drawing from human rights discourses to urge states to focus on increasing women’s 
empowerment and status in politics, the economy, and communities, i.e., Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and Beijing +10. Yet, the very receipt of international funds 
opens MENA women’s rights NGOs up to critical accusations from domestic opponents 
of the Western-backed nature of their agendas. Regardless of the validity of these 
accusations, women’s rights activists in the region often rely on international funding to 
survive and carry out their programs of social change; therefore, they must find ways to 
address issues related to the “cultural authenticity” of their change agendas. This chapter 
explores feminist discourses and programs for social change in relation to the 
international funding community, highlighting the complexities involved with cultural 
adaptation.  
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International Development Frameworks and Women’s Rights 
International funders of women’s social change efforts are part of a global 
development process that has an impact on the social and political developments of 
nation-states and civil society. Due to the influence that development agencies can have 
on domestic settings and, in this case, women’s rights NGOs in the MENA, it is 
important to review the major discursive trends in the development community in the 
recent past. In particular, the New Policy Agenda, stemming from the Reagan and 
Thatcher era of neoliberal politics and economics, moved multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
funding away from states and towards NGOs (Edwards and Hulme 1998). This agenda 
paved the way for the current context where NGOs have service delivery functions and 
contribute to civil society development. From a New Policy Agenda perspective, NGOs 
are thought to bring about more effective policy changes on behalf of marginalized 
populations in comparison to the state (Razavi and Miller 1995). For example, NGOs 
working in sectors such as education, health care, and other social service sectors are seen 
as more accountable and as more cost-effective than public organizations. Another 
important element of the New Policy Agenda is the idea that “good governance,” i.e., 
democratic institutions, underlies a strong economy; thus, we find strong emphasis on 
democratic governance and accountability structures embedded within requirements for 
receiving development aid.   
 In the sphere of women’s development specifically, a prominent discourse 
promoted in the 1970’s was the Women in Development (WID) framework.25 The 
primary focus of this approach was a push for gender equity in the economic, social, and 
political realms. At this time, there was a preference on equity instead of equality agendas 
                                                 
25
 For a detailed socio-historical account of WID and GAD frameworks, see Razavi and Miller (1995) and 
for critiques see Cornwall (2003) and Parpart (2002).  
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as these goals could be justified through economic arguments of efficiency.  For many 
activists, this approach did not sit well, given the excessive economic focus, and their 
critiques led to a more nuanced development approach: Gender and Development (GAD) 
(Razavi and Miller 1995).  The GAD approach highlights the importance of participatory 
development in contrast to top-down policy prescriptions. These changes are reflected by 
the following shift: 
… from a focus on women-specific projects to mainstreaming 
women/gender at the programme and policy level; and more significantly, 
from a reliance on top-down planning to a growing emphasis on bottom-
up or participatory development strategies signifying the growing 
politicization of the development agenda (Razavi and Miller 1995:7).  
 
Eliminating systemic discrimination has been a primary focus of the GAD approach, 
which is addressed through gender mainstreaming,26 human rights, and empowerment 
strategies. In this next section, the human rights and empowerment approaches are 
outlined as they frame important issues throughout the chapter.  
Human Rights Approaches 
 In the early 1990s, the transnational women’s movement selected a new collective 
discourse to be utilized across the globe in arguing against discriminatory norms, 
practices, or laws (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The “women’s rights as human rights” frame 
became a primary global discourse for arguing for national and international policy and 
practice changes. However, mutual agreement on the global frame was not easily 
achieved. Friedman (1999) in her study of “transnationalism reversed,” or the study of 
                                                 
26
 Gender mainstreaming, which development agencies such as the United Nations (UN) employ, is 
defined as “…the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, 
including legislation, policies and programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making 
women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes, in all political, economic and societal spheres so 
that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve 
gender equality (ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2, UN document A/52/3, Chapter IV, par 4).”  
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the impact of national organizations in transnational networks, notes tension leading up to 
the 1995 Beijing conference on women’s rights.  
By 1993-4, women’s united efforts had begun to break down. The nearly 
inevitable tensions in agenda setting, leadership, and resource distribution 
of a now older movement became apparent in the face of an ever 
worsening political and economic situation. ...While a national preparatory 
process for the Beijing conference went forward, some activists were 
disillusioned with the degree to which the process diverted energy and 
resources away from pressing national problems (Friedman 1999:3-4).  
 
 Azza Karam (1997) further highlights some issues of concern to some MENA 
activists during the meetings leading up to the Beijing conference in 1995. At this time, 
the transnational movement was trying to choose between establishing discursive 
strategies based on equity or equality. For many religious activists in Muslim countries, 
focusing on equity was preferred because they felt it highlighted a “pro-family” approach 
and supported women’s different roles in the family, rather than the liberal feminist 
approach to equality (Karam 1997).  
 Despite disagreements, the Platform for Action was created out of the Beijing 
conference, along with the new “women’s rights as human rights” frame (Elahi 1997). 
Tsutsui (2006:335) highlights the effects that these global human rights norms can have 
in broadening a movement.  
Diffusion of global human rights norms has produced common global 
understandings and identities among activists and citizens, enabling them 
to see various human suffering as human rights violations. This shared 
understanding facilitates construction of actorhood among those who were 
resigned to the status quo, encouraging them to engage in activism. Thus 
in addition to propelling existing movements further, global norms give 
rise to new social movements whose goals are in line with global norms.  
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The global “women’s rights as human rights” frame was intended to have multiplicative 
effects, strengthening a fragmented women’s movement and thus, facilitating strategizing 
for gender equality on a global level.  
Empowerment Approaches 
 The Beijing Platform for Action created a more explicit market for funding global 
women’s empowerment work (Moghadam and Senftova 2005). Yet, with the 
mainstreaming of this objective came diverse interpretations of what women’s 
empowerment actually meant. Empowerment has been conceptualized in a variety of 
ways making it hard to consistently measure. Perhaps, the most well known conception 
of empowerment is women’s autonomy and agency. Kabeer (2001:473) captures the 
agentic and institutional dimensions of empowerment: “The expansion in people’s ability 
to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to 
them.”  
 In order to quantify empowerment, global indicators have been developed to 
capture aggregate levels of individual empowerment as well as states’ progress on gender 
equality dimensions, e.g., Gender and Development Index (GDI) developed by the 
UNDP or the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The primary focus in these 
indicators is on the state and its progress toward achieving women’s increased social, 
political, and economic status. These indicators closely align with Moghadam and 
Senftova’s (2005:390) description of empowerment as a “…a multi-dimensional process 
of civil, political, social, economic, and cultural participation and rights.”  
A particularly defining aspect of women’s empowerment is the distinction 
between individual and collective empowerment. Individual empowerment involves the 
realization of agency at the personal level, such as through re-conceptualizing one’s 
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participation or role in the family, community, or political sphere; whereas collective 
empowerment focuses on the re-structuring of norms and regulations at the societal level 
for the benefit of all women and men in a given community or society, thereby providing 
women with the opportunity to access various forms of social power. While neither type 
of empowerment is mutually exclusive, particular social groups may favor a particular 
type of empowerment over another (Afshar 1998).  
 Yet, with so many different ways of describing empowerment, the term risks 
being so nebulous that it captures everything and yet nothing at the same time. Of course 
the vagueness has real implications on NGOs creating programs of empowerment. 
Moreover, some in the development community may take up the term and re-appropriate 
it for their purposes (Cornwall 2007).  Cornwall (2007:1) refers to this as “empowerment-
lite:”  
Talk of “empowering women” turns “power” into a transferable 
commodity rather than a structural relation. “Agency” becomes self-
assertion - taking control of one’s own life, making one’s own decisions - 
through self-actualisation. Making “choices” says less about the capacity 
to determine the parameters of the possible than the possibility of selecting 
the options that development intervention makes available. 
 
 Cornwall’s statement provides an important departure point for this chapter: Even 
though donors and NGOs may draw from similar language or philosophies as pathways 
for achieving gender equitable change, the way in which these discourses are understood, 
utilized, and implemented may greatly vary. The following sections more deeply explore 
prominent discourses used for arguing for social change from a funder and NGO 
perspective, paying particular attention to the cross-national resonance of global norms.   
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International Donors’ Philosophies of Social Change 
Contextualizing Donor Giving 
Overall, development aid organizations disbursed 69 billion USD to issues related 
to international women’s rights in 2003 (Clark et al. 2006). Direct support to NGOs in the 
Global South only consisted of 400 million USD. Of this aid, 17% of funds went to 
NGOs in the MENA, 24% to Sub-Saharan Africa, 22% to Latin and Central America, 
17% to the Asia Pacific, 12% to Eastern and Central Europe, and 12% to North America 
and Western Europe (Kerr 2007). Since 2000, a majority of women’s rights NGOs have 
seen decreasing funds for their work (Kerr 2007). NGO activists attribute this downward 
trend to: shifts in donor agendas and priorities (49%); the political and economic context 
(34%); and less overall funds (22%) (Kerr 2007). 
 In this study’s sample, the majority of funders of women’s rights in the MENA 
were bi-lateral and multi-lateral funders.27 See Table 1 below for an overview of the 
funders in the sample. International NGOs (INGOs) were the second most frequent 
donors followed by private foundations, women’s funds, and individuals. Bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral development agencies offer aid between foreign governments, which are 
then distributed to NGOs.  These types of organizations fund both local initiatives as well 
as deliver their own programs. INGOs are large non-profit development and human rights 
organizations that distribute aid, which has been donated from a variety of sources, 
including governments, foundations, and other organizations. Private foundations are 
                                                 
27
 This sample is composed of 17 international funders derived from AWID’s list of the top 20 funders in 
the MENA in their 2005-2006 ‘Fundher’ study. In my analyses, I only use 17 of the 20 as three donors did 
not meet inclusion criteria: individual donors were not included because they are not organizations; local 
donors were not included as they were too numerous and diverse a group to select a organization that was 
representative; and USAID was not included because most of the WLP partners do not accept funds from 
the US government.  
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those organizations founded by an individual, such as George Soros, Open Society 
Institute. Women’s funds, a relatively new development in philanthropy, represent the 
marriage between funding institutions and social change movements. One of the first 
international women’s funds, Mama Cash, was founded in 1983. These funds aim to 
strategically impact women’s rights and lives in a sustainable manner and are financially 
supported by the public, bi- and multi-lateral agencies, foundations, and international 
NGOs, and corporations.   
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  
Describing Recipients of Funds  
 In order to gain deeper insight into how funders publically frame their relationships 
with NGOs, I conducted an analysis of how funders depict fund recipients by analyzing 
their organizational mission and vision statements. Analyses revealed a spectrum of 
positionings, which ranged from neutral to agentic descriptions of NGOs. There were two 
primary narratives related to NGO agency, those that characterized funding recipients as 
already possessing agency and those that focused on increasing actors’ agency and 
overcoming their lack of power.   
 Three funders, both of the women’s funds and the Ford Foundation, characterize 
funding recipients as explicit agents of change. Mama Cash highlights investing in 
women’s futures as the major narrative. Their vision states:  
Mama Cash strives for a peaceful and just world where women are free to 
make their own choices, develop their talents and skills, and help shape 
the future of our societies. Mama Cash supports pioneering initiatives by 
women worldwide that contribute to strengthening the women's position 
and improving their rights. 
 
 Additionally, Global Fund for Women (GFW) highlights women’s agency and choice.  
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We are part of a global women's movement that is rooted in a commitment 
to justice and an appreciation of the value of women's experience. …We 
believe that women should have a full range of choices, and that women 
themselves know best how to determine their needs and propose solutions 
for lasting change. 
 
 Ford Foundation focuses on grassroots’ innovation, which includes the local 
development of strategies, as well as cross-sectoral and cross-national collaboration. 
We believe that the best way to meet this challenge28 is to encourage 
initiatives by those living and working closest to where problems are 
located; to promote collaboration among the nonprofit, government and 
business sectors; and to ensure participation by men and women from 
diverse communities and all levels of society. 
   
GFW has the only vision statement in the sample that claims a joint feminist identity with 
the funding recipient group. This approach highlights solidarity with the women’s rights 
movement, which is a particularly intriguing development for the funding community.  
  The other form of agentic description was a dynamic “victim to agent” narrative.  
Specifically, Oxfam Novib describes the context and the organization’s aims by starting 
with a victim narrative that shifts as individuals gain their rights. The vision states that 
poverty is caused by economic injustice.  
They [poverty and injustice] are the consequence of the work of people 
and come in all shapes and sizes, although they always affect the weakest 
in society. One thing that applies universally is that people who live in 
poverty scarcely have any say in their lives. 
 
Oxfam then presents their work funding initiatives with a rights-based approach as the 
solution. “Oxfam Novib regards poverty as being equal to a lack of rights. Due to a lack 
of basic rights, people that live in poverty do not have (sufficient) access to power, 
material resources and basic services.” The five areas that Oxfam focuses on are the right 
                                                 
28
 Ford Foundation defines the challenge to “…create political, economic and social systems that promote 
peace, human welfare and the sustainability of the environment…” 
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to: a sustainable existence, basic social services, life and safety, social and political 
participation, and identity. 
 Overwhelmingly, the majority of funders (n=14) characterize NGO recipients 
neutrally, not attending to or reflecting on recipients’ agency. A typical example of a 
neutral approach comes from Cordaid. While the donor highlights the marginalization of 
its recipients, they do not describe recipients as having a subjective, victim or agent 
status. Rather, they describe the social characteristics of the NGOs with whom they work:  
Cordaid chooses to work with poor marginalised groups deprived of 
rights, supporting them and their organisations regardless of their age, 
gender, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, belief or political conviction. 
From Cordaid's perspective, poverty alleviation, society building and 
lobbying are inextricably bound together. Improving living conditions and 
reinforcing society go hand in hand. 
 
It seems that in these cases, there is not an explicit focus on shifting individuals’ agency 
that are marginalized or on building the capacities and strengths of the grassroots; rather, 
focus is placed on improving the context, through the organization, in which poor people 
live.  
 This analysis uncovers some of the implicit power assumptions embedded in 
funder-NGO relationships, particularly given that grassroots’ agency is not addressed by 
the majority of funders. Indeed, the way in which international funders characterize aid 
recipients may be related to the way in which they interact with NGOs, which is an 
explicit focus of the next chapter.  
Approaches to Funding Social Justice and Change 
 This section analyzes the discursive mechanisms that international development 
funders employ to affect change at the domestic, regional, and international levels. These 
results were derived by thematically coding the mission and visions of funders. The three 
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approaches that emerged from the analysis were human rights-based, good governance, 
and empowerment approaches. See Table 2 below for the frequency of funders’ 
approaches. 
 A rights-based approach to change is characterized by its focus on human rights 
and rights-based argumentation as a means for achieving increases in women’s status or 
participation. For example, Equality Now’s mission centers on human rights. “Equality 
Now was founded in 1992 to work for the protection and promotion of the human rights 
of women around the world. Working with national human rights organizations and 
individual activists, Equality Now documents violence and discrimination against women 
and mobilizes international action to support their efforts to stop these human rights 
abuses.” 
 A good governance approach is defined as those funders whose primary focus is 
on aid transfer to less developed nations. The emphasis of aid delivery is on poverty 
reduction, good governance, and on standardized, often internally produced, strategies for 
change. For example, the Canadian Aid Development Agency (CIDA) notes: “The 
purpose of Canada’s Official Development Assistance is to support sustainable 
development in developing countries, in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a 
more secure, equitable, and prosperous world.” 
 An empowerment approach focuses on the empowerment of women through 
education, awareness-raising, participation, decision making, and leadership. UNIFEM’s 
mission highlights empowerment as a central component of their work: “UNIFEM 
promotes women's empowerment and gender equality. It works to ensure the 
participation of women in all levels of development planning and practice...” 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 While these approaches are not mutually exclusive, only five of the funders, 29%, 
use diverse approaches in describing their funding missions. Of the organizations that 
integrate multiple approaches, the European Union (EU) describes its work in terms of 
empowerment and governance approaches; while the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), Heinreich Boll, and 
Open Society Institute (OSI) all pair rights-based and governance approaches to 
achieving gender equality and social change.    
As seen in Table 2 above, the most prominent funding approaches to gender 
equality were rights-based and governance approaches. Both of these approaches focus 
more on the changing of social structures, such as through increased rights, socio-
economic parity and participation, and through democratic governance.  On the other 
hand, the normative dimensions of social change, which take more time to evolve and are 
more difficult to measure, more closely align with empowerment approaches, the least 
likely to be focused on.   
 These approaches to funding gender equality work have differential policy 
implications. Specifically, governance approaches typically prefer solutions that foster 
democratic institutions and public participation. Rights-based approaches tend to focus 
on ensuring the respect of human rights through the lobbying for or the monitoring of 
convention adoption or rights abuses and through broader domestic policy reform. 
Empowerment approaches most often address individual and collective awareness-raising 
efforts through increasing participation in social and political life and transformative 
change. The governance and human rights approaches could easily be conceptualized as 
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attempts to shifting social structures, whereas the empowerment approach typically 
focuses on individual and collective level shifts in norms and attitudes.   
Women’s Rights Organizations’ Philosophies of Social Change 
Contextualizing Women’s Funding in the MENA  
 As referenced, external and internal legislation and political and social 
developments have had a substantial impact on women’s organizing work. The most 
profound funding challenges for the WLP Partnership over the past few years across the 
MENA region have been restrictive domestic legislation, rising fundamentalist groups 
that oppose women’s rights work, and the increasingly restrictive provisions attached to 
funding (WLP 2006b; WLP 2008 a,b). National laws are also having an adverse impact 
on women’s rights NGOs, such as in Jordan and Egypt. In Egypt, Enas Shafei (WLP 
2006b) notes that: “NGOs receive external funding because they don’t have the internal 
resources. But the government doesn’t like that, especially from human rights groups. 
They have successfully shut down human rights NGOs that addressed victims of 
violence, especially those with international connections.” State restrictions on NGO 
funds are also common in times of conflict. In Lebanon, the government severely 
restricted emergency relief funding to NGOs during the July war of 2006. Afghanis and 
Palestinians also have experienced strict limitations on funding during conflict periods 
(WLP 2006b).  
 Above and beyond state limitations, considerable opposition to foreign funding 
stems from local political or religious groups, who perceive external funds as threatening 
to their interests. These cases have occurred in Mauritania, Morocco, and Lebanon. In 
Morocco, during the Moudawana reform campaign, the conservative religious and 
Islamist opposition charged reformist women’s rights activists with being “puppets from 
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the West” since human rights NGOs were taking foreign funds (Lemrini 2006:PI). In 
many cases, NGOs truly have no choice but to accept external funds in order to operate 
due to domestic restrictions. Aminetou Mint El Mokhtar, Executive Director of 
L'Association des Femmes Chefs de Famille (AFCF) in Mauritania, notes that almost all 
fundraising has to be conducted in foreign countries (WLP 2006b). Local donations are 
quite scarce and citizens are barred from donating to women’s rights organizations. 
Therefore, the NGO has to seek resource support from foreign funders.  
However, in the same context, domestic funding for religious organizations 
remains high. Religious and charity organizations primarily provide social services in 
place of the state in the MENA region, which heightens their importance and agendas in 
the community (Abou-Habib, WLP 2006b). Amina Lemrini, Founder of ADFM, notes 
the organizing disadvantages that religious service provision creates for the Moroccan 
women’s movement: “When we organize a demonstration, we get 1,000 women and 
when the religious groups organize a demonstration, they get 20,000 because they 
provide services, free clinics, etc.” Even after gains in equality have been made powerful 
cultural backlashes from the rise of conservative and fundamentalist forces threaten the 
implementation of progress. In Morocco, Nabia Haddouche (WLP 2008a), President of 
ADFM, notes the increasing tendency for women who do not usually wear the head scarf 
to cover when on public transportation or when in more conservative neighborhoods. 
This pressure is a recent social development likely linked to the rising growth of Islamist 
groups after the 2004 Moudawana reform. All of these cultural realities create resource 
and public mobilization disadvantages or feminist movements when mobilizing for social 
change or reform.   
47 
 
 Fundraising in the MENA has also become increasingly politicized since 
September 11. Internationally, the US government passed a new law related to 
international fund disbursement, known as the “terrorist clause.” The United States 
government requires public and private foundations and government agencies to abide by 
the law in which grantees sign a disclosure agreement. However, many NGOs in the 
region are turning away any funds that have conditions placed on it. The impact on local 
women’s rights NGOs in the MENA is extremely significant because the “terrorist 
clause” is being adopted in other funding sectors, such as by private and bi-lateral 
European donors, further limiting potential sources for financial support.  
 These are all significant challenges, which activists in the WLP Partnership 
address using a variety of institutional and non-institutional resources.  These strategies 
for addressing constraints are addressed in latter sections of this chapter and in Chapter 3. 
For now, I shift attention to how NGOs in the MENA frame their missions for social 
change and the way in which they connect or depart from international funders’ agendas.  
NGO Approaches to Social Justice and Change 
 The MENA NGOs in this sample drew most heavily from the empowerment 
approach (n=9). There was also strong support for the human rights (n=6) and democratic 
governance approaches (n=5). See Table 3 for a frequency table of NGO approaches. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 Interestingly, 72.7% or eight of the women’s rights NGOs drew from more than 
one approach when describing their mission. This is a significant contrast from the 29% 
of funders who drew from diverse approaches. Specifically, Mauritanian L'Association 
des Femmes Chefs de Famille (AFCF) uses a human rights-based and empowerment 
framework in describing their work to promote and defend women’s rights, to improve 
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women’s living conditions, and to bring together social classes for a solidarity movement 
for change. Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC), a coalition of Palestinian 
activists and NGOs, work together to increase women’s participation and decision-
making roles in society bringing together the rights-based and democratic governance 
strategies. Finally, Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) grounds 
their strategy in human rights-based and democratic governance strategies. ADFM 
weaves these perspectives to mobilize the grassroots and to lobby for democratic and 
transparent processes of legislative and policy reforms that increase women’s equality in 
the family, community, and politics. Comparisons between NGO and funders’ strategies 
for social change reveal the dynamic attention that NGOs place on reforming both social 
and political structures by drawing from structural and normative empowerment 
strategies.  
Comparing Funders’ and NGOs’ Missions and Visions 
 The comparative analysis of keywords embedded in funder and NGO mission and 
vision statements reveals that human rights and women’s rights are among the top five 
most frequently mentioned keywords in missions.29 Human rights were mentioned by 
35.2% of all funders (n=6) and 54.5 % of all MENA NGOs (n=6) in the sample. See 
Table 4 for a comparison of the frequency and incidence of the top keywords in funder 
and NGO missions. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE  
 Other similarities between the funder and women’s rights NGO analysis include a 
significant focus on women and justice.  However, this is where the similarities diverge 
                                                 
29
 See Appendix 3 for an overview of all of the top keywords mentioned in mission/vision statements of 
both funders and women’s rights NGOs. Keywords included in this table are those that had an incidence 
rate higher than one. 
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into distinct interests. On the funder level, higher priority is given to issues of poverty, 
economics, and democracy. In comparison, NGOs highlight issues of participation, 
decision-making, and local community. Interestingly, if I were to construct a narrative 
based on the top words used by funders and NGOs, it would look like the following. (1) 
NGOs are focusing on women in society and their participation in developing rights’ 
strategies that ensure equitable decision-making power in their communities as they work 
toward social justice. (2) Funders focus on women across the world particularly in 
situations of poverty where they are seeking rights and economic justice.   
 The confluence between funders’ and MENA NGOs’ strategies for framing social 
justice work is not surprising given the two parties’ interactive relationship.30 It is not 
within the scope of this study to suggest a directional or causal argument about why this 
relationship exists. However, one possible explanation for this comes from the world 
polity and neoinstitutionalist approach. This theoretical approach has developed macro-
level theories describing how institutions across the world come to look like each other. 
Central to this process is institutional isomorphism or the replication of existing and 
successful structures of organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Through this lens, 
INGOs are conceptualized as the “enactors and carriers of world culture,” as they situate 
“transnational contextual knowledge” (Boli and Thomas 1997).31 DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) believe that it is not only about the diffusion of global norms and organizational 
models, but about coercive isomorphism, or the tendency for organizations to adopt 
norms and practices of a powerful organization since they depend on their resource 
                                                 
30
 Findings are not generalizable based on the small sample size, however these intriguing findings warrant 
greater attention and analysis. 
31
 Boli and Thomas (1997) argue that INGOs interests are constitutive of collective global interests and that 
specific strategies are enacted to achieve distinct and rationalized goals, similar to that of the resource 
mobilization theorists (McCarthy and Zald 1977). 
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support. Yet, this perspective asymmetrically represents the global community’s impact 
on NGO strategy since NGOs shape the discourses of the funding sphere as well. To date, 
this line of research is largely understudied, with a few exceptions (see Friedman 1999; 
Ostrander 2004; Ostrander, Silver, and McCarthy 2005). The next chapter focuses 
precisely on these issues and on NGO strategies for building collective power and agency 
in the funding process.  However, even amongst these global polity descriptions, the 
findings from the mission and vision analysis have showed the multifaceted nature of 
NGO’s public presentation of their social change agendas.   
Human Rights, Islam, and Feminism: Linking the Global and Local  
 The difference in the ways that NGOs layer, connect, and frame their missions in 
relation to funders may point to local NGOs’ complex attunement to both local and 
international realities. The distinction is likely considering that unique socio-cultural 
norms and practices may constrain or augment public support of their work. In many 
cases, discourses used with funders may not match traditional or modern ideologies, 
practices, and beliefs on the ground. For these reasons, NGOs diversely frame social 
change for women’s equality to accommodate the local context.  
Adaptations of Human Rights and Empowerment 
 The Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI) in Jordan provides an example of the 
way that language can be adapted to a particular context. The NGO draws from elements 
common in an empowerment approach, including the building of agency, but SIGI Jordan 
never uses the word “empowerment” outright in their public mission. In this case, the 
omission of the word empowerment and a strategic re-framing of the issues as agency 
and skill building are used to more fully resonate with public values in their context. 
The SIGI Jordan mission describes the following organizational goals:  
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The promotion of women's rights; the elimination of all kinds of 
discrimination and violence against women; to provide protection, support 
and solidarity among women, the development of women's abilities, skills 
and knowledge strengthening their abilities to acquire knowledge and 
various skills, provide opportunities for women to improve their skills, and 
particularly to enable women to identify their needs, know, claim, defend 
and protect their rights, to encourage women to participate in the decision 
making within the family and the community through the achievement of 
justice and equality as well as increasing women's participation in civil 
and political life. 
 
 These strategic framings do not only relate to the NGO mission, but more 
importantly are relevant on the ground when implementing programs and campaigns for 
women’s empowerment and gender equality. In a campaign to ensure that women did not 
lose their nationality if they married a foreigner, activists in Collective for Research and 
Training on Development Action (CRTDA), along with a regional coalition of MENA 
activists, developed a frame that would highlight the law reform’s impact on the family. 
The slogan “Nationality: A Right for Me and My Family” aims to reframe the debate in 
terms of the collective family unit and moves away from a sole focus on women’s 
equality, which could prove to be more contentious.32   
Of course, using explicit human rights language in certain contexts becomes 
complicated due to the way that countermovements link human rights with the Western 
world. Activists also may be cautious in situations where human rights discourse has 
been exploited by a state, which uses the language, but does not apply it (WLP 2006b). 
Rose Shomali, Executive Director of Women’s Affair Technical Committee (WATC) in 
Palestine, reflects on rights discourse in her contexts: “One thing that hurt the woman’s 
movement was that when we talked about human rights, we seemed to be linking 
ourselves with the powerful, not those oppressed or occupied” (WLP 2006b). The choice 
                                                 
32
 The Nationality reform is explored in more depth in Chapter 5. 
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of how a movement will define their social change agenda becomes increasingly 
intertwined with the socio-political structure and local cultural specificities.  
 As such, various civil society actors have staked out different positions on the 
domestication of human rights and have taken liberty in particularizing to different 
degrees: ranging from co-opting human rights in favor of Islamic law to localizing human 
rights principles within the history and culture. Recep Senturk (2005) argues that cultures 
that value universalism, regardless of their secular or religious nature, should agree on 
securing the ‘inviolability’ of human beings’ rights. Moreover, Senturk (2005:2-3) 
suggests there are “various universalisms emanating from different cultures...There are in 
the world multiple discourses to talk about human rights and multiple grounds to justify 
human rights, reflecting the diversity of cultures on the globe.”   
 This multivocal approach to human rights is used by the WLP Partnership in 
order to bridge global norms with the local context. The MENA NGOs and activists in 
this sample have responded to local tensions and charges that human rights and Islam are 
incompatible, by adapting human rights language. Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI), President 
of WLP and Coordinator of the WLP Partnership, highlights their unique working 
strategy across the transnational network:  
Generally what we have come to realize is our deep commitment to 
universal rights. That is, people have rights as individuals because they’re 
individual human beings and not because they are Moroccan, Muslim or 
Lebanese, black or white, or women or men—so the universality of rights 
with no conditions.  However, we also fully understand that people have 
different contexts.  They have different histories.  They are at different 
levels of exposure to change and they see things differently given the 
period in history. So, we have come to the idea of universality of rights, 
but with contextual implementations. What priorities are chosen at the 
ground level and the grassroots are totally up to the individuals who are 
going to be working on these issues.  So, the cultural, socioeconomic, and 
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historical context impacts the prioritization of issues and the way in which 
implementation takes place.    
 
This notion of universality with diverse local applications was particularly useful 
in Morocco during the Moudawana reform process.  Amina Lemrini (2006:PI), Founder 
of ADFM, notes:  
Culture is not static, it is dynamic. We need to look for what is positive 
and not forget what is negative. Freedom, dignity, rights are universal 
because they fit all people. What is special is how they are applied. I have 
to look for strategies to secure the delivery of these values to all 
Moroccans…Our goal was to make men and women equal in terms of the 
family. If we were in Sweden, we would have chosen a different 
strategy…We looked for the best in the local context, but appealed to 
universal elements. 
 
Just as human rights discourses can be adapted and changed depending on 
context, activists in the WLP Partnership highlighted the importance of recognizing the 
adaptability and the mutability of cultural practices over time, for better or for worse 
(WLP 2006b; WLP 2008a,b). Asma Khader (WLP 2006b), Founder of Sisterhood is 
Global Institute (SIGI) Jordan and former Minister of State and Government 
Spokesperson for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, describes how Jordanian cultural 
and economic circumstances radically shifted the perception of women’s roles and rights 
from the 1970s to the 1990s. In the 1970’s, Jordanian women began entering the paid 
labor force. At the time, the national discussion was positive and there were no allusions 
to women’s work damaging the family. However, after the Gulf Crisis in the 1990s, 
unemployment significantly increased after an influx of Jordanians returned home. Given 
the economic situation, a cultural backlash against women’s work occurred, resulting in 
societal pressure on women to stay at home. Khader emphasized: “Traditions and 
cultures will change when we [women] become a political power.” This example 
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demonstrates how economics are interlaced with social and political power and how 
different environmental influences can elicit cultural norm shifts, further entrenching 
inequalities, regardless of past steps toward gender equality.  
Feminism and Islam 
The rejection of religious-secular binaries in describing women’s rights work is 
indicative of a broader trend for many activists and scholars across the MENA. Many 
activists see the term Islamic feminism as constructed by Western or non-Muslim 
feminists, such as Rita Cook, Margot Badran, and Miriam Cooke, and as essentializing 
their faith and commitment to women’s rights and not representing their diverse 
platforms (Abou Bakr 2001; Tohidi 2002). Nayereh Tohidi (2002:1) reiterates the 
potential pitfalls of this potentially divisive label cautioning: “To view Islamic feminism 
as the only or the most “authentic” path for emancipation of Muslim women may also 
imply a sort of orientalistic or essentialistic Islamic determinism manifested also in the 
views of those who see Islam either as the primary cause of women’s subordination or as 
the only path for women’s emancipation.” Instead, Tohidi (2002) calls for more nuance 
as reinforcing a split between secular or Islamic feminist positions may only serve to 
further splinter diverse women’s rights activists groups. 
Mahnaz Afkhami (WLP 2008a) explains the consequences of the particularization 
of feminisms, such Western or Islamic feminism, and explores the possibilities for 
moving beyond identity politics in the feminist movement: 
There was a time when feminism was defined as purely Western and all 
those who sought rights for women were presented with a definition and a 
set of strategies for action that came from a Western context. Gradually, 
identity issues gained prevalence and groups defined themselves in 
narrower, more specific terms. Now there is the danger that a movement 
that has splintered into hundreds of sub-categories lacks a shared vision, 
which is one of the main requirements for creation of a strong movement. 
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We feel it is time to reassert the common goal of our struggle. What better 
articulation of that common goal than the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that has been accepted and held up—at least as aspiration—by 
every nation on earth. However, prioritization of the various rights and 
design of strategies for implementing those rights will doubtless be 
dictated by the conditions on the ground and by the choice and will of the 
women who are living the reality of their socio-economic and cultural 
context and must operate within that context.  
 
 Amina Lemrini (WLP 2006b) reiterates the need not to distinguish feminisms; 
instead, she focuses on strategically analyzing pathways for achieving change:  
I don’t want to talk about Islamic feminism. What is that? Let’s bring 
together these women activists who have achieved positions of power and 
talk about their strengths and challenges. Let’s talk about these women 
activists who are in power in order to plan for the future. We can have a 
bigger role to play if we approach our movement as political. 
 
Others in the WLP Partnership choose not to use the term feminist at all due to the 
reaction it produces in their local context. Asma Khader notes that SIGI Jordan uses 
words such as “women’s issues,” “women’s rights,” and “women’s movement” rather 
than feminism, and “reforming,” “amending,” “developing” when talking about change. 
This cultural adaptation of language facilitates SIGI Jordan’s work, which helps in 
“avoiding some confrontations which are not necessary” (WLP 2006b).  
Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI) further contextualizes the feminism and religion 
debate by adding a third dimension to discussions that are typically concerned with the 
secular and religious positionings described in Chapter 1, e.g., Islamic, Islamist, Muslim, 
and secular feminists.  Instead of having the starting point for explaining a feminist 
position be the secular and modern nature of the movement or the religious framework, 
the WLP network highlights individual choice and agency as the catalyst for achieving 
gender equality: Women as free and equal human beings are the architects of gender 
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equality, selecting the most relevant secular or religious principles for strategy 
development according to their unique beliefs, value systems, and contexts.33  
Since the WLP Partnership is a unique transnational feminist network made up of 
multiple faiths, nationalities, and backgrounds, activists join together and find common 
goals and strategies in the pursuit of gender equality. Given the diversity, particularly in 
the different religious schools and sects represented in the network, selecting one school 
over another would be anti-democratic and not account for the collective’s beliefs and 
practices.  Indeed, the realities of organizing within such a network that bridges religious, 
nationality, and ethnic divides necessitates a broad range of strategies.  
Afkhami (2009:PI) carefully describes the position of the WLP Partnership 
position on religion and feminism, using the example of Islamic law. She argues that a 
feminism that is entirely reliant upon religion will not be the most productive channel for 
achieving gender equality because of the patriarchal foundations on which it was based 
and due to the realities of modern living.  
If you are confined within Islamic law, there is a historical epistemological 
process by which Islam has been interpreted and practiced. And no matter 
how wonderfully knowledgeable feminists are in this interpretation, there 
are pieces of it which are going to be very difficult to explain in feminist 
terminology, and it's going to be very difficult to confront the 
interpretations of traditionally, more qualified interpreters that are within 
the epistemological hierarchy of Islam… It's extremely valuable to have 
modern interpretations and to have new interpretations. And it's true that 
originally texts were more egalitarian than the later interpretations… In all 
religions, patriarchal aspects have pushed back the original intent of the 
text. So in that sense it helps a lot to get new ideas and interpretations, but 
in reality, feminism, democracy, human rights are concepts which are 
relatively new –Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI). 
 
                                                 
33
 See Appendix 1 pp. 202-204 for a description of the WLP Partnership’s hallmark participatory leadership 
training program, which helps strengthen women’s agency and capacity.  
57 
 
However, Afkhami (2009:PI) also stresses that religious strategies can be very effective 
resources for mobilizing change. 
There is a nuance that is very important: we want to have religion valued 
and respected and also brought in to support our cause of equality as there 
are a lot of positive and important resources within religion that can help 
us. However, we don't want to imprison ourselves within the text of any 
religion because we want to leave societies open to people of different 
faiths, to respect other people's faith, and we don't want to have this 
ongoing war with the epistemological [and religious interpretive] process 
that is a historical reality. 
 
   Since feminism is based on the equality of all human beings, any Islamic text 
that illuminates principles of equality and the spirit of justice can be used as resources in 
the quest for feminist social change (Afkhami 2009:PI; Lemrini 2005:PI; Naciri 2007:PI). 
Reinterpreted texts from the Quran, hadith, or Bible are useful strategies to draw upon in 
certain contexts and circumstances. 
In order to gain greater insight into how the WLP Partnership translates their 
philosophy of agentic feminist practice to the individual level, the next section describes 
a grassroots’ education curriculum, Claiming Our Rights: A Manual for Women’s Human 
Rights Education in Muslim Societies (hereafter referred to as Claiming Our Rights). 
Mahnaz Afkhami and Haleh Vaziri developed the empowerment program as a model for 
exploring women’s rights from Islamic and human rights perspectives.  
Contextualizing Human Rights and Religion: Claiming Our Rights 
Claiming Our Rights was written in 1996 at Sisterhood Is Global Institute (SIGI), 
where Mahnaz Afkhami was the Executive Director at the time. The interactive and 
dialogic human rights training program was created through extensive collaborations and 
feedback from prominent Muslim feminist activists, writers, and scholars, such as Fatima 
Mernissi and Nawal Saadawi. Claiming Our Rights explores the connections between 
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human rights and Islamic texts in order to make the largely inaccessible language of 
universal human rights relevant to grassroots, Muslim communities’ lives. The 
empowerment program has been translated into eleven languages, e.g., Arabic, Azeri, 
Bangla, English, French, Hindi, Malay, Persian, Russian, Urdu and Uzbek. 
Claiming Our Rights offers interactive and discussion-based scenarios for 
Muslims to explore gender equality within the family and the broader community. 
Drawing from international human rights declarations dating back to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and founded upon the ideas set forth in the Beijing 
Conference in 1995, the manual covers issues such as a women’s consent to marry, 
women’s rights and responsibilities in the family, opposing forms of domestic violence 
and other forms of violence against women, equality in faith education, women’s right to 
employment and fair wages, women’s right to privacy, religion, and free expression, 
rights during times of conflict, right to political participation and organizing, and the 
universality of human rights. The manual concludes by detailing important resources 
related to gender norms and equality from the Quran, hadith, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, CEDAW, and provides contact information for global human rights and 
women’s rights NGOs.  
Afkhami and Vaziri (1996:3) recognize that:  
Many Muslims believe that Islam contains the essentials of human rights 
and that its content, as God’s revelation, is superior to ordinary law. 
Consequently, human rights documents must be presented in dialogue 
with Islamic tenets if they are to succeed in Muslim societies…A central 
premise of the human rights education model presented here is that 
universal human rights are consonant with the spirit of Islam.   
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Thus, the goals are to help raise individuals’ understanding of the equality of women and 
men and to show the Quran, hadith, and sunnah all provide substantial support for this 
claim. The authors (1996:3-4) set the stage for Muslim women’s analysis of key religious 
and human rights texts by distinguishing between god-given sharia and the fiqh. The 
authors describe how the fiqh have been developed through the Islamic jurisprudent 
process of human interpretation, thus, revealing the man-made nature of the law as 
opposed to the god-given sharia. Given this distinction, Afkhami and Vaziri (1996) 
illustrate how Islamic law or fiqh has been historically interpreted depending on the given 
time period, local context, and socio-political influences and developments:  
Because human society has been organized hierarchally and patriarchally 
across the ages, the shari’a, like all other religiously inspired laws, reflects 
the social realities specific to that age… The interpreters of the Qur’an and 
the sunna have been able to offer different interpretations during different 
epochs precisely because the original “Word” is infinite in depth and 
scope. Hence, it is applicable to innumerable circumstances and is able to 
define evolving conditions infinitely. (Afkhami and Vaziri 1996:3)  
 
These premises challenge common conceptions and discourses about the reform of sharia 
put forth by religious conservatives, which more broadly are used as discursive 
justifications against calls for increased women’s rights— namely through arguing that 
Islamic law is sacred and immutable. Thus, the human dimensions of religious 
interpretation and the separation of the religious, God-given sharia from the man-made 
and state-implemented Islamic law offer powerful counterpoints and possibilities for 
producing gender equitable reform in Muslim societies (Afkhami and Vaziri 1996; 
Collectif Maghreb 95 Egalité 2000, 2003; Mir Hosseini 2000).  
 In highlighting the interface between universal and Muslim rights, the manual 
details the ways in which religion can be used as a resource for gender equality. This is 
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done by involving women at the grassroots in the production of new meanings related to 
gender equality in their settings, drawing from religious and human rights principles.  
Madhavi Sunder (2003) in a detailed analysis of the Claiming Our Rights manual 
describes how the awareness-raising program integrates diverse approaches in 
stimulating participants’ cultural analysis of human rights, specifically through a focus on 
translation, textual interplay, constructivism, and reconstructivism. First, attention is 
placed on translating rights from the local to the global level by drawing from rich 
cultural traditions, regional and domestic histories, and religious narratives that portray 
global human rights ideas, e.g., using stories of Khadija, the Prophet’s first wife, in 
exploring women’s right to employment.34 Second, in terms of textualization, particular 
passages from important religious texts, such as the hadith or Quran, are used to stimulate 
discussion around women’s rights and equality. Both passages that support women’s 
rights as well as some of the most contentious stories from the hadith or surahs are 
selected to generate debate. Additionally, human rights declarations are provided to 
explore rights-based issues.  The textual level of analysis largely helps to support secular, 
international human rights and demonstrates parallels between the religious and human 
rights level.  These analyses lead to increasing participant attention on how religious texts 
were interpreted based on particular historical realities and ultimately, aims to stimulate 
the challenging, reconstructing, or the rewriting of traditional women’s rights and 
equality. Sunder (2003:1445) suggests:  
Faced with these ‘bad texts,’ women participants are not asked to choose 
either religion or rights in cases of conflict, but rather, are encouraged to 
discuss the texts and to critique them. Religious texts are revealed as, in 
part, human constructions that are historically contingent and biased. This 
is the constructivist mode. Revealing some religious truths as partial, 
                                                 
34
 Facilitators often draw from the heroines of Islam, such A’isha, Khadija and Fatima. 
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women are empowered reconstruct religious and cultural norms in ways 
that reflect modern, international human rights principles and women’s 
own current needs and aspirations.” 
 
Thus, it is in the analysis, construction, and reconstruction of these texts based on lived 
realties where primary challenges to both cultural and international meanings of rights are 
contested, explored, and re-crafted. 
Dialogically Exploring Connections between Islam and Human Rights 
The following description from the manual outlines the process through which the 
empowerment program can stimulate new understandings of women’s rights in Muslim 
communities. This particular example was taken from Session 3 Negotiating your Rights 
and Responsibilities within the Family, which explores a scenario related to a woman’s 
right to choose her spouse and the time of her marriage. The session begins with a 
reading of a text that describes Leila, a young woman, and her predicament. Lelia’s father 
has arranged a marriage with Karim, a young businessman in his thirties. Leila likes 
Karim, but believes that women should be able to choose their own spouse. She is fine 
accepting the family’s decision to marry, but would first like to meet with Karim in a 
social setting to learn more about him. Leila’s father is worried about their family’s 
reputation if he allows the meeting. The text ends with questions designed to stimulate a 
group discussion, particularly around issues such as the father denying Leila her rights 
and Leila’s responsibility to her family.   
After a short discussion, the facilitators present two verses from the Quran and 
ask the group to discuss the scenario further in light of the verses.  
31, al-Luqman [Luqman the Wise]; Verse 14:And We have enjoined upon 
man (to be good) to his parents: In travail did his mother bear him, and in 
years twain was his weaning: (hear the command). “Show gratitude to Me 
and to thy parents: to Me is (thy final) Goal.” 
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Sura 9, Tauba [Repentence] or Baraat [Immunity]; Verse 71: The 
Believers, men and women, are protectors of one another: they enjoin 
what is just, and forbid what is evil…  
 
Following this discussion, individuals are then asked to reflect on the 
relationships between Leila, her father, and Karim in light of Article 16(2) in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), particularly attending to the cultural and 
religious sources that support women’s rights in the family. 
Article 16(2): Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses.  
 
By engaging in reflection on women’s rights in marriage from both a Muslim and 
human rights perspective, individuals are given time to reflect and discuss the familial 
responsibilities and duties outlined in Islamic law as well as the necessity of each parties’ 
full consent to marry. The program neither dictates a human rights nor Islamic law 
approach to determining women’s rights in a given situation. Rather, it presents multi-
faceted approaches for interpreting women’s rights. Ultimately, the program provides the 
necessary religious foundation for achieving women’s full human rights and empowers 
women with the philosophical base to be their own agents of change.  
Claiming Our Rights conceptualizes the agentic feminist perspective that NGO 
activists in the WLP Partnership espouse. Since individuals come from different 
economic, political, cultural, or educational backgrounds and vary in the extent to which 
they draw from secular or religious ideologies, the dialogue around human rights must be 
culturally adaptable to the given grassroots constituents’ needs. Summarizing, Afkhami 
(2009:PI) reflects: “We don't have to choose between faith and freedom.  You keep your 
faith, if you have one. Those who have faith can also seek freedom and equality. This is a 
much more holistic and helpful approach in terms of lobbying, advocacy, and public 
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support…” Indeed, there is no need to battle over religious interpretation; instead, every 
woman has the right and agency to explore and choose what she feels is best given her 
situation.   
The adaptive strategies put forth in Claiming Our Rights illuminate the 
importance of context when working on a grassroots level for social change. Women that 
participate in the empowerment program are provided with a wide variety of tools, 
ranging from international human rights instruments and excerpts from the Islamic texts, 
such as verses from the Quran and the hadith, from which they develop communication 
and mobilization strategies to alter their family, work, or political relations.  
Summary 
 In sum, NGO activists often find it beneficial to use international human rights 
discourses to leverage state commitments made to gender equality (Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Alvarez 2000). The universality of human rights is often a contested concept in the 
MENA. There is a need to select relevant implementation mechanisms by contextualizing 
human rights concepts. NGO activists in the WLP Partnership use different variations of 
human rights terminology to more effectively mobilize support within their broader 
communities.  
 The comparative analyses revealed the shared importance of human rights 
approaches to funders and NGOs. The coalescence of these discourses for change is 
striking. But for NGOs, an additional layer remains of the upmost importance, relating 
the human rights discourse to the local setting in a culturally authentic manner. Here, the 
concept of adaptability in feminist strategy begins to emerge. In this chapter, NGO 
activists responded to different contextual nuances and adapted global human rights 
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language to fit their conditions. This adaptation process was based on their own unique 
local, cultural, or historical specificities.   
The strategy of human rights contextualization presented in Claiming Our Rights 
provides important knowledge for understanding the WLP Partnership’s foundation for 
feminist movement building. The analysis underscores the importance of individuals 
selecting the appropriate strategy in the quest for gender equality given the cultural 
realities. The activists in this study do not use a “cut and paste” model when drawing 
from universal human rights norms nor do they solely re-interpret Islamic texts; rather, 
they blend and adapt these two strategies based on historically situated contextualization. 
This theme of adaptability, inherently important in this study, weaves itself throughout 
each of the following chapters, albeit in very different ways. 
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Chapter 3: Transnational Feminist Strategies for Increasing Funding Power 
 
 This chapter explores the transnationalization of nongovernmental organizations’ 
(NGO) practices, particularly in relation to asymmetrical power relations as navigated in 
the international funding sphere. The negotiation and collaboration between NGOs and 
funders is indeed critical to social change efforts (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Yet, often the 
literature does not account for grassroots activists’ perspectives. Therefore, this chapter 
contributes to further theorization on the bi-lateral (NGO-funder) construction of the 
global advocacy sphere and its implications for effective social movement building.  
 I analyze NGO strategy development highlighting the role of professionalization 
and its connection to power and agency. I am interested in better understanding: (1) the 
opportunities and constraints of NGO partnership with international funders for activists 
in local contexts and (2) the ways in which NGOs exercise power and agency in the 
funding relationship. Through analysis of semi-structured interview data with the 
executive leadership of the Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP) and analysis of 
interactions and dialogue in four meetings (2005-2008) of the WLP Partnership, I 
highlight a variety of practices and strategies that NGOs in this sample employ to actively 
engage with, resist, and educate international funders.35  In these ways, activists influence 
the development of effective discourses, strategies, organizational practices, and modes 
of communication within the broader global advocacy community.  
Locating the Power and Agency in the Global Advocacy Community 
 As previously discussed with the rise of the New Policy Agenda, NGOs have 
been favored to carry out particular social, political, and economic projects that 
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 See pp. 206-207 in Appendix 1 for precise details on methodology.  
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governments were failing to do well or that were not being adequately implemented. This 
shift to NGO service provision greatly impacted women’s organizations. As such, a 
broader funding sphere emerged where money for civil society, social welfare, and rights 
advocacy projects expanded.  However, in order to gain access to these funds a variety of 
accountability processes had to be met at the organizational level. As part of meeting 
funder requirements, NGOs began to focus more heavily on institution and capacity 
building. While in and of themselves these accountability norms help to efficiently 
structure and track NGO outcomes, at the same time these norms may also have negative 
consequences. Some NGOs have taken on roles and responsibilities that fall outside of 
their missions in order to secure project funding from international funders as they feel it 
was the only way to continue their work. Whereas on the funding side, more stringent 
methods for evaluating a project’s contributions can mire NGO activists down in funder 
specific requirements.36 
The process of capturing a program’s impact, on a sociological level, has been 
described as commensuration or the transformation of something with a qualitative nature 
into a numerical identity (Espeland and Stevens 1998). Espeland and Stevens (1998:315) 
argue that: “Commensuration changes the terms of what can be talked about, how we 
value, and how we treat what we value. It is symbolic, inherently interpretive, deeply 
political, and too important to be left implicit in sociological work.” The commensuration 
process distills complex information into easily comparable and standardized set of 
numerics that can be used for decision making. In the process, meaning making and 
contextual nuances are nearly entirely left out or are positioned as less valuable (Espeland 
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 This section has been developed based on conversations with Mahnaz Afkhami, Founder of Women’s 
Learning Partnership (WLP) in 2009. 
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and Stevens 1998). But, of course, from a funder perspective it is necessary to be able to 
comparatively capture the short- and long-term benefits of a project in order to more 
effectively determine impactful fund investment.   
Typically in the academic literature, the relationship between NGOs and funders 
focuses on donor-driven prioritizations. Overall, NGOs are characterized as the recipients 
and replicators of the funding and international development spheres’ priorities. The 
focus on NGOs as enactors of global values, such as in the case of human rights, 
generates a tendency to diminish the agency that local NGO actors actually have in the 
relationship as well as reify power differentials between funders and NGOs. The power 
and influence that international funders have on NGO structure often leads to discussions 
of institutional isomorphism and professionalization (Brilliant 2000; Jad 2003). 
 One of the underlying mechanisms that some researchers argue explains the 
confluence between Global North and Global South patterns of organizational structure 
and strategies is institutional isomorphism. In some circumstances, local NGOs may 
begin to replicate the organizational structure and strategies of larger and more 
established international institutions (Brilliant 2000; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This 
occurs as “…highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which individual 
efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to 
homogeneity in structure, culture, and output” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:147). Some 
researchers, such as Sally Merry (2003) reframe powerful international governmental and 
nongovernmental actors and their agendas as the new “colonizers,” who are pushing 
global law as universal, autonomous, and transferable. Transnational governments, such 
as the European Union, nation-states and their aid organizations, such as the USAID, the 
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IMF, the World Bank, private foundations, and the United Nations, are all argued to 
pressure states toward globalized norms and laws. In this conceptualization, these 
organizations are perceived as successors to the colonial state (Merry 2003). 
Neoinstitutionalists argue that isomorphism occurs through three different 
pathways—mimetic, coercive, and normative (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Mimetic 
isomorphism leads to replicating organizing practices and norms due to organizational 
uncertainty. Coercive isomorphism is stimulated through more powerful political actors 
exerting their influence on NGOs. Normative isomorphism occurs through 
professionalization influences. Professionalization is the process that occurs as 
organizations rely on external funds for their survival and take on accountability 
processes set forth by powerful organizations. One implication of professionalization is 
that collective action can become institutionalized; therefore, mobilization may be limited 
to safe means (Lang 2000; Jad 2003; Sperling, Ferree, and Risman 2001). Research has 
shown that under certain conditions professionalization can lead to goal displacement 
(Zald and Ash 1965), to NGOs being less likely to utilize disruptive or radical tactics or 
engage in contentious politics (Lang 2000; Staggenborg 1988), and to the use of 
conservative strategies to enhance organizational maintenance (Staggenborg 1988; Zald 
and Ash 1965). As Islah Jad (2003:10-11) argues this process fragments movement 
building, replacing it with project roll out: “NGOization also limits the struggle for 
national causes to ‘projects’ geared towards priorities set by an international discourse 
without diversity, and fragments the accumulation of forces for social change.” Projects 
are often preferred by funders as their impacts can be more easily empirically captured 
than longer-term efforts of radical norm change.  
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 On the other hand, formalization processes can have positive outcomes and 
increase the success for coalition work (Staggenborg 1988). Interpreting shifts to 
professionalization, Staggenborg (1988:604) notes:  
Informal SMOs,37 with their more flexible structures, are more likely to 
innovate direct-action tactics. However, the institutionalization of 
movement tactics by formalized SMOs does not necessarily mean that 
movement goals become less radical; an alternative interpretation is that 
movement demands and representatives become incorporated into 
mainstream politics. 
  
While professionalization is an issue that is increasingly important in the development 
sphere, primarily focusing on the implications of donor support can lead toward an over-
simplification of NGO-funder communication in the global playing field. Ultimately, 
funders need local NGOs and their voice and action just as much as NGOs need 
funders—without local organizations, social change work would not get done.  
 Some researchers attend to these interactive nuances arguing that global society 
and neoinstitutionalist approaches essentialize issues of transnational norm negotiation 
and vastly overlook power differentials and local innovation (Merry 2003; Grewal and 
Kaplan 1994). Grewal and Kaplan (1994) critique such “transnational centrism” 
approaches, which present activists in the Global South as passive receptacles who take 
up global discourses and practices. Reiterating the bilateral and interactive relationship 
between funders and women’s rights NGOs, Andrea Cornwall (2007:1) describes 
transnational feminists’ role in shaping development discourse on empowerment, albeit 
somewhat misinterpreted:  
Development’s emphasis on women’s empowerment has been welcomed 
by some as a return from the fog of “gender equality” and the blind alley 
of “gender mainstreaming” to a sharper, clearer concern about the 
injustice, discrimination and lack of opportunities that women the world 
                                                 
37
 Social movement organizations (SMOs) 
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over experience. But the straight talk about power that was once part of 
feminist discourses of empowerment has given way as development 
agencies have taken up the term. 
 
 Moreover, researchers such as Ostrander (2004) and Ostrander, Silver, and 
McCarthy (2005) add complexity to the field by introducing studies of feminist 
philanthropic foundations, such as women’s funds. Susan Ostrander and colleagues 
(2005) highlight an alternative framework for understanding how funders and NGOs 
interact and how social change work gets negotiated. 38 Feminist philanthropic 
organizations aim to break down the traditional hierarchal relationships that exist 
between funders and applicants and involve grantees in shaping the funding process 
(Ostrander 2004). Yet, despite these laudable aims, in most cases research has focused on 
the efforts to redistribute power from the perspective of the funder, neglecting local NGO 
contributions.   
 In this next section, I present the main challenges related to professionalization 
and asymmetrical power relations highlighted by NGO activists in the WLP Partnership. 
In the following section, I highlight the overall strategy that the NGOs in the sample have 
developed to protect themselves against these challenges. In the final two sections, I 
explore the network’s strategies developed to protect from coercive and normative 
isomorphism.  
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 Specifically, the authors suggest a more nuanced approach to assessing the influence of funder-grantee 
relationships by re-conceptualizing funding dilemmas in terms of how much opportunity the NGO (or 
grantee) has in the relationship. The authors highlight four main points on their continuum, ranging from 
the greatest to the least agency: (1) Control- NGOs that have control over funding decisions; (2) 
Collaboration- NGOs that collaborate with funders in making financial decisions; (3) Representation- 
NGOs represented by foundation staff in decision making situations; and (4) Dialogue-NGOs that have 
dialogues with funders about funding issues and concerns (Ostrander et al. 2005).   
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Power and Professionalization in Focus 
 Knowledge of activists’ roles in shaping global processes of advocacy and social 
change is particularly important and theoretically underdeveloped. This analysis sheds 
light on the strategies and practices that NGOs in the transnational WLP network have 
pursued to assuage potential threats associated with mission or goal drift and to leverage 
the opportunities to influence international funders.  The two main themes that ran 
throughout NGO discussions of funding challenges were professionalization and power. 
Power has been described by Lukes (1974) as having three different aspects or “faces.” 39  
There is power in decision-making, agenda setting, and norm creation; these diverse 
forms of power have different levels of visibility.  
Rakhee Goyal (2009:PI), WLP Executive Director, describes the fundamental 
asymmetries in decision making that exist between funders and NGOs:  
Individual organizations have limited power to impact people [funders] 
with a lot of resources that can define your work…They [funders] have the 
resources, they define what their priorities are…[decide] whether or not 
they choose to accept applications at a particular time and on specific 
areas of interest, and so there’s very little leverage.  
 
 Power in terms of agenda setting is very important in this context, particularly as 
it shapes the global advocacy sphere and the priorities that NGOs then have to respond to 
in order to secure funds. At a basic level, donors can be out of touch with indigenous 
needs and realities, which can impact NGO strategy. Mahnaz Afkhami, Founder and 
President of WLP (2009:PI) notes: “There are international organizations with very little 
footing in indigenous activism or who will have their own definition of what issues are 
significant or important at the time.” This lack of local knowledge, of course, has 
significant bearing on international agenda setting. Afkhami (2009:PI) reflects that lack 
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 Thanks to Char Ryan for stimulating this line of analysis. 
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of information about local and indigenous needs and priorities as well as lack of 
familiarity with the context leads to funders’ disproportionate emphasis on issues that do 
not have priority or that do not impact large segments of the population. For example, 
sometimes issues such as female genital mutilation or stoning, because of their egregious 
and brutal nature, tend to receive disproportionate attention in comparison to the 
everyday basic survival needs of masses of people. Afkhami wonders why a stronger 
emphasis is not placed on creating a more balanced view of aid efforts and giving 
appropriate emphasis to policies or programs that fundamentally shift power relations. 
Ultimately, agenda setting power determines if relevant and effective programs are 
implemented in the local context. 
 Activists in this sample also highlighted challenges associated with 
commensuration. Increased accountability requirements, such as those established 
through the Paris Declaration as described in Chapter 2, means that primarily only 
professionalized NGOs with specialized staff will have access to international funds. In 
the Global South and the MENA particularly, this introduces significant biases to donor 
funding. Funding applications and requirements are often only available in English, 
which creates language barriers for NGOs in obtaining proper materials. Activists may 
have difficulty accessing website materials due to institutional constraints or lack of 
access to electricity. There may also be a general lack of understanding of the detailed 
requirements necessary to apply for funds (AWID and GFW 2008; Goyal 2009:PI).  In 
conflict situations, NGO funding may be thwarted due to the intense amount of 
paperwork and verification of program success that commensuration requires. Rose 
Shomali (WLP 2006b), Executive Director of Women’s Affairs Technical Committee 
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(WATC) in Palestine, notes: “I feel like the international movement is very fragmented. I 
see that we compete and we should coordinate. We spend a lot of time satisfying donors’ 
need for paper rather than actually acting.”  Indeed, inefficient documentation systems 
place heavy burdens on NGOs and can detract valuable time from social change and 
organizing work on the ground.  
 Additionally, a majority of the work being funded is programmatic in nature when 
NGOs really need support for core capacities (Goyal 2009:PI).40 Mahnaz Afkhami 
(2009:PI) states “…that individual partners sometimes feel helpless.  They feel that their 
work, individually, is not valued and that there is pressure to take on topics that are not 
necessarily a priority for them.” Goal displacement, also conceptualized as coercive 
isomorphism, is one of the main challenges cited in the academic literature related to 
professionalization. More often than not, funding that is specified for programmatic 
initiatives of women’s social change is directed toward specific projects and is not linked 
to strengthening the core functions of the organization— without which successful 
project implementation, let alone broader advocacy efforts, is impossible.  The focus on 
project-based funding underlines some of the problems NGOs face in professionalizing. 
While programs can be effective mechanisms for short-term change, normative 
shifts are often the result of longer-term advocacy or awareness-raising efforts, which are 
also more difficult to measure. These realities link to the discussions in the previous 
chapter related to funder and NGO approaches to gender equitable social change. As 
described, analysis of funder and NGO mission and vision statements showed that NGOs 
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 Core funding supports the operation of a NGO, which includes support for core staff time, resources, 
rent, supplies, and so on. All of these aspects help ensure sustained functioning of the organization. Project 
funding, often that falls within funder priority areas, is allocated to particular projects with specific and 
measurable outcomes that can be monitored.    
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in comparison to funders are more often working toward goals of empowerment and 
awareness-raising, which take longer to produce “measurable” results. This difference in 
goals is significant and must be accounted for in commensuration processes.  
Finally, institutional challenges are often amplified when NGO activists’ 
experience great success in their work and as their contributions become more well-
known in the international development sphere. When funders or others encounter these 
successful activists, they are often invited to make special conference presentations, to 
consult, or to engage in other activities in the international policy and advocacy arena 
(WLP 2008b).  In these settings, local activists can become over-extended trying to raise 
the international profile of their local NGOs. While NGOs may reap the benefits of 
increased visibility, international engagements take activists away from local NGO 
involvement, impacting domestic work.  This tradeoff often results in the cannibalization 
of NGO talent in the Global South (Afkhami 2009:PI). Amongst all of these challenges, 
how do NGOs stay true to their missions and continue to be effective implementers of 
social change?  
The Partnership as the Mediator of External Threats 
 In order to mediate external and institutional threats experienced in the 
international funding sphere, the WLP Partnership has leveraged their solidarity and the 
collective power found in their network structure. The network protects against broader 
contextual threats posed by restrictive international and domestic legislation, conflict, and 
socio-economic turmoil. One solution to these challenges was the implementation of a 
collective fundraising strategy in 2006. For example, the WLP Partnership raised funds to 
support local NGOs involved in the Nationality campaign through online fundraising 
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tools. Collective fundraising has proved increasingly important over the past few years 
with new domestic funding restrictions and the shifting funding landscape in the MENA, 
as detailed in Chapter 2 (WLP 2006b). Moreover, activists in the WLP network have 
expressed the importance of diversifying their funding bases (WLP 2005, 2006b, 2008a). 
WLP International has introduced all partners to key donors in the region, such as 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Ford Foundation, UNFPA, and several 
family foundations and bilateral agencies. These meetings have led to some partner 
NGOs gaining grant funding from NED, Sigrid Rausing, and Global Fund for Women. 
This further broadens a NGO’s resource base and supports the continued implementation 
of its work. The network has also established an emergency reserve fund that individual 
partner NGOs can use if faced with severe socio-political threats, such as conflict, 
increasing fundamentalism, or legal restrictions (WLP 2006b, 2008a). All of these 
collective funding strategies help to mitigate some of the individual financial risks that 
NGOs face.  
 Additionally, the facilitation role of WLP International has been crucial in terms 
of fund distribution. Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI) describes the benefits of the Partnership 
structure: 
We have been, in some ways, a buffer between funders and partners…We 
can, in effect, accept funding from certain donors who are generally 
credible and looked upon positively, but even they would cause difficulty 
for some of the partners [in their domestic contexts].  But, coming through 
us, being sorted through us, it becomes less problematic. In general 
funding from international sources is politically challenging for many 
Southern NGOs. However, almost always these are the only sources of 
funding available for human rights and women’s rights activists. This is a 
dilemma for our partners that we have been able to help in some measure.   
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In 2008, WLP International advanced funds to their partner in Jordan due to the likely 
passage of the restrictive foreign funding law. The NGO has also facilitated cross-
national fund transfers between partner NGOs as in Nigeria and Kazakhstan. Often there 
are even transfer difficulties between international funders to WLP partner NGOs, e.g., 
Sigrid Rausing to the Zimbabwe partner. Thus, WLP International’s intermediary role is 
extremely important in ensuring adequate flow of funds.  
  Moreover, WLP International assists partner NGOs, such as Afghan Institute for 
Learning (AIL) in 2003-2004, in developing strong reporting techniques to meet rigorous 
criteria set forth by funders. While it was an intense learning process, now the Afghani 
NGO is equipped to meet the detailed reporting requirements set forth by funders.     
 The notion of building funding power and potential through collaboration and 
partnership was also a key recommendation from the action research study on women’s 
rights funding from Just Associates and AWID. Specifically, Kerr (2007:102) suggests:  
This conceptual shift from fundraising to agenda setting and movement 
building is expressed schematically... It suggests that by moving away 
from one organization dealing with one funder at a time to movements of 
groups and organizations working with and influencing funding sectors, 
funding policies, or funding mechanisms we are more likely to shift more 
resources into women’s rights work and influence agendas by 
demonstrating women’s agency and collective power.41  
 
Building on the collective power of networks in the face of significant bureaucracy is a 
potent NGO practice designed to enhance political leverage (Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
Alvarez 2000). In this case, the practice provides a safety net for the continued 
organizational sustainability across autonomous partner NGOs.   
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 See Appendix 4 for the model depicting this consciousness shift, developed by Lydia Alpizar Duran and 
Ellen Sprenger. 
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The Possibilities of Professionalization 
 NGO activists in the sample outline a number of challenges associated with 
professionalization, but also contextualize these challenges and highlight some 
opportunities that professionalization may provide. Throughout the interviews with the 
leaders of WLP International, professionalization was not only portrayed as having 
negative consequences. They also underscored the possibilities and opportunities of 
professionalization, which ultimately can lead to strengthening the women’s movement. 
For example, the benefits of professionalization include efficiency, credibility, 
effectiveness, and transparency (WLP 2008b). The transferable lessons and skills derived 
from project implementation that comes with needing to monitor and evaluate a project 
were also highlighted (Afkhami 2009:PI).  Rakhee Goyal (2009:PI), Executive Director 
of WLP, highlights the positive aspects of professionalization, such as transparency, 
accountability, and rigorous analysis, which are also articulated in the public and 
government sectors. As such, Goyal sees NGO work as “…an important form of public 
service and should require the best talents and the best minds.” This includes ensuring 
that accountability and transparency are as integral to civil society as they are in the 
public sector.  
In addition, professionalization creates constancy in the movement that can be 
drawn from in organizing efforts. Afkhami (2009:PI) notes: 
If you want to make change, then you need to have a vision of where 
you’re going, where you want to be, and have clear and workable steps 
and strategies towards achieving your vision.  You also need the skills and 
the systems that are going to help you get where you want to be. …The 
fact that our partner NGOs are becoming more professionalized means 
that they are becoming more efficient and their capacities and skills are 
becoming more developed. Moreover, activists rely on this more constant 
base of well-organized support, which can be drawn from for mobilization 
purposes. This is helpful in carrying out the kind of collaborative effort, 
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alliance-building, consciousness-raising and collective work towards 
change that we see in the various arenas, such as changes in legislation or 
changes in resource provision by the government. We are increasing local 
capacities to be the engines of advocacy work…using social networking 
circles to bring about broader social change. 
 
Professionalization in the women’s movement has also changed how social 
change work gets conducted. Shifts from a volunteer-based movement to 
professionalized, paid staff for advocacy is all more common in the global women’s 
rights movement. Some of these changes may be occurring to meet the evolving demands 
of women’s lives including women’s increased role in the labor force. The time it takes to 
support families, while also working in specialized careers leaves less time for volunteer 
work and involvement outside the workforce. These realities impact movement building 
by making it less likely that social change will be stimulated through volunteer driven sit-
ins and mobilizations (Afkhami 2009:PI).  Afkhami (2009:PI) describes the WLP 
Partnership’s view of movement building in the 21st century as very different from the 
20th century.  She sees movement building as being stimulated from local to global 
process of consciousness-building and grassroots action in order to catalyze changes in 
families, communities, and politics. Reflecting on the changing dimensions of the 
women’s movement, Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI) explains:  
I think that sometimes we, in the women's movement, tend to have a 
nostalgic idea of resuscitating the demonstrations, marches, 
consciousness-raising groups, and one-on-one kitchen meetings that took 
place in people's homes. But, I think we have to realize that was a 
different period all together and life is handled differently now, 
particularly in terms of the requirements of a women's working day and in 
the way that global connections and communications take place. In the 
WLP Partnership, we tend to believe that change does not come about 
decisively through organizing marches and typical organizing strategies. 
Rather, change comes through communication, through alliance building, 
through collaborative efforts, through small groups and communities 
working together for a given cause…Yet, more and more, women’s NGOs 
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are run by paid staff with oversight from volunteer boards. Movement 
building is carried out increasingly through virtual associations around 
advocacy campaigns that communicate through the internet. Internet-
based social networking tools more and more constitute the main vehicle 
for movement building and solidarity, supplemented by face to face 
meetings.  But, I think that civic organizations becoming professionalized 
build stronger institutions and help to spur and nourish movements.  
 
Movement building in this context reaches beyond specific projects that NGOs 
take on and instead is comprised of grassroots alliances and action on specific rights’ 
issues. The example of the Moudawana reform in Morocco, the focus of the next chapter, 
is an example of what feminist movement building in the region looks to be moving 
towards. The reform movement was largely led through the institutionalized support of 
NGOs and through the multitude of local and regional alliances that Moroccan women’s 
rights NGOs created within the civil society, political, and public sectors.  
Professionalization as Capacity Building 
 An example of the positive aspects of professionalization is exemplified by the 
WLP Partnership’s capacity building program.42  The capacity building process was 
initially stimulated through a specific foundation grant and was reluctantly accepted by 
WLP. At the time, the WLP Partnership preferred core funding and felt the investment in 
time and resources could be better spent on existing programs. However, as they began 
planning, the program quickly became a major project of the organization and was 
collectively selected by partner NGOs as a priority area for 2008. The WLP Partnership 
sees the capacity building program as an important component in strengthening the 
women’s movement, using their philosophy of culturally adaptable language and 
strategy. The capacity building program honors the local relevance and specificities of 
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 From August 30-September 4, 2008, 18 women leaders from Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Nigeria, and Palestine met to co-create this strategic planning and capacity building curriculum.   
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each organizational context, while drawing from cutting-edge organizational 
development techniques (WLP 2008b). Specifically, the training process includes setting 
up a mentorship program where local NGOs pair up and exchange strategies and 
expertise as they facilitate each other’s strategic planning processes (Afkhami 2009:PI; 
Goyal 2009:PI; WLP 2008a; WLP 2008b). The WLP Partnership’s experience 
demonstrated that the kind of in-depth brainstorming and exchange that occurs in 
strategic planning and capacity building processes, involving staff, constituents, and the 
board, requires a familiarity with the culture and the use of a common language that is 
lacking in the case of most external consultants (at this time, they are most often from the 
West). The pairing of partner NGOs was developed so organizations could get feedback 
from a neutral and unbiased perspective similar to that of an external consultant. The 
model of partner-driven strategic planning and capacity building is a revolutionary new 
way to conceptualize and implement sustainability practices in a participatory manner. 
With the help of funders, WLP ensured that capacity building would be a relevant 
process not just something imported from a Western consultant model (Afkhami 2009:PI; 
Goyal 2009:PI). This peer-to-peer strategic planning and capacity building process 
reinforces shared values amongst the Partnership and facilitates enhanced collaboration 
and cooperation across partner NGOs.  
 The capacity building project was useful because it fit within their collective 
mission and focus on organizational sustainability. However, making decisions on what 
kinds of funder stimulated projects to implement can be difficult.  In order to ensure the 
continued authenticity and sustainability of their work, the WLP Partnership has 
developed collective strategies to ensure the consistency of their values and philosophy 
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when working with donors (WLP 2008a). Specifically, NGO activists in the network 
highlighted three different practices for ensuring against value or mission drift. These 
include placing precedence on the NGO’s strategic priorities as conceptualized in the 
strategic plan, only accepting funding if the program falls within these priority areas, and 
establishing strong relationships with funders based on mutual respect and 
communication (WLP 2008a). All of these partnership practices help to protect against 
the possibilities of donor-driven goal displacement or normative isomorphism.  
 For the activists, the importance of establishing and maintaining the shared values 
of the WLP Partnership cannot be overstated.  NGO activists cite shared values as a 
buffer against international and domestic challenges (WLP 2008a). The WLP Partnership 
uses shared values to guide their vision and mission achievement and to form a common 
base for building strategic alliances.  
Strategies for Asserting Power in Funding Relationships 
 Power and agency are intimately related to issues of professionalization.  As 
described, NGO activists in this sample outlined specific practices to ward against 
normative isomorphic threats. This very process of strategy development points to how 
NGOs’ agentic innovations can mediate constraining conditions.  This final section 
highlights the WLP Partnership’s main strategies for asserting power in funding 
relationships, which include: rejection of funds that were not in alignment with NGO 
goals, collaboration between NGOs and funders, and training funders in issues of NGO 
concern (WLP 2006b).    
Rejection of Funds  
 In the sample, the most prominent reasons NGO activists rejected international 
grants were due to: (1) the political ideology or practices of the funder; (2) differing 
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ethical foundations; (3) the project falling outside of the NGO mission and objectives; or 
(4) the unsustainability of the program or project. Overall, across the WLP Partnership, 
the majority of NGOs have rejected funding from an international donor.  
 Many NGOs in the sample have rejected money with conditions; namely, funds 
that required alignment with the requirements set forth in the “terrorist clause.”  Lina 
Quora (WLP 2006b), Past Director of SIGI Jordan, explains: “We don’t want conditional 
money. There should be no interference in our work. We don’t want people to impose 
anything on us.” Similarly, Lina Abou-Habib (WLP 2008a) the Executive Director of the 
Lebanese, Collective for Research and Training on Development Action (CRTDA) notes: 
“Compliance with US demands make things extremely problematic. You talk about an 
egalitarian relationship [between funders and NGOs]; but in reality, the powerful partner 
is thinking their ideas are much more relevant. Recently, the government mandates on 
preventing terrorism have become very difficult for both donors and NGOs to 
implement.” 
 Another reason NGO activists in this sample have decided to reject funds is when 
the donor demonstrates a lack of knowledge about the local context and past socio-
political developments. Lina Abou-Habib (2008:PI) describes a case in which a 
prominent funder of global women’s rights reproduced an existing, successful campaign 
implemented by CRTDA and other regional partners. The funder mistakenly sent Abou-
Habib an email offering to fund another NGO to duplicate a program on nationality 
rights. CRTDA initiated the original Arab Women’s Right to Nationality Campaign in 
2001 and has been the regional coordinating organization since the campaign’s inception. 
The funder was in effect asking another organization in Lebanon to replicate the exact 
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steps and strategies that CRTDA had already successfully implemented over the past 
seven years. Lina Abou-Habib (2009:PI) notes the irony in this situation as it relates to 
indigenous versus international agendas.  
It is that kind of behavior that has negative effects, because before that 
[funder request for another nationality campaign] there was absolutely no 
doubt that the Nationality campaign was “indigenous,” led by local groups 
and so on. But now you have Big Brother with all their money onboard 
and they are actually paying loads of money for I don’t know what… 
 
The lack of funder attention to the developments on the ground, in this case, resulted in a 
gross overspending of resources. Moreover, with the international push for another 
nationality program, it opened up the possibility that campaign opponents could falsely 
implicate the original Nationality campaign as Western-initiated. CRTDA no longer 
accepts funds from this donor, despite their powerful presence in women’s rights work in 
the region, given their disregard of local activist developments and progress.  
 All of these examples provide evidence of the veto-power that NGOs possess in 
the funding process. When funders make poor planning decisions or try to push dissonant 
philosophical agendas, NGOs have the power to push back. The rejection of funds is an 
important pathway through which NGOs may exercise agency in the funding relationship 
and communicate their preferences to donors. Over time, and particularly if NGO 
opposition is coupled with collective calls for reform, there may be potential to broaden 
spaces for equal relations where NGOs can have an impact on donor practices.   
Collaboration, Negotiation, and Strategic Influence 
 Another strategy in which NGOs actively shape and educate funders is through 
collaboration and strategic influence. The WLP network is able to exert more influence 
over the funding process by using strategic interventions in highly visible positions 
(Goyal 2009:PI). For example, Mahnaz Afkhami, sits on several advisory boards, among 
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them funding agencies, where she has the opportunity to interact with those influencing 
development and funding policies. Afkhami (2009:PI) notes that partnership has been a 
mutually empowering process, both for WLP International and the autonomous WLP 
partners, particularly in raising the visibility of their work.  
When I am asked to serve on the international advisory board of a funding 
organization it is in great part due to the fact that I’m seen as representing 
a partnership of autonomous organizations [in the Global South and 
particularly in the MENA]. That helps build my credibility as being able 
to bring information from a variety of Global South organizations that are 
usually not heard from outside their own borders.  At the same time my 
being present in these places helps the partnership a great deal because I 
can make the efforts of the partners more visible.  I have a chance to bring 
attention to their extraordinary work and the importance of what they’re 
doing as moderate, progressive democrats and human rights activists. This 
is particularly important coming from societies that are usually portrayed 
as radical and violent, where moderate forces and perspectives, like the 
partners, are often left invisible and unheard.   
 
 Another example of strategic influence and partnership is evident in Palestine, 
where Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC) is forming a partnership with 
funder organizations in order to build a broad-based group of supporters around the 
NGO’s mission (WLP 2008a). This type of collaboration involving funders in the 
missions and visions of an NGO supersedes the traditional funding relationship and has 
the potential of transforming interactions into a true partnership.  
 In other cases, negotiation with funders is explicit. As described in Morocco, 
during the campaign to reform the Moudawana, a powerful charge deployed by the 
countermovement was that Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) 
and the reformist women’s rights movement were influenced by Western agendas due to 
their receipt of international funds. This claim was aimed at branding the Moudawana 
reform as an “inauthentic” brand of cultural change. Due to the critical nature of the 
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reform and the intense contention that existed between movements in Morocco, ADFM 
explained the stakes to their funders. They asked that funders allow them not to use their 
name in publications and events, as they felt it may fuel the countermovement’s claims 
(Lemrini, WLP 2006b; WLP 2008a). The funders agreed to be anonymous partners given 
the contextual realities. The communication, collaboration, and respect between ADFM 
and their funders are evident, particularly as visibility is one of the most basic 
requirements that funders place on fund recipients.  These examples demonstrate how 
NGOs can effectively leverage the power of negotiation in funding relationships.   
 
Training and Awareness-raising 
 The final and less frequently utilized strategy identified from the data was training 
and awareness-raising. One way to raise funder awareness is through better educating 
them on the NGO’s ideological and philosophical base. This helps facilitate better 
communication and understanding in the funding relationship. In this case, the WLP 
Partnership has a very explicit philosophical agenda of participatory leadership and has 
developed a dialogic leadership model designed to increase individual’s awareness of 
alternative forms of political and social leadership. The Leading to Choices (LTC) 
program aims to “empower” participants and to foster leaders who aspire to create more 
egalitarian, democratic, and pluralistic societies based on collaborative decision making 
and coalition-building. The participatory model of leadership values participation, 
equality, power sharing, and diversity.  
 WLP International learned that Oxfam Novib had committed to a multi-year 
mandate designed to instill transformative leadership within the institution. Taking 
advantage of this significant opportunity, WLP lent its expertise on participatory 
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leadership by training some members of the Oxfam Novib staff using the LTC model 
(WLP 2008b). Additionally, in January 2008, the executive leadership from WLP 
International participated in a dialogue and brainstorming session that Oxfam Novib 
organized in the Netherlands. The focus of the discussion revolved around how civil 
society actors can contribute to decreasing the democratic deficit in the global playing 
field. WLP presented successful grassroots campaigns of advocacy, from Moroccan and 
Iranian experiences of law reform, as potential models that could contribute valuable 
lessons to the public dialogue.  These are important examples of a NGO taking the 
opportunity to raise awareness and shape the public discourse in the international funding 
community.   
Summary 
 International funders of women’s social change efforts are part of a global 
development process, which has an impact on the social and political developments of 
nation-states and civil society. NGO activists operate within a sphere of asymmetrical 
power, particularly in terms of financial resources and the restrictions attached to gaining 
those funds. At the same time contextual influences, such as restrictive domestic 
legislation on NGO formation or the US “terrorist clause,” have profound implications on 
the way that NGOs in the MENA do business. Since many of the NGOs in the sample 
will not accept conditional funding as it sets up a parochial relationship when they would 
rather enter into a partnership of mutual respect, it also limits the potential pool of donor 
money.  
The analyses showed that while the literature on funding primarily highlights 
international funders as the main actors and drivers of social change efforts, NGOs also 
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hold and exercise power in the relationship. The three strategies of rejection, negotiation 
and collaboration, and training have the potential to maximize the power that NGOs have 
in the funding relationship. It is evident that these strategies address power on multiple 
levels. NGOs in this sample are trying to shift agendas through being strategically 
included as advisors and consultants to funders. They are rejecting funds that do not align 
with their values. Moreover, they are instating new norms for respectful communication 
and collaboration through training on participatory leadership and processes of inclusion.   
 The academic literature highlights the impacts of coercive and normative 
isomorphic shifts that lead to more project-based funding and toward funding programs 
with empirically verified impact. While the activists in this sample acutely describe the 
ramifications of these isomorphic processes, they also speak of important “survival” 
strategies for navigating these conditions. Specifically, the findings reveal the 
counterintuitive strategy of turning constraining conditions related to professionalization 
into opportunities for the women’s movement. Since professionalization is not “going 
away,” activists in the WLP Partnership re-interpreted constraining conditions and 
strategically assessed the ways that the movement could be strengthened by 
professionalization.43 Activists optimized the strengths of a professionalization model and 
work to prevent weakening through innovative strategizing to deflect contextual 
challenges. This is an adaptive strategy given the existing realities and power differentials 
in NGO-funder relations. The strategy of leveraging constraints and turning them into 
opportunities is more deeply explored in the following chapter.   
                                                 
43
 Certainly, there are multiple potential reactions to constraints that can range from inaction, finding 
strategies for navigating around obstacles, leveraging elements of shapeable substance within the constraint 
context, and attempting to subvert the obstacle. Yet, the way that constraints or opportunities are 
interpreted and responded to can ultimately facilitate or hinder a NGO. Tajfel and Turner (1986) highlight 
similar strategies when individuals’ experience threat to their identities. 
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Chapter 4: Bridging Discourses: Moroccan Women’s Rights Activists Framing the 
Necessity of Islamic Family Law Reform44 
 
 This chapter explores the organizing strategies of Moroccan liberal feminist 
activists45 in the campaign to reform the Moudawana (also called the Personal Status 
Code) 46 from 1999 to 2004.47 I focus on the advocacy and lobbying strategies of a 
particular feminist human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Morocco, 
Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) and its allies. I pay specific 
attention to the social, cultural, and political circumstances that influenced the 
development of the feminists’ reform discourses. In the Moroccan context, throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s, the conservative and Islamist discourse was incredibly 
persuasive in garnering public support for opposing Moudawana reform (Buskens 2008). 
Those that supported the feminist reform agenda were modernist movements in 
Moroccan politics and civil society, while the countermovement (or opposition) primarily 
consisted of religious conservatives, Islamists, and some moderates. The goal of this 
chapter is to identify how Moroccan feminists organized given constraining social and 
political conditions, paying particular attention to the creation of discourses on the 
necessity of reform. 
 In order to achieve this objective, I analyze data from years of fieldwork with 
WLP (2005-2008), three months of fieldwork with ADFM in Rabat, Morocco in 2005-
                                                 
44
 Small portions of this chapter are reproduced from a project with the Institute of Development Studies.  
45
 Sadiqi (2008:327) uses the term liberal feminists to denote of cadre of activists that “readily embraced 
‘modern’ ideas and practices without rejecting their local specificities, including being Muslim.” For 
simplicity, I will refer to the Moroccan NGO activists as the liberal feminists or feminist activists. 
46
 Throughout this chapter, I refer to the old Moudawana (1957/8-2004) as the Personal Status Code and 
the 2004 reformed Moudawana as the Family Code. 
47
 Initial attempts of feminist activists to reform the Moudawana occurred directly after it was instated in 
1957/58. However, the strongest and most organized waves of protest and mobilization occurred from the 
1999 to 2004. Therefore, I have chosen to focus on this latter movement period. 
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2006, historical and textual analysis of legal and policy documents, and semi-structured 
interviews with women’s rights activists and strategists across the Maghreb.48 
 The results demonstrate that the Moroccan feminists used a bridging framing 
strategy, interweaving global and local discourses and re-appropriating religious legal 
constraints. In order to counter the opposition, activists vernacularized global discourses, 
such as human rights and democracy with Islamic principles, localizing the issues with 
the intent to bridge the framing divide. The study offers a compelling addition to the 
feminist and social movement literature, highlighting the role that structural opportunities 
and developments in the legal and political context play in agentic movement 
innovations, while also underscoring the importance of discourse adaptation and 
vernacularization.  
 First, I theoretically locate this case study drawing from the social movement and 
law literature. In order to contextualize the analysis of the Moroccan feminist campaign, I 
provide an overview of the Moroccan context, with a brief historical summary of 
Morocco since the 1950s. I pay particular attention to the 1999-2004 time period and the 
emergence of the independent women’s rights movement.  I then move on to analyze the 
framing contests and discursive negotiations that occurred in the Moroccan campaign. 
Framing the Reform  
 As a law that was derived from Islamic legal principles, the Moudawana 
(1957/58-2004) reform was very contentious in the public sphere. This was the case as 
the countermovement framed the Moudawana as a sacred and unchangeable religious law 
in the public sphere (Lemrini 2005; 2006:PI). Moroccan women’s rights activists were 
positioned between an emerging transnational women’s movement, their national context 
                                                 
48
 For more detailed notes on methodology see pp. 207-208 in Appendix 1.  
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in which a diverse public and state weighed in on issues of religiosity and secularism, and 
their own ideological stances of human rights, justice, and gender equality.  
 There were two fundamental contrasting frames related to the actual goal of 
Personal Status Code reform in the early campaign years. The feminists argued for 
secular reform efforts based on human rights, democracy, and societal realities. The 
countermovement opposed secular reform, arguing that Moudawana reform was 
antithetical to Islamic law; as such, those who called for its reform were unIslamic and 
not culturally authentic. These contrasting frames formed the discursive field and set up a 
framing contest between the women’s reformist movement and the countermovement. 
The discursive field is the arena in which social meanings are constructed, negotiated, 
and even contradicted (King 2007; Spillman 1995). In this case, the discursive field 
represents the realm within the public sphere where multiple discourses on the legality of 
Islamic family law reform exist. Illuminating the importance of shifting interactions with 
the countermovement or other hegemonic actors on the framing process, the literature 
show that social movements often create “competing discourses” (Ryan 1991) in their 
framing contests, particularly in cases where critical social issues or cultural norms are 
being negotiated. Discourses and frames can evolve based on the interactions between 
movements and countermovements (Esacove 2004; Ferree and Merrill 2004; McCaffrey 
and Keys 2000).  In this dynamic relationship movements and countermovements shape, 
respond to, and negotiate the means and communication channels for social action and 
normative influence (Esacove 2004; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). In these cases, the 
cultural resonance of a movement’s or countermovement’s messages are of the utmost 
importance (Conway and Schaller 2007; Snow and Benford 1988).  
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 Researchers have highlighted a variety of movement framing strategies, which 
generally focus on a clear distinction between one’s own movement and the 
countermovement’s strategy, e.g., the secular-religious divide (McCaffrey and Keys 
2000; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Snow and Benford 1988; Taylor and Whittier 1992). 
The literature suggests that actors may likely (and perhaps strategically) choose to place 
their tactical framing efforts in a different substantive area from that of the 
countermovement (Evans 1997; Taylor and Whittier 1992).  This tendency to distinguish 
may lead social movement actors to craft strategic messages that more highly resonate 
with their base (Snow and Benford 1988), which likely excludes more diversified 
constituency organizing.49 These framing distinctions were particularly apparent in the 
Moroccan sphere.  
However, sometimes movements craft frames that have similar resonance in order 
to more effectively reduce the significance of a particular frame or to attract a more 
diverse group of constituents (Evans 1997). Research by Evans (1997) has shown the 
successfulness of this strategic approach when a religious pro-choice movement framed 
messages to be more inclusive of potential target groups, not only current organizational 
constituents. The attempt to bring together two issues (or groups) that are ideologically 
consistent, but that have been previously unconnected has been called frame bridging 
(Benford and Snow 2000). Frame bridging can help to build commonalities across groups 
and potentially reduce conflict in framing contests. Frames within this context take on a 
more nuanced and less ideologically rigid nature. Instead of conceptualizing messages for 
                                                 
49
 Meyer & Staggenborg (1996:1652) reiterate this normative tendency of movements to discursively 
‘divide and conquer:’ “as conflict between opposing movements heightens, coupling around certain issue 
areas, activists with a wide variety of claims cluster around each side.” Such framing attempts would push a 
singular message in response to opposition groups, rather than focus on messages to diversify their base. 
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a singular purpose, movement actors realize that frames can have multiple meanings (or 
are multivocal) and different layers of meaning that can shift over time and according to 
the audience (Steinberg 1999). Ultimately attention on more multivocal approaches to 
discursive framing may be connected to appealing to a broader range of constituents.  
 However, messaging does not happen in a vacuum. Political and socio-cultural 
factors play an influential role in framing strategies and the way in which messages are 
understood, interpreted, and accepted in the public sphere. The discursive field is 
mediated by broader contextual and historical events, shaping how meanings are 
understood and constructed as well as which messages more broadly circulate (Alimi et 
al. 2005; Amenta et al. 1992, 2005; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 
2004b; King 2007; Kurzman 2004). The discursive field in the Moroccan case was filled 
with both global and local discourses that limited and opened spaces for reform. Given 
the global discourses of human rights, democracy, and Islam, the goal of this chapter is to 
explore how these discourses were adapted, localized, and vernacularized throughout the 
law reform campaign (Merry 2006; Levitt and Merry 2007; 2008).   
The Social and Demographic Context in Morocco 
 Morocco has a population of approximately 33.4 million.  The capital city of 
Morocco is Rabat, with a population of 1.7 million.  Most of the population (58.7%) lives 
in urban areas. Islam is the state religion with the majority of the population following the 
Maliki school of Sunni Islam.50 Arabic is the official language of Morocco; however, the 
French language is often used in education, business, and diplomatic affairs. Berber 
dialects are also prominent. In fact, Berbers are currently petitioning to amend the 
constitution so that Berber languages are also official languages of Morocco.  
                                                 
50
 Muslim 98.7%, Christian 1.1%, Jewish 0.2% 
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 Politically, Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with a King, who has the 
ultimate decisive authority. According to the constitution, the King is the religious 
authority in his role as “commander of the faithful” (Amir al-Mu’minin). While the King 
is the ultimate arbiter and religious authority, the state also has a democratically elected 
parliament that shapes the political realm. This simultaneous blending of state and 
religion forms the basis for the opportunity and constraint structure, which is a crucial 
element to be considered in social movement developments.  
 Morocco has a democratically elected bicameral parliament. There are 29 official 
political parties in Morocco. The parties range from leftist socialist parties to far right 
Islamist parties. The major parties include: Istiqlal or Independence Party (nationalist), 
Parti de la Justice et du developpement (PJD) or the Justice and Development Party 
(moderate Islamist),51 Rassemblement National des Independents (RNI) or the National 
Rally of Independents (business), Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires or the Socialist 
Union of Popular Forces (USFP) (socialist), Mouvement Populaire (MP) or the Popular 
Movement (traditional/Berber). The most recent 2007 elections were considered free and 
fair. However, it was the lowest turnout since the 1996 constitutional referendum, at 
around 37%.52 
 The King appoints the Prime Minister as well as the other four head ministerial 
positions. The King has the power to dissolve Parliament, excuse cabinet members, and 
sets the national and foreign policy agendas. As such, it is not surprising that the Freedom 
                                                 
51
 Political groups that are critical of the monarchy, such as Al Adl Wal Ihssane (Justice and Spirituality), 
remain banned by the government and are unable to participate in politics because they do not recognize 
the King as ‘commander of the faithful’. The Islamist group is considered a threat to the monarchy since 
they seek to establish a theocratic state.  
52
 The previously leading party, the left leaning USFP, lost almost 25% of its seats, leaving it with only 38 
seats. Whereas, their conservative counterparts Istiqlal gained a majority with 52 seats. Other parties also 
gained seats. There was speculation that the Islamist PJD may take the majority, but their gains were more 
moderate. They took 46 seats.    
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House Index rated Morocco as only partly free, with a civil liberties score of 4 and a 
political rights score of 5.53 Additionally, the judiciary is not entirely independent and 
rarely counters official policy.  
 Morocco is a medium development country.54 The GDP per capita in 2005 was 
4,555 (PPP US$). Nineteen percent of Moroccans live under the poverty line.55 
Unemployment is quite high in the country. In urban areas, the average unemployment 
rate in 2006 was 15.5% (20.9% for women and 13.9% for men). In rural areas, 
unemployment in 2006 stood at 3.7% (1.8% for women and 4.6% or men).  Many youth 
movements in the country are organizing to raise the state’s and political parties’ 
attention to the issue of unemployment. Even despite the high levels of unemployment 
and poverty, there is a small burgeoning middle class in Morocco.  
 Women’s economic participation in relation to men’s is 33%, which means that 
33 women work out of every 100 men that work.56 Typically, women participate 
overwhelmingly in the agricultural (38.7%), industrial (31.7%), and service (18.4%) 
sectors.57 A higher number of women with lower than secondary educations are active, 
70.7%, in the labor force than those who have completed secondary education, 14.9%, 
and those who have gone on to tertiary education, 14.4%.58 This likely contributes to the 
significant gender wage gap; the estimated percent of women’s to men’s earned income 
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 According to Freedom House rankings, 1 is fully free and democratic and 7 is not free or democratic at 
all.  
54
 Over the past 30 years, the country has progressively increased its ranking in the HDR Index. In 1975, 
the HDR was 0.435; 1980-0.483; 1985-0.519; 1990-0.551; 1995-0.581; 2000-0.613; and 2005-0.646. 
55
 Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Human Development Report (HDR) 
2007/2008. http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_MAR.html  
56
 Source: Haut-Commisariat du Plan (HCP). Royaume Du Maroc. 2008. « La Femme Marocaine en 
Chiffres. Tendances d’évolution des caractéristiques démographiques et socioprofessionelles. » 
57
 Source: ibid. For all Moroccans, the largest paid work sectors include the service (42.3%), the industrial 
(24.2%), public works (18.9%) and agricultural (14.5%) sectors, according to national statistics of the HCP 
(2006).  
58
 Source: Haut-Commisariat du Plan (HCP). Royaume Du Maroc. 2008. « La Femme Marocaine en 
Chiffres. Tendances d’évolution des caractéristiques démographiques et socioprofessionelles. » 
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is 25%. Specifically, data shows that women’s estimated earned income is 1,846 (PPP 
US$) on average, whereas the estimated earned income of men is 7,297 (PPP US$).59 The 
earnings ratio for women to men who work in similar professions is 61%.60 According to 
the most recent statistics, the average rate of women’s participation in the labor market is 
27.8% and men’s participation is 76.4%.61 
 The 2005 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) notes that across the 
MENA region, women’s education remains among the lowest in comparison to other 
regions in the world, particularly in terms of female literacy levels. These lower 
education levels extend to Morocco as well. Education is free and mandatory until the 
age of 15 (primary school) in Morocco and is highly attended at 83%. Secondary school 
rates precipitously drop with only 23% of girls continuing their education. Women’s 
higher education remains quite low at 10%. Literacy rates for men and women in the 
country are 53.9%. However, these rates are much lower in rural areas, 37.4 %. Women’s 
literacy rates rose to 41.7% in 2006 from 28.7% in 1994, according to official Moroccan 
estimates. Men’s literacy rates rose to 67.1% in 2006 from 55.2% in 1994.62  In 2006, the 
Prime Minister Driss Jettou noted that efforts since 2002 had been successful in reducing 
illiteracy by 39%, although it has been difficult to statistically confirm this estimate.  
 In terms of household status, the average age of marriage for Moroccan women is 
27.2 years and 31.8 years for Moroccan men.63  Contraceptive use has increased over the 
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 Source: UNDP. HDR 2007/2008. 2005 statistics. 
60
 Source: The Gender Gap Index. 2007. World Economic forum. 
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/ggg07_morocco.pdf 
61
 Source: Enquête Nationale sur l’Emploi, Royaume du Maroc. Haut-Commisariat du Plan (HCP) 2007. 
(The Moroccan National Survey on Employment 2007). 
62
 Source: HCP 2004 data in « Les Indicateurs du Maroc en 2006. » Haut-Commisariat du Plan (HCP). 
ISBN: 9981-20-146-4. 
63
 Source: Haut-Commisariat du Plan (HCP). Royaume Du Maroc. 2008. « La Femme Marocaine en 
Chiffres. Tendances d’évolution des caractéristiques démographiques et socioprofessionelles. » 
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past ten years from 41.5% in 1992 to 63% in 2003/2004 for married women aged 15-
49.64 The average fertility rate of Moroccan women is 2.5 children.65  
 Moroccan women gained the right to suffrage in 1963. The country is signatory to 
international agreements that have the potential to impact women’s status, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Pact of Civil and 
Political Rights in 1979, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1993. After ratifying conventions such as 
CEDAW, the Moroccan state placed reservations on a number of articles that conflicted 
with Islamic legal codes. These reservations essentially negate compliance with women’s 
equality as set forth in the treaty. Placing reservations on convention articles is a common 
occurrence in many states not wishing to give up legal sovereignty. Wassila Ltaeif 
(2005:345) remarks on this trend: “It makes no difference whether governments base 
their reservations on the Sharia or on their internal legal codes (which are anyway 
religiously inspired). The end result is the same: by acting in a manner counter to the 
convention’s main objectives they render it meaningless.” It is precisely the large number 
of reservations to International Human Rights protocols, such as CEDAW in the MENA 
that prompt some Western advocates of human rights to perceive incompatibilities 
between human rights and Islamic law, however distorted or conspicuous these 
perceptions may be (Mayer 2005).66 However, on December 10, 2008, the Moroccan 
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 Source: ibid. 
65
 Source: UNDP HDR 2007/2008. 
66
 Countries that have reservations on CEDAW include: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen. The following articles are the target of reservations as states 
have conceptualized them as incompatible with Islamic law: Article 2, on national legislation and 
constitution; Article 7, on public life and political rights; Article 9, on citizenship law; Article 15, on 
equality in legal and civil rights; Article 16, on Family Law (marriage and family relations including 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance related to Islamic sharia); and Article 29, on dispute settlement between 
parties to CEDAW (Kassem 2005). 
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government lifted the reservations they had placed on CEDAW at the time of ratification. 
This landmark victory for feminists was initiated through a regional alliance of Arab 
feminists, including ADFM, to lift the reservations on CEDAW.67 Through this reform, 
the Moroccan state is expressing full commitment to eliminating the discrimination of 
women and ensuring their equal rights.  
 The primary document that has influenced women’s rights and status in Morocco 
since the country’s independence in 1956 is the Moudawana. The next two sections of 
this chapter focus on the history of the Moudawana and the main players in the Moroccan 
feminist movement that led the campaign efforts. 
 The Promulgation of the Moudawana   
 Morocco gained independence from France in 1956. The country had been a 
French protectorate since 1912. The nationalists that led the revolution were interested in 
creating an Islamic state, which would restore the cultural disintegration they had 
experienced under French colonists. They drew strength from the regional Salafayyist68 
movement that was prominent across the MENA at the time (Buskens 2008).  
After independence, Sultan Mohammad V was chosen to lead due to his 
influential and symbolic role in the nationalist movement. He relinquished the title Sultan 
and became King and head of state. King Mohammad V reigned until 1961. The 
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 See the campaign website: 
http://www.blog.ma/cedaw/index.php?subaction=categorie&id_categorie=8250  
68
 The Salafiyya movement was a pan-Arab nationalist movement in the 19th and 20th century that aimed to 
stimulate a religious revival, bringing together modernist ideals with the religious and cultural assertions of 
Islam (Buskens 2008). Ultimately the goal was to instate a truer form of Islam without the differentiation of 
Islamic schools. This would be achieved by focusing on the reinterpretation, ijtihad, of Islamic texts. Sunni 
Muslims who were members of the movement argued that the gates to ijtihad were not closed. In Morocco, 
the Salafiyya principles took the form of a pan-nationalist movement that aimed to free the country from 
colonial powers. For more detailed information on the Salafiyya movement, see Abun-Nasr, Jamil. "The 
Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious Basis of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement." Middle 
Eastern Affairs, no. 3, St. Antony's Papers, no. 16, edited by Albert Hourani (1963). 
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Moroccan nationalists wanted their legal system to be based on a newly interpreted 
sharia. However, their demands were only partially met through the abolishment of the 
customary law for the Berber population and the development of the Islamic Personal 
Status Code in 1957/1958 (Buskens 2008). In fact, the new Moroccan legal structure was 
largely a continuation of colonial legal practices, with the exception of the Moudawana. 
69
 Other Moroccan legal codes that are currently still in practice are primarily secular, 
such as the penal code and the constitution. Both of which were derived from French and 
European legal practices. In the constitution, women and men are afforded equal rights.  
However, women’s status has been primarily determined using an Islamic legal 
framework. In 1957/1958, a commission of Oulema, religious scholars and interpreters of 
Islamic doctrines and laws, underwent a process of debate, negotiation, and consensus on 
the contents of the Personal Status Code, or Moudawana (or in Arabic Mudawwanat al-
ahwal al-shakhsiyya).70 The legislation was strongly inspired by Muslim rights within the 
Malikite tradition of Islamic jurisprudence based on fiqh. As noted earlier, there are four 
schools of Islam which differentially interpret women’s rights.  The Malikite school is 
predominant in Morocco and tends towards more conservative and literal interpretations. 
Mounira Charrad (2001) argues the degree to which Maghrebian nation-states 
institutionalized conservative interpretations of the Personal Status Code depended on the 
extent to which the state relied on the tribes (or kin-based networks) for political support 
after independence.  States that relied more heavily on tribes for social control, such as 
Morocco, instated more conservative family laws based on tribal norms, than states that 
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 “The codifications of criminal law and criminal procedure in 1962 and 1959, respectively, 
contained virtually no references to the classical Islamic law, but instead drew inspiration from 
French law” (Buskens 2008:7). 
70
 See Sadiqi (2008:329) for a description of the feminists’ hopes for a liberal Moudawana in 1957. 
100 
 
did not rely on tribes, such as Tunisia, where the Personal Status Codes are among the 
most liberating for women (Charrad 2001).  
 The Moudawana was seen by the public as the symbol of Moroccan national 
unity (Buskens 2008).  This was particularly important given that under colonial rule 
there was a pluralist legal structure, divided into French and Spanish codes and Sharfian 
codes. The Sharfian code consisted of Moroccan Islamic law with judges who made 
rulings based on the Maliki school; separate Berber laws for those specific areas 
recognized as Berber; 71 Jewish law for judgments administered through the rabbinical 
courts; and makhzen law, which were laws decreed by the Sultan before the protectorate 
and mostly dealt with administrative matters.72   
 Interestingly, the French legal influence was not only apparent in Moroccan 
secular law, but the French also played a role in reforming elements of Islamic law 
(Buskens 1993, 2008). Specifically, the French influenced the textualization and 
formatting of Islamic law, not its substance (Buskens 1993). The structure and content of 
the law shifted when Islamic law was written down and recorded in accordance with 
French legal standards. One of the most profound shifts stemming from textualization 
was the loss of many of the oral interpretations of fiqh. In the traditional European and 
French model of legal documentation, only textual references of law were considered 
valid (Buskens 1993). In the textualization process, variation and historical 
interpretations of fiqh were lost. 
 Shifts in Moroccan Islamic law due to the colonial influence differed from other 
countries’ experiences where more substantial and direct shifts have been documented. 
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 Referred to as dahir berbère. 
72
 For a more detailed history of the legal structure during the French protectorate, see Buskens (2008).  
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For example, there was a more in-depth blending of colonial and Islamic legal influences 
in Egypt. Amira El-Azhary Sonbol has explored the colonial influences on shaping and 
deepening discrimination against women in Islamic law. Sonbol (2003a) shows how 
colonial law deepened discrimination against women in Egyptian Islamic law. 
Specifically, Egyptian Islamic law was impacted by colonial laws through the 
establishment of different courts for distinct classes of people, nationalities, and religious 
affiliations. In fact, a “hierarchy of ‘guardianship’ and dependents—guardians being 
adult males, dependents being females and minors” was established under these reformed 
courts (Sonbol 2003a:87).  The notion of personal status was derived from the Italian 
language and had nothing to do with Islamic law. In fact, it was adopted to distinguish 
between property laws and laws related to personal relations. Interestingly, personal 
status laws in the colonial homelands were being abolished due to their latent sexism. 
Nonetheless, the discriminatory laws and practices were exported to the colonies, where 
they were adopted and accepted (Sonbol 2003a).   
The Moudawana and Women’s Rights  
 The old Moudawana (1957/58-2004) legislated women’s and men’s roles and 
obligations and women’s rights within the family. The man was deemed the head of the 
household, the wife’s guardian, and financial provider, establishing patriarchal relations 
within the family sphere. Moreover, women were not autonomous decision-makers in 
legal settings and were required to have a male family member, wali, sign legal 
documents, such as marriage certificates, on her behalf. Other restrictions on women’s 
rights included the right to unilaterally divorce, to share head of household 
responsibilities, and to gain equal inheritance. 
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These laws set up a normative system for interactions within the family, which 
differentially valued men’s and women’s contributions. Leila Ahmed (1992:242) 
highlights the way in which these laws are based on patriarchal systems of social 
organization: “Family law is the cornerstone of the system of male privilege set up by 
establishment Islam. That it is still preserved almost intact signals the existence of 
enormously powerful forces within Middle Eastern societies determined to uphold male 
privilege and male control over women.” These discriminatory national contexts are the 
historical result of an amalgamation of traditional and patriarchal practices, including 
feudal, colonial, and national legacies, which aim to control and legislate women’s lives 
and bodies (Moghadam 2003; Mashour 2005). Feminist activists in the Maghreb detail 
the various influences on Islamic law: 
Historically, Islamic law has been shaped on the Arabian peninsula in a 
tribal and patriarchal society, structured on the preeminence of agnatic 
lineage groups (i.e. kinship through male descent) and the preeminence of 
the father within that group. As with any other historical production, 
Islamic law was formed through the intertwining of that which was newly 
established (Islam and its text) and that which was handed down from the 
past or borrowed and adapted to the needs of the growing 
community...This complex and progressive construction, based on the 
interpretation of sacred sources, as well as on awareness of the special 
circumstances that brought about this law’s birth and development was 
abruptly halted in the fourth century of the Hejrah (10th century A.D.). 
This was based on “the theological and political” grounds that the door of 
ijtihad had been closed, which meant ending the legislative effort and 
halting doctrinal interpretation. Since that time, Islamic law has become 
ossified under the weight of theological dogmatism and legal scholarship 
(Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 2003:13-14). 
 
 Reformist feminist activists in the Maghreb have argued that the Quran, the 
hadith, and the tradition of the Prophet, the sunnah has been subject to a masculine and 
conservative interpretation (Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 2003). Moroccan activists are 
careful not to refer to the Moudawana as sharia, but rather as Islamic law due to the 
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underlying ideological implications of these terms. Hirsch (2006) explains the very 
important distinction between the terms sharia and Islamic law, as the two words are 
often used interchangeably, particularly in the West. Islamic law is seen as being derived 
from the holy texts of Islam and often from other secular and tribal influences as well.  
However, sharia denotes a religious and sacred legal perspective: “Islamists in particular 
would argue that shari’a invokes the divinely inspired dimension and not the creations of 
humans, such as the Islamic legal principles of current legal systems or even, for some, 
the schools of jurisprudence (madhhab) that have figured so prominently in Islamic legal 
scholarship” (Hirsch 2006:167). This difference is paramount to the feminist activists’ 
reform agenda and to the creation of politicized identities and discourses as seen later in 
the chapter. 
The Emergence of Civil Society and the Women’s Movement 
 It was in the climate of state-sponsored democratization in the latter years of King 
Hassan II and with the opening of political spaces that a strong civil society base for the 
women’s movement began developing. After the death of King Mohamed V, his son 
Hassan II ruled Morocco until 1999. There was a great degree of political repression 
under King Hassan II’s rule, particularly in the earlier years. This time period was 
characterized by the imprisonment, torture, and the arrest of political opponents. These 
massive human rights abuses are still being investigated today.73 Periods of heightened 
repression occurred during failed coup attempts in 1971 and 1972.  King Hassan II also 
marched into Western Sahara annexing this land as Moroccan and stimulating a conflict 
with the Algerian pro-independence forces, the Polisario Front.  
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 In 2004, King Mohamed VI set up the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER), a truth and 
reconciliation commission to explore the human rights abuses made by authorities between 1956 and 1999. 
This was the first human rights commission of its kind in the Arab states. 
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 In the 1980s, the country undertook a structural adjustment program (SAP) under 
advisement of the World Bank and IMF to eliminate debt and begin working toward a 
free market economic structure.74 Some of the political and economic policy shifts were 
due to the King’s desire to maintain close ties with Europe, which included a 1987 bid for 
European Union membership that was rejected on regional grounds. During the latter part 
of King Hassan II’s rule in the 1990s, he began a gradual process of political 
liberalization reforms aimed at democratizing some of the political processes through 
constitutional reform. Among some of the reforms, the King separated the power between 
the legislative and executive system and, through constitutional reforms in 1996, 
established a bicameral parliament.  
 In the 1990s after international criticism regarding past human rights violations, 
King Hassan II established a human rights council. Concurrently, more voice was 
allowed from opposition groups to the King through the established political party 
system. Yet, King Hassan II was criticized by international actors as not truly instilling 
democratic structures, since he still retained ultimate authority over political and 
legislative decisions.75 
                                                 
74
 For a discussion of the legacy of the SAP on Morocco’s economic condition through the 1990s to 2001, 
see Denoeux (2001). 
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 Denoeux and Maghraoui (1998:130) highlight the paradox of state sponsored democratic opening and its 
impact on legislative and policy negotiations that occur in the country: “The move toward a more 
democratic, participatory and accountable form of government - one that tolerates an expanded role for 
civil society and is better capable of satisfying part of its demands - may even be predicated on the system's 
ability to resort to royal arbitration. In part, this is because royal arbitration becomes the only mechanism 
available to settle potentially polarizing issues on which there is considerable disagreement within civil 
society or between civil society and the state. Similarly, the authority and legitimacy of the king were 
instrumental in making possible such significant steps toward democracy as the 1992 constitution and the 
1996 constitutional amendment. Ironically, therefore, further democratization in Morocco may depend, for 
a while at least, on the occasional resort to nondemocratic ways of exercising authority”. 
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 While evidence of a Moroccan women’s movement dates back to the 1946 at 
independence,76 these new political and economic shifts ushered in the rise of women’s 
advocacy groups. In the early 1980s, human rights advocacy organizations were limited 
due to government pressure. However, more groups gradually began to emerge in the 
next decade (Buskens 2003). In this next generation, feminist associations began to play a 
central role in shifting dominant socio-legal norms.  While some of these organizations 
were closely affiliated with political parties at their founding, over time the associations 
evolved to be partially or completely autonomous from partisan structures. Examples of 
such organizations are Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) 
established in 1985 and Union de l’Action Feminine (UAF) established in 1987.  These 
NGOs focus on matters of gender discrimination, civil rights, violence against women, 
and sexual harassment (Naciri 1998). ADFM was a central part of the reform efforts and 
an organizational hub for bringing together a number of NGOs and creating joint 
coalitions and networks, such as the Printemps de l’Egalité (Spring of Equality Coalition) 
and the regional, Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité. The strategies that these organizations 
developed in light of political openings and closings in the Moudawana reform efforts are 
the focus of the rest of this chapter.   
 The feminists’ objective was to demonstrate that gender equality could be reached 
in a Muslim country (Lemrini 2005:PI).  The main goal was to reform the Moudawana, 
such that women had the right to legal and familial autonomy as evidenced through 
shared head of household and autonomous legal decision-making status. Additionally, the 
activists demanded that women were to be free from threats of repudiation or polygamy 
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 See Sadiqi (2008:325-326) for a detailed description of the first feminists in Morocco, largely connected 
to the Istiqlal (Independence) party. 
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and should have equal rights to men in inheritance, divorce, age of marriage, and 
custodial matters (Naciri 2007:PI). Feminist arguments emerged calling for equality 
between men and women as a fundamental prerequisite for achieving a democratic 
society, respectful of human rights (Naciri 1998).  
…the defenders of the patriarchal system have taken the feminists’ 
discourse for what it was: a radical questioning of written and 
unwritten laws which structure political and social order in the 
Maghreb. By defending their specific rights, Maghrebian women 
have, furthermore, extended the scope of the struggle for 
democracy. Their claim for equality between the sexes clearly 
poses the question of the kind of democracy sought by opposition 
institutional forces…But by questioning the social order based on 
the discrimination against women, they [feminists] contribute to 
undermining its ideological foundations. (Collectif 95 Maghreb 
Egalité 2000:58). 
 
Feminist activists focused on gender equality through law reform in order to 
institutionalize women’s rights and as a first step toward shifting gender norms and 
relations. 
However, the women’s movement was not the only group to prosper under new 
political openings. The Islamists also gained strength from the political opportunities and 
posed a strong threat to the women’s movement’s achievement of its goals. The political 
Islamists framed the reforms proposed by the women’s movement as influenced from the 
West with the goal of destroying Moroccan society and Moroccan family values. Their 
longer-term political plan entailed Morocco moving forward toward the goal of 
establishing an Islamic state (Guessous 2007:PI). Islamists found allies in traditionalist 
and conservative religious groups who argued for a close interpretation of Islamic 
principles and stated that any revision made to the Personal Status Code would be against 
Islam. They countered that in place of reforms there should be greater respect for the 
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traditions of Allah and the religion itself. Both conservatives and Islamist political groups 
used religion to persuasively reject the women’s rights activists’ claim of equality within 
the family. 
Sadiqi (2008:330) notes:  
Liberal feminists quickly realized that Islamists targeted women, 
especially the lower classes, through their call for veiling and their 
carefully packaged discourses that comforted the patriarchal tendencies 
among men, especially young unemployed males who were easily led to 
think that women’s work outside the home robs them of opportunities. 
They also realized that by pushing politicized women to demand rights 
from a religious perspective, they were trying to hijack the discourse, 
space, and fruits of years of efforts by liberal feminists. 
 
The growth of both the feminist and Islamist movements throughout the 1980s set the 
stage for a contentious battle over Moudawana reform in the 1990s. 
Early Campaign Successes in the Moudawana Reform 
 In 1992-1993, the feminist activists met their first wave of successes. In order to 
organize public support for the Moudawana reform, the Union d’Action Feminine 
(UAF), through its newspaper 8 Mars on March 3, 1992, launched a grassroots campaign 
to obtain a million signatures to support a petition in favor of the Moudawana reforms. 
This petition was a great success, with UAF obtaining over a million signatures, 
illustrating significant public support of legislative reform. The combination of women’s 
rights grassroots’ mobilizations through the One Million Person Signature Campaign and 
through activists’ political lobbying led King Hassan II to establish a commission to 
investigate potential Moudawana reforms in 1992 (Buskens 2003). King Hassan II used 
his role as “commander of the faithful” to invoke ijtihad, or religious interpretation, 
which situated the reform effort in an Islamic framework (Buskens 2008). The 
commission’s feedback led to minor amendments being made to the Moudawana in 
108 
 
1993.77 While the amendments did not grant any substantive changes in women’s rights, 
the symbolic act of reforming Islamic law was very significant (Buskens 2003; Lemrini 
2005:PI).  Activists saw the reforms as a critical success for future reform efforts.  Once 
the Moudawana had been amended, activists could leverage the fact that it was no longer 
an unalterable text (Lemrini 2005:PI).  A veil of sacredness had been broken down in the 
process of the 1993 reform. 
 During this time period there were also regional efforts of coalition building 
initiated across the Maghreb. Specifically, the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité (hereafter 
referred to as the Collectif 95) was created from 1991-1992 to actively reflect on and 
propose reforms to family legislation in the Maghreb. The Collectif 95 is a coalition of 
women’s activist organizations, intellectuals, leaders, and researchers from three 
countries, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.78 ADFM in Morocco coordinated the Collectif 
95’s work for ten years. The Collectif 95 drew upon experts in different fields, such as 
legislators, activists, and educators and formed a theoretical foundation for its project to 
reform Maghrebian family laws, also called the 100 Measures. The document was 
produced in the time leading up to the 1995 Beijing Fourth Conference on the Status of 
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 Some of the more substantial changes in the 1993 reform were the following: a woman must consent to 
marry by signing a registry witnessed by officials that are appointed by the Minister of Justice, a father 
could no longer compel his daughter to marry, a mother was ensured legal guardianship of her child, as 
well as minor clarifications made to a husband’s maintenance or nafaqa. These reforms were considered 
superficial because the major issues of concern to women’s rights activists, i.e. marital tutorship, polygamy, 
divorce, and repudiation, were left virtually untouched (Buskens 2003).  
78
 The main non-governmental human and women’s rights organizations  involved in the founding of the 
Collectif 95 and its efforts at family law change include: Algeria: Association pour la Promotion des Droits 
des Femmes (APDF) (Association for the Promotion of Women’s Rights);  Association Indèpendante pour 
le Triomphe des Droits des Femmes (AITDF) (Independent Association for the Victory of Women’s 
Rights); Morocco, Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) (Democratic Association of 
Moroccan Women); Tunisia, Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD), (Tunisian 
Association of Democratic Women); and Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le 
Développement (AFTURD) (Tunisian Women’s Research and Development Association).   
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Women for lobbying purposes. An Algerian member of the Collectif 95, Caroline Brac de 
la Pérrière (2007:PI) highlights the starting point for the Maghrebian code.  
We agreed that we would not accept anything less than the rights guaranteed in 
the Tunisian law. We were from the same culture - the Maghreb - so we felt that 
we should not have discriminatory laws [as existed in Morocco and Algeria] when 
Tunisians enjoy equality [in most spheres of their life].  
 
The 100 Measures document became the basic level of shared understanding that 
the Collectif 95  and many feminists activists in Morocco started with in rewriting new 
egalitarian laws (Brac de la Pérrière, 2007:PI; Naciri, 2007:PI).  
Contentious Discourses: The Battle over Referents  
 The Moroccan political context began more positively shifting in favor of 
Moroccan reformist feminist activists in the late 1990s. There were some major political 
changes that opened up opportunities for the women’s reform movement. A key shift in 
the Moroccan women’s movement campaign effort occurred with a change in political 
leadership (Buskens 2003). Following the legislative elections in 1997, the Union 
Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) a Socialist opposition party came into political 
power, holding 57 of 325 seats.79 Following this victory, in early 1998, King Hassan II 
appointed Abderrahmane El Youssoufi, (Secretary General of the USFP party) to the 
Prime Minister position.  
Building upon these opportunities, the women’s rights activists aimed to create a 
collective national platform, which could then be adapted for local, regional, or national 
mobilization and campaign efforts. The outcome of this vision for legal change was the 
Plan of Action for the Integration of Women in Development (PANIFD) (Plan d’Action 
pour l’Intégration des Femmes au Développement), which integrated the tenets of the 
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 An Islamist political party also enjoyed its first election to parliament in 1997. In 2007, the Islamist PJD 
gained 46 seats in Parliament, finishing second to the nationalist Independence party, 52 seats.   
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Beijing Platform. Eight of the two hundred and fourteen measures were related to the 
revision of the Moudawana. On March 19, 1999, Prime Minister Abderrahmane el-
Youssoufi publicly supported PANIFD.  
The political opportunity for women’s voices to be heard further increased when 
King Mohamed VI assumed office in 1999 after the death of his father, King Hassan II. 
King Mohamed VI was more supportive of women’s equal rights, democratic reforms, 
and economic liberalization (Buskens 2003). A significant portion of the population held 
high hopes for improving their quality of life, so much so that the public characterized 
him “the king of the poor” (Buskens 2003:94). In an address to Parliament in 1999 after 
ascending to the throne, King Mohamed VI publicly supported women’s quest for 
equality: “How can society achieve progress, while women, who represent half the 
nation, see their rights violated and suffer as a result of injustice, violence and 
marginalisation, notwithstanding the dignity and justice granted them by our glorious 
religion?” 80 After the speech, the King began instating a number of women to high-
profile positions (Sadiqi and Enaji 2006). In this context, women’s status and political 
participation in Morocco were increasing. Leveraging the openings, the women’s 
movement increased the frequency of their demands for equitable Moudawana reform. 
Yet, though there were political openings, this was also a time of strong public and 
religious opposition. 
Extreme backlash from the conservative and Islamist groups arose in response to 
state support for Moudawana reform and specifically to Prime Minister el-Youssoufi’s 
support of PANIFD in March 1999. The League of Oulema of Morocco was angered 
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 King Mohamed VI reiterated this sentiment in a 2003 speech as well.  See 
http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/speech/2003/ParliamentFallSession101003.htm for the full 
transcript. 
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because they were not consulted before the government supported the measure and 
therefore, they insulted women’s rights activists and supporters of PANIFD deeming 
them heretics (Buskens 2003). The League of Oulema opposed the reform because they 
believed it contradicted the sharia, Quran, and sunnah. Additionally, Islamist feminists 
framed the liberal feminists’ goal of reform as being outside of Islam. Iman Ghazalla 
(2001) notes that prominent Islamist feminists, such as Jamilla Messala from the 
Association of Renewal of Women’s Consciousness, described PANIFD as rejecting 
Islamic specificity by using the discourse of international human rights under the 
umbrella of the United Nations. Taking this notion one step further, activists from the 
same organization argued that the feminist claims for gender equality stated in the Plan 
actually suppressed Islamic identity, cautioning: “…This could lead to the eventual 
abrogation of the definitive texts of Islamic law and their substitution with the rules of the 
United Nations.” (Ghazalla 2001:3 on Bassima el-Haqqawy). 
Liberal women’s rights groups responded that religious scholars did not have the 
absolute right to interpret Islam and that true democratization would result from 
reinterpretations of Islamic law (Buskens 2003; Lemrini 2005, 2006:PI). During this 
time, the Conservatives and Political Islamists joined forces forming an opposition 
network, National Group for the Protection of the Moroccan Family (Organisme national 
pour la protection de la famille Marocaine). The group launched a powerful opposition 
campaign mobilizing and disseminating conservative ideology through mosques and 
within other shared cultural spaces such as in the medina (old city), madrasas (religious 
schools), popular media, and political arena (Buskens 2003; El Habti 2007:PI; and 
Guessous 2007:PI). Soon thereafter, the government withdrew its support for PANIFD.  
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The opponents to PANIFD were framing the anti-plan platform in terms of the 
preservation of the family and Islamic identity. This strategy resonated with a wide range 
of political and ideological positions. In fact, opposition to the Plan consisted of a broad 
constituency that even included some individuals from more progressive parties, such as 
the socialist USFP party, in addition to the religious conservatives and Islamists (Salime 
2005). In the face of this setback, women’s rights associations in Morocco organized two 
networks of NGOs in 1999. The first was called the Network of Support for PANIFD 
(Réseau d’appui au PANIFD) that advocated for the adoption of the action plan by the 
government. The Network encompassed over 200 human rights, women’s rights, and 
development associations who supported and promoted the measures put forth in the plan 
of action (Lemrini 2005:PI). The Network of Support for PANIFD took on a public 
mobilization and political role in promoting the plan to show that extensive support for 
women’s rights existed in the country and that it was primarily mobilized through civil 
society organizations. The second network formed in 1999 was the Front for the Defense 
of Moroccan Women’s Rights (Front de Défense des Droits Des Femmes Marocaines) 
and consisted of more than 50 women’s associations. The Front, in order to show mass 
support for PANIFD, focused heavily on mobilizing trade unions and cultural 
organizations along with women’s groups to garner national and international support for 
the reform efforts and against the Conservative Islamists’ hostile actions to women’s 
rights groups.  While the networks pursued separate actions, they were also 
complementary and initiated common actions, such as mobilizing support for the Rabat 
march of 2000, as described below.  
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Framing issues of Moudawana reform in terms of Islamic identity struck a deep 
chord with the broader Moroccan public and drew support away from the women’s 
reformist agenda. In fact, the countermovement’s mainstream influence on the public 
debate was so powerful that religion became the primary focus of framing contests 
(Lemrini 2008; El Habti 2007:PI; Buskens 2008). Conservatives and Islamists labeled 
women’s rights activists as “un-Islamic” (Lemrini 2005: PI; El Habti 2007:PI). The 
opposition made declarative statements such as “Islam is in danger” in response to the 
activists’ demands for reform (Lemrini 2005:PI).  
The intensity and broad influence of the countermovement’s messages were 
revealed in a critical culmination of mobilization events in 2000. The women’s 
movement had organized a march in Rabat to support International Women’s Day and 
the Moroccan women’s struggle for equality in legislation. Estimates place turnout at 
around 50,000-100,000, including moderate men and women. The countermovement 
mobilized a powerful countermarch, estimated at around 500,000, in Casablanca against 
the Moudawana reform and the PANIFD. Raja El Habti (2007:PI) recalls: 
Not only did they [conservatives and Islamists] rally their constituency 
and people in the party, but also the average Moroccan...women in jeans 
marched against the plan [PANIFD and more broadly, Moudawana 
reform]. It was not about covering up and it was not about belonging to a 
political party. It was about religion and the attack against their religion 
and they believed that they should make their voices heard. 
 
 Signs at the Islamist rally strongly positioned the reformist feminist activists as 
the “other” and as Western influenced. Slogans included: “‘They march for the 
international community, we march for our nation;’ ‘Their march is international, ours is 
national;’ and ‘They are funded by the World Bank, we are self-funded’ …” (Salime 
2005:95). Raja El Habti (2007:PI) notes that many opposition forces were arguing that 
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the reform was “some Western conspiracy to destroy Moroccan society and religion.”  
The opposition groups to PANIFD were carefully constructing arguments that positioned 
the reformist feminists as outsiders, interlopers, and as out of touch with Moroccan 
values, and as such, they should not make claims on Moudawana reform. Dichotomies 
between “secular versus religious” and “Western versus culturally authentic reform” were 
easily mobilized by the countermovement, as Taylor and Whittier (1992) describe 
creating distinct “us versus them” boundaries. It is important to note that the opposition 
used the fact that activists were receiving international funding against them in this 
context, as explored in depth in Chapter 2. For the countermovement, foreign funding 
was a primary means to validate the Western push behind the feminists’ messages. The 
primacy of international funding in constructing and validating the countermovements’ 
arguments depiction of the cultural inauthenticity of the movement cannot be overstated. 
These were very powerful strategies for tapping into histories of colonialism and the need 
for national resistance and strength in Muslim identity. Likely, framing attempts such as 
these led activists at ADFM to ask funders not to be publically named in campaign events 
in Morocco and beyond due to the intense framing efforts of the countermovement, as 
previously discussed. The focus on the activists’ connection to the international 
community shows how foreign support can be both a constraining and enabling resource, 
echoing findings in Chapter 2.  
The countermovement’s successful framing of national identity and sovereignty 
was quite potent and the loss of state support for PANIFD was a significant setback for 
the feminist movement. However, in the period after these setbacks, the activists aimed to 
lobby and position itself with the state, understanding that the state would not support the 
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Islamist groups rising power (Sadiqi 2008:332). According to the reformist activists, at 
the base of the opposition’s arguments were notions of Islamic patriarchy, which were 
rooted in claims of cultural particularism. This strategy aligned with politicized religious 
opposition across the MENA that have legitimated women’s inequality by “seek [ing] 
justifications [for not reforming laws] by applying conservative or literal interpretations 
of various Quranic texts or by abstracting certain passages out of their context” (Mashour 
2005:565).  Therefore, the feminists’ subsequent strategies would more prominently 
highlight the spirit and goals of justice and equality within Islam and calling for ijtihad 
and textual reinterpretation (Lemrini 2005:PI; Naciri 2007:PI; Sadiqi 2008).  
Feminists’ Adaptive Strategizing 
 Following the controversial public demonstrations of women’s rights activists and 
opponents, King Mohamed VI decided in March 2001 to deal with the Moudawana 
reform in his capacity as “commander of the faithful.” The King invited forty important 
female leaders from Moroccan women’s organizations and political and social 
movements to provide recommendations for reform. In order to ensure consistent 
lobbying given the new political developments, a group of activists formed a new 
coalition in 2001 called Printemps de l’Egalité (or the Spring of Equality network).81  
The network demanded changes in the Personal Status Code, including the eradication of 
marital tutorship, an increase in women’s age of marriage to 18 (equal to the age of 
marriage for men), the allowance of divorce, the establishment of equality in marriage, 
and the abolishment of polygamy. The network gave priority to advocacy and media 
campaigns aimed at the public regarding women’s status and rights (ADFM 2003). More 
limited in scope, this smaller coalition aimed to establish a network to advocate for the 
                                                 
81
 Printemps d’Egalité was initially composed of nine women’s organizations, but eventually grew to 30. 
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reform of the Moudawana and more closely monitor the situation and its developments.  
In 2001, the Printemps de l’Egalité network sent King Mohamed VI a memorandum with 
their propositions and visions for reform in the Moudawana. The network facilitated 
strong, continuous, and relevant use of the mass media in order to apply and maintain 
pressure on decision makers.  
Activists at ADFM also drew on their transnational feminist ties. In particular, as 
members of the WLP, ADFM invited the network in mid-2001 to be the first 
international organization to support the appeal to reform the Moudawana.  Reaching out 
to international networks of support was a critical decision, particularly due to the 
opposition’s claims of external influence in the feminist movement. However, given the 
WLP Partnership’s focus on Muslim-majority countries, the NGO was perceive as a 
regional ally. WLP wrote a petition of support for the Moudawana reform to the Prime 
Minister Abderrahmane el-Youssoufi and sent it to their international network of NGOs, 
activists, academics, and policy makers. Over 200 activists, academics, and organizations 
joined Moroccan NGOs in support of their quest for increasing women’s rights. Rakhee 
Goyal, Executive Director of WLP, recalls the letter that Mahnaz Afkhami, Founder of 
WLP wrote to el-Youssoufi.  “We actually got a response back and he indicated that they 
were very appreciative of support from the rest of the world and from the MENA region 
at the time.”   Importantly, this transnational support came at a strategic time chosen by 
the Moroccan feminists after their mobilization strategy had been developed and, as 
political opportunities were ripe for international visibility.   
 The efforts of the various feminist domestic and regional networks were 
successful in mobilizing an official response from King Mohamed VI. The King created 
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the Royal Advisory Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission), which was 
responsible for the reform of the Moudawana in 2001. The Commission was composed 
of 16 religious scientists, lawyers, sociologists and doctors, whose perspectives ranged 
from liberal to traditional. Three members were women from highly respected 
professions. This Commission met regularly between 2001 and 2004.82 King Mohamed 
VI asked the Commission to follow three principles in coming up with recommendations 
for the Moudawana reform: (1) to keep with the founding principles of Islam, or 
maqasid; (2) to invoke ijtihad, or religious interpretation, from any religious tradition or 
school, if necessary; and (3) to maintain international principles of human rights as 
mentioned in the Moroccan constitution (Guessous 2007:PI).83 The Royal Commission 
was to pass their recommendations on to the democratically elected parliament who 
would vote on the reform. This was the first time that legal reform occurred not through 
Royal decree, but rather through using more democratic means of debate and legislative 
vote (Naciri 2007:PI). 
 Nouzha Guessous, Professor of the Faculty of Medicine, women’s rights activist, 
and a member of the Commission to Reform the Moudawana, describes the reform 
process. The Commission embarked on a three year reform and analysis process that 
consisted of multiple phases. First, the Commission held open hearings and received 
delegations of representatives from over 80 local women’s NGOs, associations, and 
departments.  Each organization shared its perspective on the Moudawana reform and 
offered its recommendations for changes.  In total, the delegation process lasted 
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 In 2003, King Mohamed VI nominated a new President to the Commission and a more open dialogue 
followed. 
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 Interestingly, the second principle set forth by the King, ijtihad, was an important part of the reformist 
activists’ layered framing strategy, as subsequently explored.  
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approximately nine months. During the second phase after the hearings, the Commission 
met to analyze each article in the old Moudawana and discussed the proposals put forth 
by the different constituents.  This process involved in-depth negotiations and debates. 
There was considerable debate among commission members. Some members believed 
they should take into account different organizations’ and associations’ proposals in the 
rewriting process. Others felt that the hearings were merely for educational purposes and 
had no binding character (Guessous 2007:PI).  
Despite the promising political openings with the establishment of the 
Commission, the strong countermovement still blocked reform. It was important that the 
Moroccan women’s reformist movement reach the grassroots and establish cultural 
legitimacy. They began to reformulate their discursive frames based on the constraints 
they had faced thus far (Lemrini, WLP 2008b).   
Diverse Argumentation for Law Reform 
 As Raja El Habti (2007:PI), key religious strategist to ADFM and the Collectif 95, 
explains the turning point for the women’s movement was after the 2000 march in Rabat. 
The feminists re-visited their discursive claims, framing tactics, and mobilization 
strategy.  After the 100 Measures had been prepared, the Collectif 95 realized that 
activists often lacked tangible tools which they could use to frame their debates, counter 
the opposition, and mobilize support. In order to more effectively communicate the need 
for egalitarian laws to the public, in 2001, the Collectif 95 created a complementary and 
comprehensive strategy for arguing for family law reform (Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 
2003). In order to address these challenges, the coalition drafted the Guide to Equality in 
the Family in the Maghreb (Dalil pour l’égalité dans la famille au Maghreb). 84 The 
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 The book, originally published in 2003 in French and Arabic, was recently translated into English by WLP. 
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Guide for Equality is an activist’s resource that provides arguments for family law reform 
from sociological, human rights, religious, and legal perspectives. Eleven key issues in 
family legislation in the Maghreb are addressed in the Guide to Equality, such as the legal 
age of marriage, the ban on polygamy, the duty to obey, and the obligation to support the 
family. There is a review of the current Personal Status Codes in Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia and justifications for achieving legal equality from the four different 
perspectives. Within the Moroccan context, the Guide to Equality was used to document 
past legal shifts and justifications for religious reinterpretation of Islamic law or the 
multiple interpretations of fiqh. 
Rabéa Naciri (2007:PI), Former President of ADFM, describes the fundamental 
premise of the feminists’ position:  
From the 80’s, we chose not to separate our universal rights frame of 
reference from the religious frame of reference in our campaign 
arguments, based on the following two main ideas: Islam is not opposed to 
women’s equality and dignity and should not be presented as such; on the 
contrary, it is an equity and justice religion; and Islamic law (fiqh) is not 
the Sharia, and we need to distinguish between both. Islamic law is a 
human and historical production, and consequently, is able to evolve to 
take account of social developments and to fulfil new needs of Muslim 
men and women. 
 
This nuanced position could be conceptualized as a bridge between a religious and a 
secular approach to Moudawana reform. This perspective involved producing and 
disseminating a rationale for the conceptualization of equality within an Islamic 
framework. The framing also pointed to the emerging democratic ideals in the region as 
one of the bases for women’s legal and social equality. The Moroccan arguments were 
pragmatic, as activists included issues that would be most likely to reach a broad 
consensus among their democratic and modernist allies. Such non-negotiable issues 
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included head of the family status, abolition of the woman’s obedience duty to her 
husband, and elimination of marriage guardianship. On the other hand, issues such as 
equality in the inheritance and marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man were 
not included in the list of claims, for political and social reasons (Naciri 2007:PI). 85 Not 
only was there a clear and tangible rights-based vision outlined, but the women’s rights 
activists used the religious and political sentiments of the time to forward their objectives 
(Naciri 2007:PI).  
 Within this approach, feminists highlighted religious argumentation as one piece 
of the discursive framing method, yet one that could be differentially employed, 
depending on the target audience and the activists’ overall strategy (Brac de la Pérrière 
2007:PI; El Habti 2007:PI; Naciri 2007:PI). The strategic choice to highlight religious 
discursive strategies was not without contention with activists in the Collectif 95. Some 
feminists in the coalition wanted to draw attention away from religion and focus on 
increasing attention to processes of democratic deepening, national legal norms, and 
international human rights realities (Brac de la Pérrière 2007:PI). There was considerable 
debate on the topic, but ultimately there was consensus on the importance of religious 
discourses, particularly in light of the cultural realities and strong religious opposition 
(Lemrini 2005:PI). Ghazalla (2001:19) interprets the Collectif 95’s strategy:  
While women’s liberation is linked to their liberation from religion, it is 
necessary to distinguish between two levels of Islam. Islam as belief and 
as a cultural and civilizational heritage should be left intact, but Islam as a 
legislative system produced by jurists should be changed. Since the 
modern ideology reflected in human rights represents universally shared 
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 Citizenship and women’s inheritance were not included in the activists’ Moudawana reform campaign. As such, a 
few months before the adoption of the new family law, ADFM issued a political document called ‘Reform is necessary 
and achievable’ that addressed these issues. 
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cultural norms, it is necessary to urgently change national laws in 
accordance with international standards such as CEDAW. Collective 95 
recommended an alternative legislation to the Moudawana that is secular, 
as well as adapted to the Islamic referent. 
 
 Ghazalla separates the cultural and legislative aspects of Islam and argues that it 
is the legislative aspects, which are to be reformed. Additionally, Ghazalla highlights the 
bridging role of the Collectif 95’s framing strategy. These distinctions are particularly 
important as they relate to the ideological and institutional dimensions of Islamic law. 
Strategic Framing: Re-appropriating the Religious  
The following section presents an example of the discursive framing that was 
used by activists in arguing for reform of the Moudawana. Articles from the Moudawana 
related to the “duty to obey” principle are used as the foundation for analyzing the 
activists’ discursive framing tactics. I then show how these tactics led to more nuanced 
argumentation for the necessity of women’s equal rights in Moroccan society.  
The “Duty to Obey” Principle 
The following codes in the old Moudawana (1957/58-2004) highlight the 
principle of the duty to obey and the husband’s position as head of household.86  
Marriage is a legal contract.... The goal of marriage is a life of fidelity and 
purity and the desire to procreate, by establishing on stable foundations 
and under the direction of the husband, a home that allows the husband 
and wife to fulfill their mutual obligations in safety, peace, affection and 
mutual respect. (Article 1)  
 
Article 36 further highlighted women’s roles in the relationship and the subordination of 
women to men in the marital relationship.  
The husband is entitled to expect his wife to: be faithful; be obedient in 
accordance with acceptable standards of behavior; nurse the children born 
to the couple, if possible; allow him to oversee the running and 
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 Old Moudawana article references have been taken from the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité’s (2003) 
Guide to Equality in the Family in the Maghreb.  
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organization of the household; be respectful of his father, mother and close 
relatives. 
 
From these articles, the patriarchal normative trend for the duty of the wife to obey her 
husband was established. Practically translated, these articles had considerable impact on 
women’s right to autonomy, control over their sexuality, work, and freedom of 
movement (Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 95 2003).  
In comparison, the following article was written by Maghrebian feminists in the 
100 Measures document as an alternative, progressive article describing the relationship 
between husband and wife. 87 
Husbands and wives owe each other mutual respect, fidelity and 
assistance. Together, they shall manage the family, raise and protect the 
children and choose the family home. They must avoid causing each other 
any kind of harm whatsoever (Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 1995: Article 
23). 
 
This article secures equality in terms of the roles and responsibilities within the 
marital relationship, which is based on deep respect. The feminists’ proposition for new 
legislation differed drastically from the laws in the old Moudawana.  Given the normative 
gap in the values and rights put forth by activists in the 100 Measures and those in the old 
Moudawana, activists believed it was necessary to have a comprehensive communication 
strategy with multiple forms of argumentation to support their campaign.  
Religious Framing through Ijtihad 
The activists argued against gender inequalities found in Articles 1 and 36 in the 
old Moudawana, by claiming that Islamic verses that supported the “duty to obey”88 were 
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 In order to strengthen the movement’s demands, in 1995 the Collectif 95 developed a Hundred Measures 
and Steps for Egalitarian Legislation of Family Relations in the Maghreb. The document put forth 100 
article propositions for an equitable and discrimination-free Moudawana. 
88
 Verse 34 of the surah Al-Nisa: “Men have authority over women because Allah has made the one 
superior to the other, and because they spend their wealth (to maintain them)” (as seen in the Collectif 95 
Maghreb Egalité 2003:74). 
123 
 
largely based on ijtihad. Specifically, the activists cite a religious scholar in support of his 
position regarding the multiple interpretations of the “duty to obey” in different schools 
of Islam.  
In this respect, Ibn Hazm, in discussing the ahadiths follows: Some people have 
offered differing points of view on the subject that we have just mentioned and 
have advanced worthless information (al-Muhall·:volume 7, part 10, pages 332-
334) (Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 2003:74). 
 
The Collectif 95 (2003:16) also highlighted the human interpretative dimensions 
of Islamic law: 
Fiqh, a product of the human intelligence of the great doctors of law and 
their students that is sustained by various contributions, did not escape the 
laws of diversity. Through their very existence, their geopolitical bonds, 
their number and the doctrinal differences that oppose them, the legal 
schools attest to this rich diversity and the prolific abundance of ideas. 
Controversy (ikhtilaf) fueled the legal debate and gave the various 
opinions their discursive authority and persuasive force. Under these 
conditions, how could preeminence and absolute authority be ascribed to 
the opinion of a single person or school of thought? Through what 
mechanisms were dissenting opinions suppressed? What caused creative 
logic to give way to dogmatic reasoning? What is preventing current 
legislators from interpreting and adapting, just like the founders? Nothing 
that is at all sacred is preventing them in any case.  
 
The Maghrebian activists highlighted the inconsistencies in the different interpretations 
of the body of Islamic law and used the various interpretations as support that there was 
no singular interpretation of Islamic law. 
The activists also provided alternative hadith (the recorded oral traditions of the 
Prophet) and passages from the Quran given their positive and equal view of women that 
could be drawn upon for persuasive counterargumentation in the public sphere (Collectif 
95 Maghreb Egalité 2003:74).  
Such positive and constructive attitudes draw their strength and credibility 
from the love and mercy that are the foundation of the relationship 
between husband and wife in Islam: By another sign He gave you wives 
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from among yourselves that you might live in tranquility with them, and 
planted love and kindness in your hearts. (surah Al-Rum, “The Romans,” 
verse 21) 
 
They are a comfort to you as you are to them. (surah Al-Baqarah,“The 
Cow,” verse 187) 
 
Drawing from ijtihad and underscoring the multiple interpretations of Islamic law 
helps create a religious foundation upon which the reform efforts are validated. In a way, 
the activists’ strategy of ijtihad could be seen as an attempt to democratize the religious 
interpretive process (Pittman 2008). Activists began shifting their discourse to an 
evolving religious frame to argue for Islamic law reform, which lent itself to the re-
writing of equality between men and women. The activists used the material reality of 
multiple schools of Islamic thought (and thus varying rights for women depending on the 
school) as a fundamental basis for the very radical claim that there is no one sacred 
textual interpretation of Islamic law. Since there are a variety of interpretations of Islamic 
law and no one shared law exists across regions, there is a need to align legal 
interpretations with current social and political contexts. This, in effect, opens the 
pathway for the activists to broaden discursive framing mechanisms and vernacularize 
multiple strands of global and local norms and ideologies.  
For example, after the Rabat march of 2000, feminist organizations such as the 
Ligue Démocratique pour les Droits de la Femme began issuing statements such as: 
Islam has from the beginning been a religion of justice and equality. On 
the basis of ijtihad, the interpretations laid down in the Moudawana, 
which date from a period of decadence of Islamic scholarship and are 
closely linked to customary law, can be changed. Equality is not a foreign 
idea and was defended by Islam long before it became fashionable in the 
West (Ligue Démocratique pour les Droits de la Femme, 2000, as seen in 
Buskens 2003).  
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By using the language of their opponents and by claiming rights to ijtihad, the 
feminists were able to engage in public discussions grounded in religious principles, 
emphasizing the cultural authenticity of the women’s movements’ claims.89  Moreover, it 
offered activists the means to neutralize the opposition’s claims over the religious and 
cultural arena. The activists were careful to link the religious frame of equality to 
regional histories, thus distinguishing the women’s movement from Western influences 
and deflecting Islamists’ claims of cultural inauthenticity. Moreover, through drawing 
from ijtihad, there was an embedded necessity to align the Moudawana with current 
international human rights law, constitutional law, and sociological realties in Morocco.  
Diversifying Frames: Integrating the Sociological, International, and Constitutional 
I refer back to the articles related to “duty to obey” as an illustrative example of 
how reformist activists further diversified the arguments to show the necessity of law 
reform. In addition to religious frames, the activists argued for the abolition of the “duty 
to obey” based on sociological arguments that these laws were based on historical 
arrangements where the husband had been deemed the main financial provider. The 
activists argued that women’s roles had shifted in the Maghreb since the writing of the 
law and that current sociological realities necessitated revisions. They used women’s 
participation in the labor force as an example of the shift in women’s economic power, 
e.g., one third of Moroccan women are in the paid workforce, with 17.5% of women 
holding head of household status.  
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 Buskens (2003) has highlighted the Islamists’ framing of the women’s movement as lacking “cultural 
authenticity.”   
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Activists also needed to address the countermovement’s claim that eliminating the 
“duty to obey” articles would result in a breakdown of the nuclear family and family 
values. As such, the Maghrebian activists developed the following response:  
In the collective imagination, it is thought that concentrating power in the 
hands of the husband and father contributes to maintaining family 
cohesion and stability. And yet in Tunisia, where the duty to obey was 
abolished in 1993, the divorce rate is the lowest in the region. 
Consequently, abolishing the duty to obey does not necessarily lead to a 
breakdown in the family. On the contrary, the Tunisian example shows 
that freeing women from marital domination and having a more equal 
distribution of power between spouses contribute to family solidarity 
(Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 2003:76).  
 
This sociological argument was targeted toward the general public as a counterargument 
with evidence that family values and the nuclear family itself does not dissolve as a result 
of family law reform, as seen from the Tunisian experience. 
Additionally, the activists constructed arguments for abolishing the “duty to 
obey” based on international human rights principles to which Morocco was signatory, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and through their national 
legislation. 
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law (Article 6). and All are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and 
against any incitement to such discrimination (Article 7). 
  
Article 5 of the Moroccan constitution states: “All Moroccans are equal 
before the law.” 
 
The feminist activists highlighted the discrepancies between international and 
national legislation that guaranteed women’s equal rights and the articles in the 
Moudawana. Activists then leveraged these legal disconnects as additional justification 
for reform. For example, activists might argue that since the “duty to obey” in the 
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Moudawana Articles 1 and 36 violated principles of equality set forth in the Moroccan 
constitution, the law should be reformed to reflect the constitutional principles legally 
granted to all citizens. By preparing many levels of argumentation, activists could 
develop context or group specific arguments, further increasing a message’s relevance. 
This was an incredibly useful way to keep their framing strategy flexible and adaptable 
(Lemrini 2005:PI; Naciri 2007:PI).  
Cross-Cutting Discourses: Lived Experiences, Aspirations, and Law Reform  
One final example of the strategic creation and mobilization of discourses was 
carried out by the Moroccan Printemps d’Egalité coalition from 2002-2003. Printemps 
d’Egalité created a media campaign to raise the public’s awareness of the impact of 
discriminatory laws on women’s lives. The campaign developed narratives around legal 
issues, such as early marriage, repudiation, and domestic violence. Dissemination efforts 
included sharing the four real case histories of Moroccan women from different 
backgrounds with the grassroots at demonstrations through the media, rallies, and 
marketplaces.  Two case studies from the campaign are described below. The case of 
Kenza, a 32-year-old engineer who is battered asked: “I work. I pay my taxes. I take on 
my responsibilities in the house. All the same, my husband beats me regularly. So why do 
I not have the right to ask for a divorce?” 
VISUAL 5 ABOUT HERE 
Sixty-five-year-old Yamna, who has five children – four of them small – is 
homeless, and commented: “After all these years, I don’t understand …. Yes, I refused to 
share my house with another [woman], but not to be thrown out on the street, this is 
unjust.”  
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VISUAL 6 ABOUT HERE 
Each case ended with the slogan: “Building a democratic Moroccan society 
depends on the respect of women’s rights.” The narratives used in all of the cases point to 
a life where women do not experience autonomy, agency, and voice in their families 
(Pittman and Naciri 2007). However, even while expressing these hardships, the woman 
in each case strongly questions her position, the lack of justice in her situation, and the 
inequality she experiences at the hands of male family members.  
The closing slogan is particularly important. Moroccan activists were subtly 
leveraging aspirations of democracy set forth by the state as well as local norms and 
practices embedded in daily life, i.e., norms regarding decision making power, 
interactions between men and women, and educational prospects for women. 
Interestingly, instead of using an international human rights framework to support 
women’s rights, the activists focused on leveraging their historical context and social 
goals in order to justify equal rights for women, e.g., through highlighting the historical 
push toward democratic structures in Morocco and pairing the success of democracy with 
the necessity of women’s equality. The blending of broader transnational democratic 
principles into current political aspirations was a strategic attempt to frame the messages 
in a manner that would resonate with the public. Simultaneously, this also reflected the 
feminist activists attempt to publicly pressure the state to keep its commitment to the 
democratic processes of debate and to ensure the passing of the Moudawana through 
parliament (Lemrini 2005:PI; Naciri 2007:PI).   
Another objective of these cases was to provide the public with the motivation for 
and a rationale behind reforming the Moudawana. The activists found spaces to 
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humanize and shed light on women’s status and hardships under the old Moudawana 
using individual narratives. These narratives offer a space to make meaning of the 
legislation and their relation to Moroccan national identity in a very different way than 
the Islamists’ description of Moroccan identity. Still, there was difficulty convincing men 
of the necessity of reform and in gaining their support, perhaps due to the privileges the 
current social system procured for them. Activists framed the gender issues at stake by 
personalizing major issues in the Moudawana, by asking men if they wanted their 
daughters protected from injustices such as repudiation and domestic violence (Lemrini 
2005:PI).  
Finally, the narratives help to create a wedge between religious and secular 
ideology by shifting the debate from a secular-religious binary to a case of human 
injustice. Analyzing the awareness campaign, it appears that activists were attempting to 
discursively dismantle hegemonic laws as they related to individual women’s lived 
experiences, by rewriting the possibilities for reform and prefacing women’s equality on 
the nation-state’s shared political goals. Finally, by taking individually lived experiences 
such as these and pairing them with discourses of ijtihad, which support the 
reinterpretation of fiqh given the current socio-political realities, Moroccan feminists had 
a strong counterpoint to Islamists’ argumentation.  
The Family Law Reform  
The momentum of support for the Moudawana reform radically shifted following 
the 2003 bombings in Casablanca. The terror act, initiated by a radical Islamist group, 
resulted in public backlash. The Moroccan public distanced themselves from the 
Islamists’ messages at this time due to the tragedy, thus, opening up a broader space in 
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which the feminist discourses could resonate (Mir Hoesseni 2007; Sadiqi 2008). King 
Mohamed VI reacted and built on the public fear and outrage by cracking down on 
Islamist groups in the country. He began putting pressure on the Commission to move 
forward with the reform efforts, using his power as “commander of the faithful” to instate 
a progressive and modern family law (Buskens 2008). In October 2003, King Mohamed 
VI announced that legal changes would be made to the Moudawana. On the February 3, 
2004, the new Family Code was unanimously passed by parliament after being presented 
by the King Mohamed VI months earlier.  
After over 46 years of feminist and activist contestation of institutionalized 
gender inequality, the Moudawana was fundamentally altered.  The major changes to the 
Moudawana included: the abolition of marital tutorship, the elimination of the principle 
of obedience to the husband, the establishment of joint responsibility between husbands 
and wives within the family, opportunities for mutual spousal divorce, the establishment 
of 18 as the legal age for marriage for both men and women alike, the expansion of legal 
guardianship rights for women (e.g., at 15 years of age, children have a choice of which 
parent to stay with as their primary guardian and if a woman remarries she can have 
custody of the children until they reach seven years of age), judicial discretion is to be 
applied in cases of polygamy, and inheritance from maternal grandfathers as well as from 
paternal grandparents is allowed for grandchildren. 
 The following excerpts from the preamble of the reformed Moudawana in 
February 2004 highlight the major changes to enhance women’s rights.90  
Adopt a modern form of wording and remove degrading and debasing 
terms for women. Place the family under the joint responsibility of both 
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 Moudawana translated into English by Human Rights Education Association (HREA) www.hrea.org. 
Retrieved January 15, 2008.   
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spouses, given that 'women are men's sisters before the law' in keeping 
with the words of my ancestor the Chosen Prophet Sidna Mohammed, 
Peace Be Upon Him, as reported, 'Only an honourable person dignifies 
women, and only a villainous one degrades them. 
 
 The Moudawana reform also substantially impacted the “duty to obey,” rendering 
it dissolute. The following articles of the reformed Family Code demonstrate how the 
language and normative expectations for the marital relationship had been altered by the 
reform. Under the revisions, the article addressing the purpose of marriage (Article 1 as 
seen above) was changed to: 
Marriage is a legal contract by which a man and a woman mutually 
consent to unite in a common and enduring conjugal life. Its purpose is 
fidelity, virtue and the creation of a stable family, under the supervision of 
both spouses according to the provisions of this Moudawana (Article 4). 
 
 The reformed Moudawana is considered to be more progressive than the past law; 
although, in no way is it considered a perfect law (Naciri 2007:PI).  
Implications of the Reform 
 The reforms provided essential legal changes for institutionalizing women’s rights 
and autonomy within an Islamic framework (Lemrini 2005:PI). At the individual level, 
some of the most important changes were the co-responsibility between husbands and 
wives within the family, along with the abolition of the duty of obedience. Taken 
together, these changes supported women’s full, equal, and autonomous participation in 
their private and public lives. Through the alterations to the Family Code, religious law 
was no longer seen as sacred and untouchable, but rather open to reinterpretation based 
on principles of equality within the Quran as well as more universal principles of dignity, 
freedom, and equality. The adoption of the new Family Code in 2004 represented a 
turning point for Moroccan women as well as for the entire society (Naciri 2007:PI).  
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However, even with these successes, significant legal and social challenges still 
exist. Even though the reforms increased women’s equality in the family, the ban on 
polygamy was not outlawed and inheritance issues were not addressed (Lemrini 2005:PI; 
Wuerth 2005). In fact, Nouzha Guessous (2007:PI) notes: “There are many contradictions 
within the new Moudawana. Many of these contradictions occurred due to the article 
revision process.”  For example, Guessous noted that the Moudawana is not a coherent 
code because the Commission was not able to analyze articles in relation to each other. 
Therefore, there was no transparency or consistency between different articles in 
Moudawana.  The most important contradiction to these laws in Guessous’ opinion is that 
despite the proclamation of equal responsibility between the husband and wife in the 
family,91 the legal representation of the children is still exclusively granted to the 
husband, except in the case of his absence or in case of an emergency where the mother 
can represent the father and make decisions for the children. Additionally, the law does 
not stipulate the sharing of nafaqa, or family maintenance and financial support, between 
spouses.92 Due to these inconsistencies during the article revision process, Guessous 
stopped lobbying for changes concerning sharing of the nafaqa because it was unclear if 
a consensus would be reached on the legal co-guardianship of the children and if the 
group would come to recognize domestic work as a part of the economic contributions of 
                                                 
91
  Moudawana, Section 1, Article 51 states, “The mutual rights and duties between spouses are: 
1- lawful cohabitation on the basis of good conjugal relations, justice, equality in case of 
polygamy, mutual fidelity, virtue, and the preservation of family honour and their children; 
2- cohabitation, mutual respect, affection, and the preservation of the family interests; 
3- the wife’s assuming with the husband the responsibility of managing and protecting 
household affairs and the children’s education; 
4- consultation on decisions concerning the management of family affairs, children, and 
family planning; 
5- good relations with each other’s parents and close relatives, respecting, visiting and hosting 
them within accepted standards.” 
92
 Moudawana, Article 194 states: “The husband shall be obligated to pay maintenance to his wife the 
moment their marriage is consummated, as well as if she has bidden her husband to consummate their 
marriage once it has been duly concluded.”  
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women. These complications made it difficult to advocate for changes in one law without 
knowing the consequences for another. Such inconsistencies in the Commission’s reform 
processes as well as its outputs are a matter for further analysis.  
In short, women’s rights activists feel there is more work to be accomplished, 
which is the focus of future planning and mobilizations. Rabéa Naciri (2007:PI) notes: 
“Success can have pernicious effects and lead to loss of identity and particularity of the 
Moroccan women’s movement. The idea that Moroccan women have gained all of their 
rights may represent a danger.” Further challenges may arise due to the difficulties in 
implementing these new rights, in view of high illiteracy, problems in legal enforcement, 
and growing backlash from Conservatives and Islamists (Bordat and Kouzzi 2004; 
Lemrini 2005, 2006:PI).  
Another potential challenge may also arise from the new judiciary system created 
through the reforms. Family matters will now be taken out of the ordinary court system 
and be placed within these special family courts. Many argue that the separation of 
family issues from the ordinary judiciary system may be problematic due to a lack of 
family court accountability (Bordat and Kouzzi 2004). 
The Anaruz network, created in April 2004, seeks to address some of these 
concerns by following-up and monitoring the Moudawana reform efforts (Naciri 
2007:PI).  The Anaruz network is a national network of information and legal assistance 
centers aimed at women victims of violence that now encompasses 39 organizations 
throughout Morocco. The network has been conducting research on implementation of 
the Moudawana, engaging in an advocacy campaign to ensure the Family Code is 
correctly applied, and offering legal advice for victims of domestic violence under the 
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new family law standards. Most recently, Anaruz (2009) prepared a documentary film 
entitled, The Family Code: The Law and Women’s Lives (Le Code de la Famille: La Loi 
et la Vie des Femmes). The film presents women’s testimonies, highlighting the 
inconsistencies between the written law and their experiences of conjugal violence, 
domestic repudiation, and divorce, to shed light on reflect on the implementation of the 
new family court system and the Family Code. 
Addressing accountability concerns, Naciri (2007:PI) suggests mobilizing to: 
ensure that the Moroccan constitution explicitly incorporates equality between men and 
women in all domains, promote equality and justice with every local piece of legislation, 
ensure that legislation is implemented and effective, and implement gender-based 
programs and policies, such as positive discrimination policies (or affirmative action) in 
order to promote women’s public and political participation as well as economic activity.  
At its heart, this campaign was about challenging unequal patriarchal norms and 
ensuring that women experience equal freedoms, dignity, and opportunities in an Islamic 
society. Yet, paradigmatic social shifts within a society cannot transpire overnight. For 
these reasons, women’s rights activists, such as ADFM, have shifted their strategies from 
active campaign mobilizations to education and empowerment-based initiatives. Some of 
the public education campaigns included televisions and radio announcements explaining 
new rights gained with the new Family Code. In May 2005, ADFM launched a media 
campaign in French and Moroccan Arabic to educate the public on women’s rights, 
gender equality, and the new changes made to the Moudawana. Six main social problems 
were targeted: domestic violence, divorce, expulsion, sexual harassment, matrimonial 
tutorship, and gender discrimination in the workplace. See below for an example of the 
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marital tutorship message that ran on the radio and on the television. The text read: “Yes, 
adult women have the full legal capacity to finalize their marriage. Why be silent when 
the law protects you? Article 23 in the new family code stipulates that women have the 
right to finalize the act of marriage on her own.” 
VISUAL 7 ABOUT HERE 
ADFM (2005) concludes the case with the following statement: 
Through the recent legislative reforms (Family Code, Penal Code, and 
Labor Code), Morocco is committing to a road of equality and justice for 
all Moroccans.  However, there are numerous forms of injustices toward 
women that persist in daily life: violence, sexual harassment, 
discrimination between men and women in access to education, health 
services, employment, and decision making...These new legal texts punish 
these abuses. When respected, it is moving forward from state 
consolidation of rights and toward democratic opening. When ignored... it 
is again a form of exclusion, of violence and of denying half of the 
Moroccan population its citizenship.  
 
The media campaign helped to raise public awareness in regards to new women’s 
rights in the Moudawana and laid the foundation for shifting the way that men and 
women conceptualize women’s rights within the family (Pittman and Naciri 2007). The 
activists offer a powerful juxtaposition of national symbolism with women’s rights to 
educate the public on the impact of the Moudawana reforms. ADFM continued to draw 
from democracy frames, extending their previous frames and then linking women’s rights 
to full citizenship and public participation.  
 In summary, Moroccan women’s rights activists were successful in re-locating 
Islamic law in a historically evolving framework using ijtihad and popular national 
discourses of democracy, human rights, and social justice. Through their extensive efforts 
engaging the grassroots and lobbying public officials, the activists contributed to the 
democratization of public space (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006). While social and practical 
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barriers to women’s equality in Morocco still remain a challenge, women’s rights 
associations are now shifting their strategies to public awareness-raising of the new rights 
afforded in the Moudawana. Some NGOs, such as ADFM, have gone even further to 
lobby for women’s more full inclusion as citizens through additional reform to the 
Nationality Code, which is the focus of the following chapter.  
Constraints as Innovation Catalysts  
The challenge of overcoming obstacles in a movement may offer a hidden 
opportunity for strategic innovation. Constraints, like opportunities, are important sites 
for strategic analysis in social movements. It may be that a specific set of constrained 
choices or limitations may serve as a catalyst for a group to begin to critically assess 
issues that normally might not be a central focus. In the Moroccan case, activists 
responded to the Islamist and conservative countermovements’ claims by looking for 
sources of potential leverage. Amina Lemrini (WLP 2008a) explains: 
Each time we conducted a deeper analysis of the context, we saw that 
some opportunities carried risks and could be opportunities, but could be 
threats at the same time… When we worked on the Moudawana reform, it 
never would have happened without the controversy of Islamists. They 
submitted the topic for discussion, they helped to get us to reflect on the 
issues … and this helped us, we exploited these threats in order to 
transform them into opportunities. 
 
 This case underscores the importance of the dynamic interaction between 
movements and countermovements in shaping the discursive fields. Moreover, it appears 
that movement constraints can be integral to creating effective strategy.  Importantly, the 
Moroccan feminist activists did not perceive religious constraints as fixed, and therefore 
off-limits, but rather as alterable or permeable. This is particularly important given the 
intensity surrounding any reform related to Islamic law and the very real roadblocks that 
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come with the hierarchal structure and process of Islamic jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the 
feminist activists found an authentic way to engage with the contextual constraints and 
sought strategic political support at the highest levels. Not only did the contentious 
atmosphere of the 2000 International Women’s Day march and the challenges associated 
with mobilizing the average Moroccan assist reformist activists in regrouping, but it also 
prevented activists from missing the unique opportunity to close the discourse gap by re-
appropriating the religious debate. They developed multiple discourses, including 
religious references, in order to ground their goals of reform in a Moroccan perspective. 
This vernacularization of global norms can be conceptualized as a means to bridge the 
secular and religious frameworks in order to support Islamic law reform.  
 Interestingly, adapting discourses based on the shifting political developments 
was not only a strategy used by the reformist movement. Political developments in 
October 2003, after King Mohamed VI announced that the Moudawana would be 
reformed, stimulated the Islamists to amend their frames as well. Analyzing newspaper 
data in the month after the King announced the reform I found the language of one 
Islamist groups had shifted. For example, in Le Journal Hebdomadaire on October 24 
2008, the women’s section of the banned Islamist and anti-monarchy political group, Al 
Adl Wal Ihssane (Justice and Spirituality) wrote an op-ed article. The article states: “The 
association of Sheik Yassine does not contest the recent measures of the Family Code. 
Regarding women, contrary to general belief, the movement has never been against the 
revision of the Moudawana, on the condition that that the Quranic referential remains the 
single referent.” 93 Mouna Khalifi (2003), member of the Justice and Spirituality group 
begins the article by stating: “The Moudawana is not sacred because all human work is 
                                                 
93
 French translation is the author’s own.  
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imperfect and must be subject to revisions and questioning based on weaknesses that are 
revealed through its practical applications.” The positions put forth in the newspaper 
articles were mildly conciliatory, particularly in relation to the sacredness of the 
Moudawana and its ability to be reformed. Intriguingly, the reformist activists’ strategy 
of the human interpretation of Islamic law is reflected in the Justice and Spirituality 
position. It is important to note that this statement was released in the six months after the 
turbulent Casablanca attacks when many moderate Islamists were distancing themselves 
from radical rhetoric (Howe 2005). However, it is an interesting statement coming from 
Justice and Spirituality given their contentious relationship with King Mohamed VI. As 
Zakia Salime (2005) has argued over the life of the Moudawana campaign, the reformist 
movement’s claims became “Islamicized” and the Islamist movement’s frames became 
“secularized.” 94  
Shifts in the both the feminist movement’s and countermovement’s positions 
demonstrate the fluid and dynamic nature of Muslim identities as these political and civil 
society actors respond to broader social, political, and historical events (Sharify-Funk 
2008). Activists are often quick to work on solidifying identities, and to garner support 
for one’s cause, particularly in charged movement contexts. Ideological values, such as 
conservative religiosity or secularism, can become buzzwords in framing contests as a 
means to separate “us” from “them.” Of course, these factionalized messages can also 
create divisions that prevent diverse constituency building and reinforce identity 
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 For a more in depth analysis of the Islamist feminist claims on the state after the Moudawana reform see 
Zakia Salime (2007). Salime describes how Islamist feminists made demands to the state to “take the 
mosques back,” focusing on bringing women to positions of leadership and power in the mosque through 
preaching. They also highlighted the moderate goals of a politicized version of motherhood while calling 
for gender equitable progress within religious institutions. 
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differentiations (Taylor and Whittier 1992).  For a movement trying to find a common 
ground, this can make the task infinitely more difficult. However, the progressive shifts 
of both actors’ discourses over the life of the Moudawana campaign reveals the potential 
for creating dynamic discourses that could bridge different ideological positions and 
appeal to a broader base despite contention.     
Summary 
 The goal of this study was to highlight the ways in which Moroccan reformist 
feminist activists blurred the ideological distinctions between secular and religious 
binaries and implemented innovative framing strategies in light of constraining 
conditions. The conservative religious and Islamist opposition were very successful in 
framing reformist activists as cultural outsiders, tapping into “cultural authentic” versus 
“foreign imported” binaries. They attempted to leverage these fracturing discourses and 
even accused activists of not being true Muslims. It appears that the legal context, both 
the normative and structural components of Islamic law, played a facilitative role in the 
mobilizing of politicized and oppositional frames of “secular versus religious.” These 
frames tap into long standing postcolonial ideological battles. These deeply engrained 
historical legacies feed into essentialized ideological distinctions and binaries that elicit 
strong reactions. These emotions were strategically and effectively mobilized into 
identities and by politicized religious groups (Goodwin and Jasper 2006). On the other 
hand, interpretations of the interactions between religion, secularism, and reform from the 
case study could be alternatively conceptualized with a focus on how activists tapped into 
different aspects of Moroccan identity. Fatima Mernissi (1975) has described the multiple 
identities that Moroccans embrace including aspects related to the modern, Arab, and 
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Muslim. The modern dimension of identity is connected to the encoding of a modern 
legal system blending secular and religious elements and to international human rights 
principles. The Arab dimension of identity refers to the notion of pan-national identity 
and resistance against colonialism. The Muslim identity taps into the religious sphere and 
transcendent practices. Using these different permutations of identity, one could interpret 
the countermovement as primarily attempting to mobilize Muslim and Arab identities, 
particularly in reaction to Western ideas and against colonialism, tapping into issues of 
cultural authenticity. The feminist activists, on the other hand, were attempting to bridge 
the Muslim aspect of identity with the modern aspect, in effect trying to broaden support 
for reform by drawing from one of the countermovements’ primary identities, Muslim, 
and linking it with the modern.   
The strategic use of religion as a pretext for the impossibility of reform was 
directly attended to by activists after they saw how persuasive these arguments had been 
in the public sphere. In order to respond to the countermovement’s frames, activists re-
appropriated elements of the constraining local discourses. The reformist feminists and 
other progressives countered that in fact many religious principles within Islamic legal 
texts necessitated women’s equality. According to this perspective, reform could be 
achieved through ijtihad and the reinterpretations of religious texts, such as the Quran 
and sunnah. The activists highlighted cross-cutting discourses, such as democracy, 
feminism, human rights, and religious principles in their framing reformulations. By 
using personal narratives, the activists were able to bring the legal code to life, thus 
increasing the potential that the public would engage and connect with the issue of 
reform. The feminists’ creation of bridging strategies can be interpreted as an attempt to 
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defuse the politicization of and mobilization of the countermovement’s version of 
Muslim identity. This stimulated diverse public debate on legislative reform, thus 
fostering spaces for multi-partisan public debate that is characteristic in a democratic 
reform process (Lemrini 2005:PI).  
 I have been careful not to argue that the Moroccan activists’ broadening of public 
discourse and debate led to the reform of the Moudawana. Indeed, a variety of structural 
political opportunities and constraints played major roles in stimulating reform. 
Ultimately, the actions of the King, who was sympathetic to modernist principles of 
gender equality and human rights, made the reform a reality through his power as 
“commander of the faithful.” However, he had to rely on liberal elements in civil society, 
such as the women’s movement, to broaden public support for the reform due to the 
strategic influence of religious groups in the political and public sphere.  In this context, 
activists made strategic use of opening and closing political opportunities, through high 
level political lobbying efforts with parliament and the King, which led to the 
establishment of the commission to reform the Moudawana. A critical event for the 
reformist activists was the 2003 Casablanca terrorist acts (Sewell 2005).95 After this 
event, the King distanced himself from the Islamists and religious conservatives who had 
been an extremely influential political group in the country. Soon thereafter, the King 
committed full support to making the Moudawana reform a reality.  Energy shifted away 
from the religious opposition and more moderate voices were able to leverage the 
opportunity, thus, opening up a broader space for the feminists’ bridging constituency 
discourses to resonate. These findings underline the importance of the mediating aspect 
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 Sewell (2005) argues that critical junctures or events can serve as catalysts for opening up the space for 
social movement actors to achieve their goals. 
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of legal and political contexts (Alimi et al 2005; Amenta et al 1992; 2005; Kitschelt 
1986; Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1982; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; 
Sewell 2005; Tarrow 1998) and specifically, constraining conditions on activists’ 
strategy. 
 The results from this case challenge findings in the literature that suggest frames 
are more effective with core unchanging messages. The use of layered multiple frames to 
target different constituents (also called multi-organizational fields) is advantageous as 
long as activists maintain their core demands (Evans 1997).  The vernacularized 
discourses, drawing from global rights, religious, and domestic claims made it more 
likely that messages would appeal to a broader Moroccan constituency. It also seems that 
adaptations to global and local discourses and the bridging of different ideologies were a 
good contextual fit given the broader political opportunities and constraints (Evans 1997; 
Levitt and Merry 2007; 2008; Tohidi 2002). Discursive frames were developed and 
adapted through trial and error based on analysis of the socio-political context, through 
positive and negative interactions with the state, policy, and advocacy organizations, and 
with powerful political allies and challengers in mind. The flexibility and adaptability 
seen in the Moroccan women’s movement’s strategy is an important component related 
to positive social movement outcomes (McCammon et al. 2008).  
 The analysis also sheds light on the idea that encountering a staunch roadblock 
may be a unique catalyst for a movement. This may be the case as it positions activists in 
a space where great strategic benefit may result from the re-analysis of the basic goals 
and assumptions of a specific campaign or a movement, more broadly (McCammon and 
Campbell 2002; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). This case demonstrates the dynamic 
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interaction and evolution of discourse as political actors interact with allies and 
opponents, face various contextual constraints to achieving their goals, win and lose 
political battles, and react to broader moments of historical significance. 
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Chapter 5: Beyond the Local: Cross-Regional Strategizing and Coalition Building 
for Nationality Reform 
 
In this chapter, I explore the organizing practices associated with regional 
feminist coalition building efforts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). I 
analyze the case of the regional Campaign to Reform Arab Women’s Nationality 
(CRAWN also referred to as the Nationality campaign). Having examined the domestic 
case of Personal Status Code reform, which highlighted the adaptive movement strategies 
of the Moroccan women’s movement, I now assess movement strategy in a coalitional 
setting with diverse cross-national NGO actors. My goal is to understand how 
international and local resources and strategies are used to build regional movements for 
women’s nationality rights. Specifically, I emphasize the roles of solidarity, leverage, and 
movement learning in nationality reform efforts in the MENA (Alvarez 2000; Bandy 
2004).  
I start by profiling the regional nationality campaign and give an example of the 
local Moroccan implementation, focusing on spaces for movement learning and 
knowledge exchange between NGO actors. Next, I analyze the role of international 
networking in the Nationality campaign, highlighting how transnational collaboration has 
contributed to the increased visibility of and political leverage in the campaign.  I 
conclude by exploring the different adaptations of coalition-building strategies as they 
move from regional spheres of development to local spheres of implementation, 
highlighting the cross-fertilization potential of movement strategies. I conclude by 
demonstrating the transborder exchange of campaign strategies by briefly describing the 
Iranian One Million Signatures campaign and the regional Musawah campaign.  
145 
 
 In order to do this, I profile multi-lateral and regional partnerships between three 
NGOs: Collective for Research Training and Development in Action (CRTDA) in 
Lebanon, Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) in Morocco, and 
Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP) International in the USA.96  I analyze data from 
interviews with the executive leadership of CRTDA, ADFM, and WLP International as 
well as activists’ interactions in two transnational meetings in 2006 and 2008 in Potomac, 
MD. I examine internal organizational documents and reports from the three NGOs, 
which include campaign reports, annual reports, and reports to funders. I also draw data 
from two Nationality campaign websites, hosted respectively by CRTDA and WLP.  
From the above analyses, a model for grassroots movement building emerged, which 
began at the grassroots regional level and reached out to international networks. This 
model builds on strengths in the local context and makes use of international connections 
for visibility purposes. This multi-level approach to movement strengthening is useful 
when building transnational social movements with multiple social and political 
influences that affect the domestic context.  
Coalition Building: Elements of Success 
 Coalitions involve the temporary or permanent collaboration of numerous 
autonomous organizations that jointly pursue a shared goal (Mizrahi and Rosenthal 
1993). Coalitions can be viewed as political actors and characterized as social movement 
organizations.  Effective processes of coalition building are integral to a movement as it 
bridges diverse constituents and identities toward a common purpose and goal (Evans 
1997; Staggenborg 1988). Research has shown the distinct advantages of transnational 
coalition building, which includes: increasing regional recognition of shared grievances, 
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 For more detailed information on the methodology see pp. 208-209 in Appendix 1. 
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broadening local perspectives, developing activists’ strategic development and action 
plans through increased involvement in and analysis of social, political, and economic 
issues that affect multiple countries, and increasing hope and solidarity through shared 
successes and failures (Bandy 2004).  
 However, coalition building is not a magic bullet for reforms and certainly does 
not only create positive outcomes. There are many problems that may arise that can have 
destabilizing effects on a movement or on NGOs. Among these problems are 
communication rifts, differences in priorities and strategies, power struggles, 
disagreement over adequate responses to challenges posed by countermovements, and so 
on (Bobo, Kendall, and Max 2001; Kleidman and Rochon 1997), all of which can lead to 
a breakdown in solidarity and relationships, to goal drift, and potentially dissolve the 
purpose of the coalition. 
 Nevertheless, research by Alvarez (2000) suggests two primary reasons that 
NGOs seek out transnational connections: solidarity and leverage. NGO activists find 
strength in “…transnational contacts as a means to (re)construct or reaffirm subaltern or 
politically marginalized identities and to establish personal and strategic bonds of 
solidarity with others who share locally stigmatized values…” (Alvarez 2000:3). 
Moreover, NGOs use these bonds to seek out transborder partnerships to expand rights or 
policies. The nature of these networks creates spaces of international leverage that can 
affect domestic ties. Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue this process occurs through the 
“boomerang pattern of influence” where transnational actors, such as NGOs, put pressure 
on states to make policy or law changes in alignment with their rights commitments. 
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Confirming the importance of solidarity, Bandy (2004) found in his study of the 
Mexican labor movement, that drawing strength and solidarity from broader coalitions 
boosted local movements’ survival and their sense of strategic exploration. Indeed, such 
solidarity can provide psychological protection against local challenges and setbacks, 
during difficult times (Brac de la Pérrière 2007:PI). More than that, working to forge 
transnational linkages gives NGOs the mental space to begin reflecting on and outlining 
strategies for change. These strategies, created in spaces of solidarity, can be effectively 
leveraged when the timing is advantageous, as will be seen later on in this chapter. 
Carmin, Hicks, and Beckmann (2003), in their study on the formation of the white 
Carpathian Euro-region, show that even during times of extreme repression and the lack 
of political opportunities, NGOs formed the groundwork for a longer term vision of 
change, by developing local, regional, and international strategies, which could then be 
leveraged at more opportune times. In addition to solidarity and leverage, I suggest that a 
third factor should be added to Alvarez’s (2000) theory on the reasons why activists seek 
out transnational connections, for movement learning purposes.  
Overview of Nationality and Citizenship in the Maghreb  
 Nationality is one aspect of citizenship, which describes the political rights and 
obligations between an individual and the state. In the MENA, this relationship has 
historically been brokered between the state and the male head of household. Typically, 
the male is regarded as the head of household according to the Islamic family law 
(CRTDA 2004). Therefore, the husband’s nationality is conferred upon the children, and 
in some countries the wife if she does not share the same nationality.  
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 Citizenship regulations in many MENA states discriminate against women’s 
ability to enjoy full and equal membership in their societies, relegating them to a ‘second-
class’ citizenship status (CRTDA 2004; Joseph 2002). They deprive mothers of the right 
to transfer nationality to their children or husband. In some countries, such as Jordan, 
Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, women take the nationality of their husband after marriage, 
losing their own nationality. This has serious implications. If the family were to return 
home to the women’s birth country, they would not be able to apply for residency cards 
since she had lost her citizenship rights through marriage (Sonbol 2003b). In other 
countries, such as Morocco, husbands and wives hold different nationalities after 
marriage.  
 States have been clear that their main concern is preserving the family and not the 
individual as the basic building blocks for their societies; therefore, women’s roles and 
rights are not seen as independent, but rather are defined in relation to their family roles 
as wives and mothers: “This is the major factor in enhancing and promoting both 
religious and familial control over them [women] and rendering them more dependent on 
these institutions for representation and security” (CRTDA 2004:8). As these laws are 
combined with other political, legal, and societal elements, they then form the basis for 
an institutionalized structure of discrimination against women.  
These social institutions are nurtured by generally gender discriminating 
legal systems, ranging from Personal Status and Family laws to Civil and 
Criminal laws and most relevant to the issue at hand, Nationality laws. 
They are also maintained and reinforced by complex legal procedures and 
a social and judicial environment, which is unfavorable to women 
(CRTDA 2004:12).  
 
An analysis of the relationship between the state and women’s full public participation 
makes room for greater range of debate on women’s rights and status in the MENA 
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(CRTDA 2004; Joseph 2000). “For in reality, what is being disputed here is the future 
nature of the socio-political structure in the Arab world. More specifically, it is the core 
of the social and cultural fabric of the Arab world that is being re-drawn” (CRTDA 
2004:9). 
 However, these practices of citizenship are not in alignment with constitutional or 
international laws in most countries in the MENA. For example, as seen in the last 
chapter, Article 5 of the Moroccan Constitution asserts women’s equality to men. In 
Lebanon, a similar law exists, Article 7 in the 1926 Lebanese constitution states: “All 
Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights and are 
equally bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction.” A number of 
international legal frameworks also protect women’s right to nationality. The most 
prominent of which is the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). The majority of Arab states that have ratified CEDAW also express 
reservations on articles that they do not want to enforce as previously described.97  Often 
reservations are placed on Article 9(2) in CEDAW, which notes: “States parties shall 
grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.”98  As 
described in the introductory chapter, states in the MENA often justify reservations by 
highlighting the incompatibilities between international laws and their domestic legal 
structure, which draws from Islamic sharia.99 
The goal for activists involved in the regional nationality coalition was to rectify 
contradictions between constitutional law and discriminatory Nationality Codes by 
ensuring women’s and children’s equality as citizens through their right to nationality. 
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  As described in the last chapter, the Moroccan reservations were lifted from CEDAW.  
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 Source: CEDAW Website. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article9 
99
 This includes Morocco prior to the 2008 reform.  
150 
 
The following case study describes one of the most comprehensive, regional, indigenous 
coalition building efforts for citizenship reform.  
Global Strategy Development  
 The Campaign to Reform Arab Women’s Nationality (CRAWN) aims to educate 
and advocate for legislative changes in all MENA countries to support women’s full and 
equal citizenship. The regional campaign was initiated in 2001, with activists in 
Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, and Algeria.100 Lina Abou-Habib (2008:PI), 
the Regional Coordinator for the Nationality campaign, describes the process of deciding 
to focus on citizenship:  
First there was a collaborative action between women organizations in the 
MENA region. We were engaged in various forms of work doing a 
regional gender analysis. We were discussing compelling issues for 
women and for equality in the region and nationality arose [as an 
important issue].  There was a consensus around it [nationality] because at 
least in 2001 and 2002, it was a shared concern for all the other countries, 
which were involved.  The problems were shared, in the sense, that most 
of the laws in all these countries prevented women from transmitting their 
nationality. 
 
 Together, the coalition developed a collective campaign frame of reference for 
understanding, outlining, and speaking about the need for nationality reform. Lina Abou-
Habib (2006) continues:101  
At the regional level, we want to focus on information and communication 
on the issue of nationality. There is a lot of misinformation and 
miscommunication because, unfortunately, most states have done their 
best to link women’s right to nationality to political argumentation. For 
example, states claim that granting women the right to nationality will 
disturb the social demographic, leading to overpopulation or civil unrest. 
                                                 
100
 Coordinating NGOs in each country include: Centre d'Informatique et de Documentation sur les Droits 
de l'Enfant et de las Femme (CIDDEF), Bahrain Women's Society (BWS), Forum for Women in 
Development (FWID), Sisterhood is Global Institute/Jordan (SIGI/J), CRTDA Lebanon, and ADFM 
Morocco.  
101
 Interview from Women Learning Partnership’s, Claiming Equal Citizenship website 
http://www.learningpartnership.org/citizenship/2006/08/lahinterview030406/. 
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We are spending a lot of time with friends in the media, with sister 
organizations, demystifying the issue of citizenship. We are also building 
alliances with NGOs and, talking with parliamentarians, particularly 
women parliamentarians…The regional aspect of the campaign 
undermines the arguments against granting nationality to women at the 
national level. It demonstrates that the real issue is patriarchy and a male 
vision of citizenship, rather than all the silly political arguments that are 
being made when we demand women’s right to nationality. In addition, 
the campaign demonstrates the solidarity between women’s organizations 
and the linkages to broader citizenship issues in the Arab region.  
 
Collectively, campaign members developed the main goals of the regional 
campaign, which include: developing effective messages and reform strategies for 
regional use, mobilizing and educating grassroots women affected by the nationality 
laws, and developing solidarity and inter-organizational support for reform across the 
MENA region. 
Framing the Issue as a Shared Problem  
 In order to come up with an effective global frame to communicate campaign 
messages, activists conducted extensive research in the first few years of the Nationality 
campaign.  Each of the participating NGOs in the coalition conducted an in-depth study 
of the current domestic and international legal codes related to nationality in their 
country. In some countries such as Morocco, research studies on nationality 
discriminations were undertaken to estimate the collective impact of the laws. Next, 
activists brought together stakeholders, women affected by nationality laws, in order to 
document their stories and provide them with the appropriate legal tools to fight for their 
rights (Hayek 2008:PI; Idrissi 2008:PI). This preliminary analysis phase in the coalition 
resulted in the crafting of country cases. These cases include: an overview of 
constitutional laws related to nationality, the current nationality law, international treaties 
and conventions related to nationality issues, personal testimonies that humanize the 
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laws, and recent updates in the campaign.  A sample from the Moroccan case can be seen 
in Appendix 5.   
 After conducting the necessary background research, activists from the six major 
countries in the coalition met to discuss major framing tactics and strategies and the 
campaign slogan. Lina Abou-Habib (2008:PI) describes how the slogan “My nationality, 
a right for me and my family” was decided on. The activists based the slogan on the 
concept of equality of all citizens. However, in Arabic, nationality is a masculine word; 
therefore, in the slogan, activists used the feminine translation of “my nationality.” The 
idea was to include their major campaign frame and demand in the tagline—the right for 
women and their children to obtain full citizenship rights. The location of citizenship in a 
rights framework had a variety of implications. Men had always enjoyed the unilateral 
right to pass on their nationality, now women wanted the opportunity as well. First, 
drawing from a rights framework offered opportunities for the comparison and leverage 
of other fundamental rights that were secured by the state, such as constitutional rights to 
equality. Second, the slogan framed citizenship as a family issue, taking into account not 
only a woman’s right to her own nationality and citizenship, but the children’s right to 
inherit the mother’s citizenship as well. The aim was to frame nationality as a shared 
problem for the family that had negative ramifications on the children. This effectively 
broadened the potential range of supporters for reform, i.e., this was not only about 
gender equality, but rather about ensuring equal access to rights and resources within a 
family. This family frame could also be interpreted as a more politically palatable 
approach in comparison to only using a gender equality frame.   
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Highlighting Legal Inconsistencies  
A prominent communication tactic coalition activists used to argue for nationality 
reform across the coalition was to highlight legislative, political, and social 
inconsistencies in the law (Abou-Habib 2008: PI; Idrissi 2008:PI; Nafaa 2008:PI). This 
was also a prominent tactic of the Moroccan strategies in the previous chapter, pointing 
to the cross-fertilization of movement strategies. In the Nationality campaign, activists 
drew from the strengths of existing constitutional legislation that unequivocally stated 
equality between men and women. The activists’ focus on harmonizing different pieces 
of national legislation was a strategic move that provided evidence of a culturally 
authentic and domestically consistent reform effort. The issue of authenticity is 
particularly important in light of the Moroccan activists’ experiences with the opposition 
in the previous chapter. Coalition activists also strategically leveraged national consensus 
that had been codified in constitutional law and used previously agreed upon international 
standards, such as CEDAW, as a means to justify revising the states’ reservations on 
nationality. In order to disseminate their strategy, which focused primarily on secular 
inconsistencies between various sets of domestic law, regional activists developed a 
range of communication and outreach strategies that could be used by the different NGO 
partners in the local context as necessary. These different modes of mobilization 
included: petition drives, public rallies, special events, political lobbying, and media 
campaigns. The campaign made significant use of blogs and social networking sites, such 
as facebook. Coalition activists also built on emerging technological trends as a powerful 
space for awareness-raising, organizing, and recruitment in the public sphere (Abou-
Habib:2008 PI; Hayek 2008:PI; Goyal 2009:PI; Afkhami 2009:PI).   
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In basing their communication tactics on discrepancies between existing laws in 
their country and other agreements the state had signed onto, activists in the MENA 
could circumvent contentious issues that might have derailed feminist reform efforts, 
such as the “culturally authentic” versus “foreign import” frames seen in the Moudawana 
reform. In this case, the fact that nationality law was not located in Islamic law, but rather 
was a secular, administrative law allowed activists the opportunity to focus most of their 
framing efforts on raising the visibility of the legal inequalities, devising effective 
messages, and then mobilizing those messages. However, even though the law was not 
within the religious framework, a prominent international funder still commissioned a 
study to see how nationality could be justified in a religious framework, demonstrating 
the agenda setting power donors possess as described in Chapter 3. Lina Abou Habib 
(2008:PI) describes reactions when the study results were presented at an international 
meeting:  
I remember I was sitting next to this Yemeni Islamist and he said at the 
end of the presentation: ‘You know, that study is correct.  There’s 
absolutely no doubt about it.  But if I can ask you, why are you bringing 
religion into this?  It has nothing to do with it.’ So the report was actually 
counterproductive.  We actually had a fantastic opportunity to shift the 
discourse away from the religious level as you don’t always have to justify 
equality in terms of religion.  Here you have a perfect case in point where 
it’s [the nationality campaign] totally beyond the religious framework and 
yet some people insist on bringing it back to religion. 
 
This experience highlights how external actors can shape and influence domestic 
campaigns and influence discussions, debates, the type of public information that 
circulates. The nationality campaign discourse was moving beyond secular-religious 
binaries, yet it was thwarted due to external priorities. These findings underline the need 
155 
 
for increased international attention on local priorities, explications of the debate, and 
political framings in supporting campaign strategy development. 
Local Nationality Campaign Implementation in Morocco 
 The next two sections briefly describe how Association Démocratique des 
Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) adapted the regional strategies for change in their context. 
Building on the momentum gained from the Moudawana reform, the Moroccan women’s 
rights’ activists shifted their focus to reforming discriminatory nationality laws. 
Campaign activities were initiated in the early 2000s with the regional nationality reform 
efforts. Specifically, Moroccan women’s rights’ activists wanted to ensure that the 
nationality law was reformed so that women could pass nationality onto their children. 
The old Nationality Code did not allow Moroccan women to pass on nationality to their 
children unless the father was unknown. Husbands and wives held different nationalities, 
unless otherwise appealed. ADFM activists lobbied for no age limits on children applying 
for citizenship (under the old law the current age to apply for a mother’s citizenship was 
18) and for the law to be applicable to all women regardless of the husband’s nationality. 
Moreover, they wanted the nationality law to apply retroactively to assist Moroccan 
women and their children whose citizenship status had been outstanding for some time.  
 The activists went about their campaign goals using a four-pronged mobilization 
strategy that consisted of: (1) establishing a working group that included women who 
were experiencing nationality discriminations; (2) designing tools and research to analyze 
the current state of nationality laws and studying the public’s awareness of the 
discrimination that women faced under the current law;  (3) creating alliances between 
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national women’s organizations, human rights NGOs, and political parties; and (4) 
lobbying and mobilizing support at the political and grassroots level.  
 ADFM led an extensive research effort to better understand nationality laws in 
relation to constitutional and international law. In 2002, ADFM held meetings throughout 
the year to listen to the accounts and experiences of women stakeholders affected by the 
nationality law. ADFM then sent these testimonies out to 22 media outlets to publicize 
the prominent social and familial issues involved with the unequal nationality law and to 
call for its reform. Testimonies were similar to the examples below.  
I am a 14-year-old girl. My mother is Moroccan and my father is Syrian. 
My father is a generous and patient man. He spent a long period of time in 
Morocco where he lived and studied, married, and had his children. My 
brother and I were born here and we got integrated in this society… I grew 
up in a 100 percent Moroccan environment, my family and friends are 
Moroccan and so is my accent…above all I love this country and mom is 
Moroccan! I’ve known the national anthem as long as I can remember…I 
am also a supporter of Raja De Casablanca soccer team and a fan of singer 
Abdel-Hadi Belkhayat; haven’t I the right, being a Moroccan to obtain the 
nationality? 
Testimony of Rana, a 14 year old girl (Reprinted from CRTDA 2004) 
 
 Additionally, activists at ADFM commissioned a variety of qualitative studies, 
including a study led by Amina Lemrini and Rabéa Naciri (2002), regarding women 
married to non-nationals. The results of the study revealed that most of the women in the 
sample, despite their education level, were not initially aware of the consequences of 
being married to a non-national; rather, most women learned of their citizenship status 
after marriage or after giving birth to their first child. Many women in the sample were 
shocked and disturbed when they realized the degradation of their rights and the ways in 
which these laws restricted their movement and status within their home country. 
Moreover, many women were deeply affected by the lack of their children’s access to 
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services and their freedom to travel (Lemrini 2006). The research study gave activists the 
important demographic and personal information with which they could develop a more 
in-depth campaign strategy. ADFM and other women’s associations built on the 
recommendations of the women married to non-nationals that participated in the study in 
order to formulate a broader mobilization plan for the Nationality campaign (Idrissi 
2008:PI).   
 This also gave ADFM activists the opportunity to train, educate, and raise the 
awareness of groups of concerned women. However, the process of identifying and 
gathering affected women was a particularly difficult part of the campaign (Idrissi 
2008:PI). Many of these women were not previously engaged with the women’s 
movement and came in with their own personal issues they were trying to deal with. But, 
after sustained outreach and personal contact, ADFM was able to organize a committee 
of affected women (Idrissi 2008:PI). From these groups, activists brought affected 
women into the reform and strategizing process.  Activists broadened their support base 
by deeply involving the grassroots, and in particular women who were experiencing 
discrimination based on nationality by bringing their cases to life through narratives and 
giving them organizing skills to advocate with ADFM for social justice.  
Public Mobilizations 
 The first public debate on nationality reform in Morocco was held in April 2004, 
followed by a press conference in October 2004. It was during these public debates and 
discussions that the activists learned of support from the Islamists in their context (Nafaa 
2008:PI; Idrissi 2008:PI). Rachida Nafaa (2008:PI), ADFM board member and key 
organizer of the Nationality reform effort in Morocco, describes the Islamist position on 
the secular Nationality Code: “We met the leaders of the Islamist party who told us ‘We 
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are with you, we support you’ because in Islam there is nothing opposing [equal] 
nationality.” The support of Islamists was surprising to activists, particularly given the 
long and hard battle to reform the Moudawana. But, the barriers to reform that were 
prominent in the Moudawana case did not transfer due to the secular nature of the law. 
This very important issue is revisited later in the chapter and in the conclusion.  
 It was around this time that activists gained considerable rights through the 
Moudawana reform. Things were going well for the Moroccan activists. In 2005, new 
opportunities opened as King Mohamed VI bolstered activists’ efforts and answered the 
requests of coalitions in civil society. During his speech given on his Sixth Anniversary 
of Ascension to the Throne, the King asserted that in his role as “commander of the 
faithful” he had decided that the nationality law must be reformed so that a mother’s 
nationality could be passed onto the child.102 He called for a democratic process of law 
reform in alignment with the new principles in the reformed Moudawana. Following the 
King’s statement, the Ministry of Justice created a Commission to reform the Nationality 
Code and passed their recommendations on to Parliament (Lemrini 2006). Saïda Idrissi 
(2008:PI), Vice President of ADFM, remarks: “The political will was there for the 
reform. Except that it took a lot of time, the law against terrorism slowed the process 
down. …everything started well, but with the Casablanca attacks and the promulgation of 
the anti-terrorism law, there was a lot for everyone to think about.” 
 Given these setbacks, activists continued their efforts to stimulate public debate 
on topics of nationality, holding a series of public debates and meetings in Rabat, 
including a roundtable held with the Science Faculty in Rabat, where the Minister of 
                                                 
102
 See King Mohamed VI’s speech on July 30, 2005 at http://www.maroc.ma/NR/exeres/55901BD3-
ED0A-4907-A86F-D145D83C2B7C 
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Justice attended.  However, this was a time of uncertainty. There had been strong 
political support for the Nationality Code reform, but no actions were being taken. Idrissi 
(2008:PI)  describes this time period:  
There was total silence after the King’s speech in 2005… without any 
information on the code, on the reform. Nothing. The commission, who 
worked on the Nationality Code reform process, they had no information, 
they were not answering their telephones…And with this, there were 
rumors—they are going to reform [the committee to reform the 
Nationality Code], they are not going to reform. 
 
 In 2006, Moroccan activists seized upon an opportunity after months of silence 
from legislators. In March of that year, Morocco became a candidate for entrance to the 
Human Rights Commission, headquartered in Geneva.103 In order to gain membership, 
the state needed to make progress in complying with important human rights 
declarations. Women’s rights activists took this opportunity to bring attention to the fact 
that there were reservations attached to CEDAW and that this affected women’s equality 
as citizens. Feminists leveraged the need for legal cohesion between international and 
domestic law in order to support the Moroccan candidacy (Lemrini 2006). To maximize 
this leverage, activists continued high level political lobbying and also organized a series 
of sit-ins throughout 2006 in order to pressure the state and parliament. Before the sit-ins, 
ADFM contacted all of the major Moroccan media outlets and foreign TV outlets, such 
as Al Jazeera, Alarabia, Almanar, and Radio Monte Carlo. This ensured heightened 
visibility and coverage of nationality issues in the public sphere and kept the issue of 
reform on the forefront of the public’s and political leaders’ minds. 
                                                 
103
 Morocco became a member of the Human Rights Commission later in 2006. See 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/C5BF0606F91D8B7FC125713000376A
2E?OpenDocument 
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   Similar to the Moudawana reform, activists focused on a multi-layered discourse 
of women’s citizenship as a political issue. The activists drew from the regional 
nationality frames and focused attention on the political arena, through lobbying and 
media related events, where arguments to align the current constitutional and 
international law would be more impactful.  Moreover, activists strategically leveraged 
national consensus that had been codified in constitutional law as a means to further 
justify reform.  
Outcome 
 On January 18, 2007, the council of the Moroccan government adopted a new bill 
to reform the Nationality Code. In February 2007, Parliament ratified the Nationality 
Code. The new code is retroactive and states that a child born of a Moroccan father, or a 
child born of a Moroccan mother is a Moroccan citizen. Rabéa Naciri (2007), former 
President of ADFM, asserts:  
The revision of Article 6 [Nationality Code] comes to supplement the 
Moudawana. It has a great range insofar as this article puts the father and 
the mother on equal footing. The identity of the child can be defined by 
his mother or father. In this sense, it is a significant blow to the patriarchal 
status and to the ‘primacy’ of men to women.  
 
 After the success of the campaign, ADFM initiated a number of follow up 
activities designed to monitor the reforms. The monitoring effort is being coordinated by 
the Anaruz network and the Nejma center. The network is monitoring the Ministry of 
Justice to ensure new juridical regulations for applying for citizenship are respected. 
ADFM has been offering a variety of workshops, training affected women in their new 
rights and conducting public awareness-raising events. ADFM also undertook the task of 
documenting the process that individuals go through in order to gain citizenship rights. In 
2007, ADFM activists began documenting the legal process in a guide (Idrissi 2008:PI; 
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Oueldammou 2008:PI), which provides guidelines for implementing nationality reforms 
in different contexts and includes suggestions for communication and mobilization 
strategies. Currently, it is in the process of being finalized and will be published and 
posted on ADFM’s website for regional movement strengthening.  
 In reflecting on the process and success of the Nationality campaign, Rachida 
Nafaa (2008:PI) credits the Moroccan success to the political context, leadership, and 
solidarity. Nafaa (2008:PI) notes that in other countries such as Bahrain and Lebanon, 
where there are multiple religious sects and more diverse coalitional politics, reform 
becomes a much more complicated endeavor.   
Summary  
 In analyzing the regional and local strategies for nationality reform, four primary 
communication strategies emerged: (1) developing common frames; (2) involving and 
empowering the stakeholders; (3) mobilizing personal stories by humanizing nationality 
laws; and (4) highlighting legal inconsistencies. This multi-layered communication 
process undergirded their mobilization strategy, which was not met without challenges.  
 In the Moroccan context, there was a lot of down time after political commitments 
were made. The actual reform of the code took two years even with prominent political 
support. Part of the reason for this delay was due to the national debate on anti-terrorism 
laws at the time and a shift in priorities and the national agenda (Idrissi 2008:PI). 
Nevertheless, the Moroccan case is interesting to explore as it illuminates how setbacks 
can occur despite political will and support for reform at the highest levels. The absence 
of action in the face of opportunities and successful activists’ leveraging of the campaign 
issue shows the importance of political timing.  
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  To date, three of the six countries involved in the regional Nationality campaign, 
Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco have reformed nationality laws granting women to pass 
nationality on to children. The 2004 reforms in Egypt allow women married to non-
nationals to pass their nationality on to their children. The 2005 reforms in Algeria 
granted women married to non-nationals permission to pass their nationality on to their 
spouses and their children. The 2007 reform in Morocco allows women married to non-
nationals to pass their citizenship on to their children. In Bahrain, Jordan, and Lebanon 
activists are still campaigning for reform.  
International Coalition Building for Nationality Reform 
 This section focuses on the dynamics of international networking, with a focus on 
inter-organizational collaboration and communication. NGOs that are effective in 
increasing their visibility often reach out to different constituencies in order to broaden 
the reach of their network, tapping into more extensive networks of weaker social ties 
(Granovetter 1973). These bridging activities can raise awareness, forge new alliances, 
and ultimately expand the impact of the campaign.    In the five years after the regional 
Nationality campaign was established, regional activists had begun discussing ways to 
increase the international impact of the campaign. Members of the WLP Partnership, 
including CRTDA and ADFM, believed an international campaign would “increase the 
visibility” of citizenship laws across the Global North and South (Abou-Habib 2008:PI). 
Since regional activists already had deep-rooted and locally legitimate campaigns, local 
arguments about the “cultural authenticity” of the reforms were not an issue, as had been 
the case in other campaigns (Abou-Habib 2008:PI; Afkhami 2008: PI; Goyal 2008 PI). 
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The breadth of support across different communities was conceptualized as a distinct 
advantage and justification for the international campaign. 
 In September 2006, the Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP) launched the 
international campaign, Claiming Equal Citizenship: The Campaign for Arab Women’s 
Right to Nationality.104  The role of WLP International in the citizenship campaign has 
been to raise international visibility and to strengthen the regional advocacy ties of the 
campaign. Essentially, WLP International acts as an information clearinghouse, capacity 
builder, and network facilitator. WLP International is effective in this bridging and 
coordinating role due to the leadership’s extensive connections to the international policy 
community, civic NGOs, international funders, and government officials in the Global 
North and South. WLP raises awareness in the international advocacy sphere through 
formal speaking engagements; participation in global networks where they speak about 
the campaign; the media, including television, radio, and print; and organizing public 
events such as the human security event at John Hopkins University in September 2006. 
The NGO has gained important individual and organizational endorsements to support 
local campaigns, including activists and academics such as, Shirin Ebadi, Najma 
Heptulla, Attiya Inayatullah, Joanna Kerr, Aruna Rao, and Mary Robinson, Janet Afari, 
Ann Mayer, Nayereh Tohidi, and Azar Nafisi. The international campaign provides a 
vehicle for amplifying the strength and dissemination of the regional campaign messages 
and objectives.   
 WLP International constructed an interactive and dynamic blog that provides 
educational resources on discriminatory nationality legislation in the MENA and Gulf 
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 See campaign website http://www.learningpartnership.org/citizenship/ 
 
164 
 
regions. The blog issues campaign updates, provides extensive information on the 
campaign progress in the six partner countries, provides real testimonies regarding the 
effects of discriminatory nationality laws on women and their families, offers up to date 
media coverage, current mobilizations and events, research reports, and educational 
material, as well as disseminates an international petition of support for the activists’ 
campaign efforts. The blog is set up to facilitate interaction and awareness-raising. 
Participants can submit their own personal testimonies, such as the following from an 
Afghan man.  
I’m 25 years old, born in Iran and married to an Iranian woman, but I can’t 
have Iranian citizenship. In Iran, refugee status comes through two 
conditions, either based on soil or based on blood. There are now many 
people in Iran who have both conditions, but still are not considered 
Iranian. 
 
My parents are Afghan. They came to Iran years ago and lived in a village 
near the city of Mashhad. My parents were illiterate and never thought of 
getting residency documents. My dad was an ordinary man. They didn’t 
care about my education, but I studied and worked, and I’m now a 
university student. No matter how much an Afghan man studies, he can’t 
get anywhere. I’m still a construction laborer. Not much is left from my 
graduation, but I’ve been told to leave the country, and get a visa if I want 
to come back. 
 
I consider myself Iranian. My wife is Iranian. I’ve been living in Iran for 
25 years and yet I’m not considered Iranian. I don’t feel very connected to 
Afghanistan. I went there once a few years ago and realized that I can’t 
stay there. 
 
There is no restriction for the marriage of two Muslim people in Islam. My 
wife is Iranian but her family has disowned her because of marrying me. 
My wife has endured my poverty and we love each other. Our marriage is 
halal (permissible) in Islam, why does the Iranian law consider it haram 
(forbidden)? 
 
How can you tell people not to marry when they fall in love? If she was 
from anywhere in the world I would marry her. Her human personality 
was important to me. Ask the officials what their interpretation of love is. 
You fall in love, you don’t learn it. I don’t know what will happen to our 
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children if we have any in the future. Will they become like me? Having 
no identity? 
 Source: Sarmayeh.net  
 
 Another use of testimony aims to raise awareness, but also to search for answers 
and hold legal authorities accountable.  
I am writing in regards to the nationality issue in Egypt as it pertains to 
Egyptian women marrying Palestinian men. 
 
Egypt’s new Nationality Law No. 154 of 2004 states that whoever is born 
of an Egyptian mother is Egyptian. This law has applied to all Egyptian 
women married to non-Egyptian men except the Egyptian women who 
marry Palestinians. 
 
A child born to an Egyptian woman and Palestinian man after the new 
nationality law is eligible to receive Egyptian citizenship immediately, but 
unfortunately the children born to Egyptians and Palestinians before the 
law have not been granted Egyptian citizenship. 
 
Nobody knows why the Egyptian Ministry of Interior refused to accept 
their applications for Egyptian citizenship. The question that always arises 
is why the Ministry of Interior insists on refusing to implement the new 
nationality law and why doesn’t the new law apply the provisions of the 
Egyptian judiciary to only women who marry Palestinians. This continues 
the discrimination against Egyptian women and deprives their children of 
their constitutional right of access to the nationality of their mothers. 
 
This rejection from the Egyptian Ministry of Interior to give children of 
Egyptian women their constitutional right to citizenship is a flagrant 
violation of the Egyptian Constitution and international laws.  
 
 These interactive technological spaces also engage visitors on a personal level and 
provide the chance to interact with those who posted through its blog format. For 
example, one poster commented on the Egyptian women’s testimony above: “Wow! I am 
deeply sorry for those women and children. The children who grow up with a sense of 
pride in their heritage/culture will find soon that their right to education, voting, 
constitutional protection of civil rights, etc will be stripped from them. This is not fair 
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and needs to change!” This form of online interaction shifts from a passive to a more 
active space for nationality debate and information gathering.  
 In addition to setting up technological spaces for collaboration and information 
gathering, WLP International introduced the Nationality campaign to NGOs beyond the 
six initial regional actors to work on nationality reform. Members of the WLP Partnership 
in Palestine and Mauritania began implementing the Nationality campaign in their 
countries in 2006. Broader regional interest in the campaign also occurred after the WLP 
2006 campaign launch. In particular, the network received interest from a lawyer in 
Bangladesh who wanted to learn from the Nationality campaign tactics. Based on 
feedback from the WLP Partnership’s experiences with the regional campaign in the 
Middle East, the Bangladeshi lawyer is considering developing a South Asian Nationality 
campaign.  
One primary way that WLP International facilitates capacity building around law 
reforms, including nationality rights, is through their hallmark Leading to Choices 
leadership program, discussed in Appendix 1. WLP International in coordination with 
local NGO partners implement these skills building workshops for local women affected 
by unjust nationality laws. The workshop goals are twofold: first, the aim is to shift 
women’s conceptualization of themselves such that they begin to envision themselves as 
active agents of change and second, they are trained in specific organizing and mobilizing 
skills for reforming nationality laws.105  For example, in Palestine, the Women’s Affairs 
Technical Committee (WATC) implemented a number of awareness-raising workshops 
on citizenship laws in order to create a grassroots base for citizenship reform. On the 
organizational side of capacity building, WLP is working with Lebanese and Moroccan 
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 Source: Internal WLP Report to Funder. May 2008. 
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partners to document the best practices being used in the Nationality campaign. Finally, 
WLP International aims to bring the underrepresented voices of their partners to its 
global connections and advocacy networks. They facilitate this process of connecting 
partner NGOs with influential policymakers, funders, development practitioners, and 
academics in a variety of ways.  
The Power of Movement Learning 
 The Nationality campaign case study describes a model for indigenous, grassroots 
organizing in a globalized world. The focus of this model is on the dynamic synergies 
and collaboration between multiple levels and types of feminist organizing. First, 
activists draw from their local and regional strengths in strategizing and implementing 
advocacy campaigns. The Nationality campaign began at the grassroots when local 
NGOs across the MENA came together to form a regional strategy. This strategy was 
then diversely implemented depending on the national context and the socio-political 
landscape. Once the national campaigns were well-established, coalition activists reached 
out to the international WLP Partnership to provide increased visibility and technological 
support. Branching out in this way keeps the movement fresh as “...there is dynamic 
exchange between the international, regional and national [spheres]” (Goyal 2009:PI).  
 The WLP Partnership’s continuous communication and flexibility offer diverse 
mechanisms for responding to and overcoming organizational challenges and crises. As 
Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI) notes, these are important elements that undergird learning 
organizations.106 The WLP Partnership embeds adaptive learning and feedback 
mechanisms into their work; in fact, they have encoded this principle of adaptation into 
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 The learning community perspective stems from the organizational management literature, made 
popular by Peter Senge (1990), who highlights the importance of focusing on generative organizational 
learning. 
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their Charter, which guides their work. “The important thing to us is the readiness to 
evolve and be flexible and change according to the core principles that are expressed in 
the Charter. We have been able to reposition, refocus, restructure in ways that are helpful 
to both our constituency and each others’ institutions.”  She notes the importance of 
“intertwining circles” that are iterative in determining the collective tasks that can be 
accomplished and the level of adaptation that is necessary based on external forces.  At 
the center of this philosophy is “the capacity to respond to the conditions outside the 
organization or entity and in relation to each other's expressed or perceived meanings” 
(Afkhami 2009:PI).  Ultimately, this adaptiveness relates to organizational sustainability, 
longevity, and effectiveness in implementing social change work.107 
A good example of this adaptive responsiveness can be described by the Lebanese 
partners, CRTDA and their call on the WLP Partnership during the July war in 2006.108 
Just five days into the war, there were nearly 30,000-40,000 internally displaced refugees 
in Beirut and the government had run out of state supplied emergency food and safety 
kits. Given the circumstances, CRTDA activists partnered with other NGO across the 
country to provide humanitarian relief efforts. CRTDA and their networks organized a 
relief campaign to ensure that mothers and children had their basic health needs met. 
They sent out an international appeal for relief funds to international networks and 
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 There is a well-developed literature in the organizational NGO management literature that focuses on 
responsiveness as key to organizational effectiveness (Edwards 2002). Social movement theories, such as 
Resource Mobilization theories have focused on some of these organizational issues (McCarthy and Zald 
1977). More recently, literature driven by Holly McCammon and colleagues has been integrating aspects of 
movement adaptability.  
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 On July 12, 2006 Hezbollah fighters began shooting rockets into Israeli border towns. Fighting ensued 
between Israeli soldiers and Hezbollah. Israel widened the conflict by bombing civilian and military targets 
and infrastructure in Beirut and initiating a ground invasion in Southern Lebanon. The war lasted from July 
12 -August 14 when a UN ceasefire agreement was signed. There was heavy damage and the humanitarian 
crisis was significant with over a thousand Lebanese deaths and over 1 million Lebanese civilians 
displaced. 
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partnerships, including the transnational WLP Partnership. CRTDA requested funds to 
supply health and sanitation kits to 1,000 women head of households.109 Through the 
assistance of their international partnership with the WLP, CRTDA was able to raise 
$62,500 to assist local internally displaced mothers in Beirut, Saida, Metn, Jbail, 
Kesrwan, and Tripoli.  
In this case, CRTDA’s local response was facilitated by the extensive leadership 
trainings that had been the core focus of their collective work with the WLP Partnership 
since 2001 (Abou-Habib 2008:PI; Goyal 2009:PI). Due to these empowerment trainings, 
the Lebanese activists at CRTDA had established national networks with well-trained 
leadership and extensive community reach. The activists were able to leverage these 
networks and mobilize for the relief effort. Given this strength, the WLP Partnership was 
then able to respond to the Lebanese crises by drawing on its institutional resources and 
networks in the Global South through their partners. 
  Additionally, activists in the Nationality campaign draw strength from the 
diversity of implementations amongst them. The Nationality campaign is greatly enriched 
by the diverse approaches and experiences that each NGO brings to the table (Goyal 
2009:PI). The coalition activists meet annually to share successful strategies and lessons 
learned from their local experiences, which builds activists’ collective toolbox of 
strategies. Saïda Idrissi (2008:PI) notes that the regional Nationality coalition created 
synergistic relationships and common visions, which they were able to more effectively 
mobilize for change. She sees power in the collective organizing for change. Rakhee 
Goyal (2009:PI) remarks: “I don't think that our campaigns would have been as rich as 
they are today if we hadn't had the experience of learning from one another.”    
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 Source: http://learningpartnership.org/en/advocacy/alerts/lebrefugeecrisis0706 
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 For many coalitions, power difficulties or agenda setting discrepancies can break 
down even the best formulated collaborative efforts. The WLP Partnership aims to 
circumvent power inequities by sharing ownership over the collective strategy 
implementation process and by focusing on their shared underlying values.110  The NGO 
does this by ensuring space for multiple voices in coalitional strategy development 
processes.  
 This diversity is important because the reach of the shared movement strategies 
eventually affect more than just one campaign. Rather, as NGOs work together on a 
variety of social change efforts, the diverse sets of strategies and lessons learned gained 
from the sharing of experiences can be drawn from for future campaign development.  
Specifically, through inter-movement communication and diverse coalition building, 
lessons from the successful advocacy model in Morocco have been transferred to other 
campaigns and women’s rights movements (Moghadam & Roudi-Fahimi 2005; Pittman 
and Naciri 2007; Brac de la Pérrière 2007:PI). Two examples of the cross-fertilization of 
strategy are the Iranian One Million Signatures campaign and the regional Musawah 
campaign. Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI) comments:  
National [activism] has actually enriched the regional and vice versa. Both 
of these [levels] have led to transfer of ideas and transfer of experiences 
and solidarity, which has taken campaign ideas outside even of the Arab 
world. …This, transnationality and cross-border exchange that is 
happening—it is very exciting to us.  It shows the impact [of this regional 
coalition building model] when people in the One Million Signatures 
Campaign in Iran are adapting the Moroccan [reform] process and also 
that the Moroccan process is now in effect leading to the Musawah 
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 These values include: being committed to creating tolerant, egalitarian, and democratic communities; 
sustaining their partnerships through open, ongoing, and in-depth communication; being flexible, 
adaptable, and responsive at the organizational level; investing in the collective nature of the Partnership 
and developing a shared vision; drawing from participatory and inclusive leadership built on relationships 
of trust and respect, and focusing on local adaptation based on unique local context (WLP 2006:4).  
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campaign in Malaysia, which is going to be an international movement, 
we hope.  
 
Iran “One Million Signatures Campaign” 
   The One Million Signatures campaign implemented in March 2006 aims to 
eliminate all discrimination against women that exists in Iranian law. The women’s rights 
activists highlight the Iranian government’s ratification of many international human 
rights conventions, and are calling for reform based on their stated commitments to 
international law. The campaign launched by primarily youth activists aims to target law 
reform from a practical standpoint with the tangible goals of reshaping socio-cultural 
norms and practices in order to bring greater equality to women (Tohidi 2006). Activists 
use a face-to-face, door to door mobilization strategy and petition in order to bring 
citizens into the movement and amplify the effects and base of the campaign support.  
 Tohidi (2006) argues that women are fighting for equality primarily within the 
cultural and legal spheres and their main oppositional sources stem from the family, 
workplace, and religious groups, such as mosques, synagogues, churches, marketplaces, 
and media. Therefore, it is within these social structures of daily life that activists share 
their messages of reform and mobilize for the necessity of women’s equality within the 
country. Nayereh Tohidi (2006:1) notes the way that Iranian feminists have positioned 
themselves at the intersection of the transnational and local feminist movement. 
…the activists involved in the “One Million Signatures Campaign,” are 
not only well-rooted in the specific historical, cultural, religious, and 
geopolitical realities of Iran, but it [the campaign] is also in step with the 
most progressive and current discourses, laws and universal values. 
Furthermore, the aims of this campaign are respected and in line with 
values and goals espoused by international institutions such as the United 
Nations and well respected international human rights organizations. 
Iranian activists are not following some abstract theory in defining and 
developing their strategy for change; rather they are basing these strategies 
on the available resources as well as tangible, concrete, and immediate 
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realities. This choice of strategy demonstrates their understanding and 
knowledge of the daily-ness of women’s struggle, feminist theories and 
principles, and also of their involvement, connection and cooperation with 
trans-national feminist organizations in the region and beyond. These 
women understand that lofty goals will be difficult to achieve under the 
present repressive atmosphere, as such they have chosen to utilize 
deliberate and practical methods, with a persistent approach in-line with a 
woman-centered and feminist approach to culture-building (Tohidi 
2006:1).  
 
 While the Iranian women’s movement has been quite successful in mobilizing 
participation, the broader political structure has been attempting to quell the activists’ 
reform efforts. Official government responses to the women’s rights activists have been 
violent and repressive, resulting in attacks, arrests, and incarceration of activists in 
attempts to limit their civil liberties and stop the progression of the movement. Further 
developing strategies these challenges, Iranian activists are drawing from models of 
successful law reform, such as in the Maghreb. Specifically, The Guide to Equality in the 
Family in the Maghreb was recently translated into Persian for adaptation and for use in 
the Iranian context. Transnational organizations, such as the WLP Partnership, have 
assisted in raising the visibility of the Iranian women’s movement and the One Million 
Signatures campaign as well as facilitated and organized the Persian translation of The 
Guide to Equality.  
Musawah Campaign for Equality 
 The Musawah campaign (meaning equality in Arabic) is a global movement 
calling for equality, justice, and dignity of Muslim women’s rights in the family. It was 
initiated in 2007 by Sisters in Islam (SIS), an NGO that aims to gain women’s rights 
through an Islamic framework in Malaysia. The global campaign launch occurred in 
Kuala Lampur in February 2009 and was attended by over 200 activists, scholars, and 
policymakers from 47 countries across the Global South. All of the members of the WLP 
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Partnership attended the meeting and many helped shaped the proceedings, particularly 
ADFM, where Rabéa Naciri was part of the advisory board.  The goals of the campaign 
are to ensure that family and marital relationships are based on mutual respect, dignity, 
and equality with equal roles and responsibilities for men and women, as well as non-
discrimination and equality in all social relations, and full and equal citizenship rights for 
all persons. Activists argue that “change is possible:” 
Musawah declares that equality in the family is possible through a 
framework that is consistent with Islamic teachings, universal human 
rights principles, fundamental rights guarantees, and the lived realities of 
women and men. Muslim laws and practices must reflect justice, which is 
the indisputable objective of the Shari‘ah. They must also uphold equality, 
which is an essential part of today’s understanding of justice. Today’s 
Muslim family laws are human interpretations of the Shari‘ah, based on 
juristic theories and assumptions. Therefore, they can change in 
accordance with the changing realities of time and place and contemporary 
notions of justice (Source: Musawah website).111 
 
 The Musawah campaign has drawn from the successful experiences of reform 
across the region, including the Moroccan Moudawana and nationality reforms, the 
Egyptian Divorce Code reform, and Turkish Penal Code reform in order to develop their 
framework for reform. See Appendix 6 for the Musawah Framework for Action.   
Summary 
  This chapter has explored successful elements in transnational coalition building, 
drawing from the Nationality campaign case in the MENA and highlighted the transfer of 
campaign successes from one context to another. In the regional campaign, an integral 
part of the strategy focused on mobilizing grassroots awareness and lobbying with 
legislators in order to bring about reform. The activists framed nationality in terms of 
political equality. They contextualized nationality laws by using persuasive narratives 
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from women who could not pass their nationality onto their children and highlighted the 
impact on children, and the family, more generally. Activists also focused the public 
debate on the current discontinuities that existed between the current Nationality Code 
and national constitutional and transnational law. The attention to both bottom-up and 
top-down approaches to legal reform is important, particularly in light of discussions in 
Chapter 2 on mobilizing collective versus individual levels of empowerment.  Ultimately, 
it appears that movement learning was a critical component of transnational coalition 
building across the WLP Partnership, extending Alvarez’s argument. The coalition 
activists have created a system of collaboration, knowledge sharing, and critical 
reflection and feedback that is normally only done on a national or organizational level. 
By sharing these adaptive strategies, the activists contribute to stronger movement 
building practices that have replicative impacts. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: New Paths and Resources for Transnational Movement 
Building 
 
 This dissertation has explored how global and local influences, both ideological 
and institutional, shaped feminist movement dynamics and synergies in the Women’s 
Learning Partnership (WLP). Three rich cases were used to explore activists’ complex 
navigation of feminist social change in Muslim-majority societies: (1) Globally, I 
explored the discourses, practices, and interactions between the WLP Partnership and 
international funders; (2) Domestically, I analyzed Association Démocratique des 
Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) and their role in creating dynamic discourses and strategies 
for Moudawana reform; and (3) Regionally and domestically, I examined inter-
organizational collaboration and coalition building in the Campaign to Reform Arab 
Women’s Nationality.  
Women’s rights movements across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
have faced great successes and struggles over the past decades. Revolutionary reforms 
led by feminist activists have produced laws that support women’s equal rights in a 
variety of different spheres. Some of these successes include the 2004 Islamic Family 
Law reform in Morocco, the Egyptian khul divorces in 2000, the Kuwaiti reform for 
suffrage in 2005, Nationality rights in Algeria in 2005, and the lifting of reservations on 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) in Morocco in 2008 (Brac de la Pérrière 2006; Pittman 2007, 2008; 
Singerman 2005; Salhi 2003; Warrick 2005). Yet despite these important strides, MENA 
feminists increasingly face grave threats to their work due to political instability, conflict, 
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war, and increasing fundamentalism. Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI) describes the impact of 
radically shifting conditions over the past few years on the WLP Partnership:  
The whole world is changing so fast and the process of change is 
becoming more and more accelerated. But in the case of the regions where 
we work, it seems that lately there have been constant explosions and 
radical shifts. Just in the last few years, we have had wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, which has so affected the regions in which we work. There has 
also been war in Lebanon and then conflict in Palestine with the Intifada 
and the Gaza crisis. These are all situations that affect one partner NGO, 
but more broadly impact and destabilize the region. These shifts also 
affect specific partners’ relationships with each other.  So we have had to 
learn to act quickly, turn things around, and change our focus in light of 
these threats. 
 
 Organizing for social justice and equality given such conditions necessitates a 
flexible and adaptive approach with an eye toward mitigating potential and actual risks. 
The following section highlights the theoretical and practical implications of activists’ 
innovative strategies developed to address these fluctuating contexts.  
Agency, Resistance, and Negotiation: Institutional and Normative Power  
This study has detailed the many different institutional challenges that NGO 
activists working in the region face, which range from negotiations with global funders to 
managing powerful and well-organized religious opposition. Feminist activists negotiate 
issues of human rights, women’s equality, and Islamic family law reform in conservative 
circumstances where patriarchal religious laws structure gender relations.  While many of 
the activists in this study share the Muslim faith, they also seek to ensure women’s 
equality and feminist goals using secular methods of implementation. As the research 
findings suggest, there is a need for more nuance related to feminist identity in the 
MENA, particularly in terms of how religiosity and secularism are depicted (Ahmed 
1992; Abu-Lughod 1998; Abou-Bakr 2001; Tohidi 2002; Sharify-Funk 2008).   
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In Chapter 2, I demonstrated how the Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP) has 
navigated the religious and secular feminist debate by shifting the subject under question. 
Instead of highlighting religion or secularism as the means by which to achieve gender 
equality, the activists focused on the individual woman as the enactor of strategy. In other 
words, choice and free will determine strategy not secularism or religiosity. This joins the 
pathways for achieving gender equality and broadens the possibilities for dynamic 
alliances on the ground. Through their agentic strategy, the WLP Partnership advocates a 
multivocal form of feminism. 
Mahnaz Afkhami (2009:PI) notes that the collective implementation strategy is 
designed to account for local specificities in political, economic, cultural, or religious 
practices. For example, in a Personal Status Code reform effort, some NGO activists 
might feel it is more appropriate to draw from religious reinterpretations, others may feel 
more comfortable with strict legislative arguments drawing from constitutional, 
international, and domestic laws, while another group may be drawn to firsthand accounts 
of testimony and narratives to outline argumentation in opposition to discriminatory laws 
(Abou-Habib 2008:PI; Afkhami 2009:PI). This conceptualization of adaptation also 
augments the debate on human rights as it relates to particularism versus universalism 
(Baderin 2005, 2007; Senturk 2005). 
The exemplar of this philosophy is the dialogic Claiming Our Rights curriculum, 
which engages Muslim women in critical reflection of gender relations within the family 
and the community from a religious and human rights perspective. The WLP Partnership 
has managed to straddle the universalism-particularism debate by underscoring the 
universal principle of women’s equality and human rights as well as local activists’ 
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diverse prioritization and implementation of those rights. In this context, the goal is to 
create new meanings of human rights and Islamic law and their contributions to women’s 
rights through individual refection and analysis (Levitt and Merry 2008). This creative 
localization process diversifies the norms related to human rights (Levitt and Merry 
2008). 
In Chapter 4, the Moroccan case of reform provided an intriguing example of how 
feminist movements have challenged hegemonic Islamic legal structure. One primary 
tactic that feminists used to deal with the countermovements’ notion of unchangeable 
Islamic law was to differentiate between its institutional and normative aspects. Activists 
understood the power of Islamic law as a normative structure, shaping social relations 
and understandings of men’s and women’s roles and capacities in society. As such, in 
order to foster new social understandings of gender equality, the Moudawana had to be 
reformed. However, the feminists deconstructed the legality of Islamic law as a sacred, 
God-given, and immutable legal structure. Feminist activists argued that since the law 
had been humanly interpreted, Islamic law was not the god-given sharia code, but rather 
a human construction that could be reformed. The separation of the religious structure 
from the state-implemented practice of the law was intended to delineate different types 
of structure in Islamic law: The religious legal structure was embedded in a hegemonic 
epistemological framework that was resistant to change;112 however, the state’s encoding 
of Islamic law did not possess the same restrictive principles limiting reform. By 
distinguishing different types of structure, the feminists uncovered spaces of opportunity 
for Islamic family law reform.  They challenged the hegemonic religious structure of 
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 See Messick (1988) for an analysis of how the multivocal nature of Islamic law protects itself against 
transformative reform.  
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Islamic law by drawing from its own internal logic and principles in order to provide a 
theological foundation for eventual Islamic law reform. Ultimately, the Moudawana 
evolved through the reinterpretation of Islamic structures themselves and by leveraging 
religious principles of equality and justice with modern norms of democracy and rights 
that stimulated the evolution of the Moudawana.  
This links to Gramscian notions of hegemonic change and Foucauldian discourses 
of power. Reform would be conceptualized as not just a battle between hegemony and 
innovation; rather, innovation, in this case, is predicated on the use of dominant socio-
legal structures. Ewick and Silbey (1998:1335) relate this process of structural 
transformation drawing from Gramsci noting: “Resistance, as much as power, is 
contingent upon the structural resources available to the relational participants. Because 
structures help to constitute identities, and expectations, the tacit or explicit apprehension 
and enactment of social structure is necessary in order to act in any situation.” Discourse 
then becomes the symbolic site where the strategic battle for power is produced. These 
perspectives underline the polyvocal nature of discourse as it can be differentially 
interpreted and created in interaction with and response to hegemonic fields (Steinberg 
1999).                       
The Role of Movement Learning  
Transnational networks can indeed be incubators for innovative and effective 
social movement strategies. These networks provide the opportunity for innovative 
strategizing based on the lessons and experiences of a diverse set of organizations. In 
Chapter 6, I highlighted the strategic importance of movement learning in transnational 
feminist coalition building (Alvarez 2000). Findings from the Nationality case in 
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Morocco showed a variety of ways in which activists shared the progress and setbacks 
they faced in their local settings with each other for the purposes of building more 
effective and responsive campaigns. For example, Nationality campaign partners learned 
of the importance of ally and opponent analysis from the Lebanese and Moroccan 
experiences with Islamists and other political actors. Lina Abou-Habib (2008:PI) 
describes their surprise at unexpected barriers to reform in Lebanon and the lessons 
learned more broadly for the regional campaign:  
We thought that the Nationality Code reform would be easy.  And what 
actually was encouraging, when we began the process of contacting 
parliamentarians for lobbying purposes there was never a rejection or 
opposition from MP’s [members of parliament] in religious or 
conservative groups…So we didn’t have the opposition from where we 
expected it.  But as I said, I think we were foolish, because we 
underestimated the opposition and I think that there is a myth that you 
have in your mind that bad guys are only located in one place. But, 
actually they are not; they are all over the place.  And so, the most rabid 
opposition came from politicians, from political groups, which had various 
different political agendas and quite a bit of religious racism…  And I 
think this was the lesson we learned, to investigate before [the campaign 
launch] and find out who is likely to oppose you and why.   
 
Coalition activists established formal mechanisms for sharing collective knowledge by 
documenting lessons learned, such as in the Lebanese implementation.  These exchanges 
made it possible for activists across the MENA to strategically draw from the wealth of 
knowledge, experiences, opportunities, and obstacles that others had experienced in order 
to adapt and apply the pertinent lessons in their own context. 
At the individual organizational level, the capital that ADFM gained through the 
Moudawana reform carried over and created a more solid organizing foundation for 
implementing the Nationality reform.  Transnationally, there was also a generative aspect 
to the Moroccan success as movement strategies acquired in one context transferred 
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across and beyond the WLP network. In the years since 2001 when the regional 
Nationality campaign was initiated by the NGOs, at least four other campaigns were 
influenced by the collective strategies developed by NGOs involved in the Nationality 
campaign (Goyal 2009:PI; Afkhami 2009:PI). First, the Moudawana and the Nationality 
campaign share similar campaign framing strategies, e.g., highlighting legal 
inconsistencies and developing powerful narratives and political frames to stimulate 
personal connections to the laws. This shared strategy stems from ADFM’s collaborative 
role and involvement with other regional networks and partnerships in the Maghreb. 
Second, the regional Equality without Reservations campaign to eliminate 
discriminations in CEDAW drew from the Nationality campaign strategies of regional 
organizing and involved many of the same stakeholders.  Third, ADFM documented its 
mobilization and discursive strategy in The Guide to Equality, which was then shared 
with Iranian activists who mobilized the One Million Signatures campaign in their 
country.  Fourth, the Guide to Equality and the Moroccan experiences of reform also 
informed the regional Musawah campaign for Muslim women’s equality in Personal 
Status Codes. Therefore, learning and exchange is taking place “within the campaign, 
outside of the particular campaign, and in the evolution of one campaign into other 
campaigns. It is a multi-tiered way of strengthening movements” (Afkhami 2009: PI). 
The transfer of these localized movement strategies back to transnational spheres of 
influence furthers our understanding of how transborder campaigns evolve (Alvarez 
2000; Friedman 1999). 
All of the case studies in this dissertation revealed the importance of maintaining 
flexible and adaptable movement strategy as an important element in movement learning.  
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I have developed the theoretical and practical propositions in the following three areas 
that shed light on social movement strategizing: (1) adaptive negotiations of long-
standing constraints; (2) adaptability and responsiveness to sudden shifts in the context; 
and (3) adaptive crafting of movement discourses.  
Constraints, like opportunities, may offer a potent source for strategic innovation in 
social movements.  
As Sewell (1992) notes, the environment offers both enabling and constraining 
actions. In analyzing the constraints faced in the international funding sphere in Chapter 
3, such as restrictive domestic laws and increasing international pressure from funders to 
professionalize, the Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP) leveraged their internal 
sources of strength; specifically, drawing from the collective nature of the network and 
their strong base of shared values. WLP developed a collective approach to seeking 
funding as a means to protect individual partners that faced high risks in their contexts—
out of constraint, came movement innovation. Moreover, the NGO activists used three 
primary strategies to protect against professionalization or normative isomorphic 
tendencies, leveraging and counteracting hegemonic trends. These included the rejection 
of funds that were not in alignment with the NGO’s goals, the collaboration of NGOs 
with funders or gaining access to strategic positions on advisory boards or brainstorming 
sessions of funding organizations, and briefing and training funders in NGO issues of key 
concern. These findings contribute to a growing theoretical shift in the literature (Alvarez 
2000; Friedman 1999; Ostrander 2004; Ostrander 2005 et al.) from primarily focusing on 
traditional power bearers to a more complex analysis that highlights the unique 
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contributions and negotiations of NGOs with funders and NGOs’ influence on the 
development sphere.   
Interestingly, in opposition to much of the literature that characterizes 
professionalization as depleting the innovation and impact of movements, in this case 
WLP International perceives professionalization as a basis for movement strength as well 
as the means through which they can more effectively articulate the goals and vision that 
guide their work. The process of establishing and maintaining core values was crafted in 
order to resist the negative aspects associated with professionalization: namely, goal 
displacement. The importance of strong organizational processes and resource bases 
often reflect resource mobilization approaches (McCarthy and Zald 1977).  
 Additionally, the Moroccan case of the Moudawana reform in Chapter 4 sheds 
light on the idea that opposition and even encountering a major roadblock may serve as a 
unique catalyst for a movement. This may be the case as it positions activists in a space 
where great strategic benefit may result from the re-analysis of basic movement 
assumptions (McCammon and Campbell 2002; McCammon et al. 2008; McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). In the case of Moudawana reform, activists spent a long time 
trying to navigate around the seemingly impervious obstacle that the Moudawana was a 
sacred and unalterable law. However, as Amina Lemrini noted, it was within this very 
powerful constraint that activists ultimately found an opportunity to reframe their debate 
using Islamic referents—thus responding to and neutralizing the countermovement’s 
frame. This finding underscores the strategic practicality of analyzing constraints in 
movements.  
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Adaptability and responsiveness to contextual shifts has the potential to increase the 
sustainability of a movement. 
  Practically, the recognition of the multi-faceted nature of the opportunity-
constraint context can facilitate a more grounded assessment of the movement playing 
field and of potential movement influence. Both the Moudawana and Nationality 
campaigns highlight the importance of strategic assessment of the environmental 
conditions and the flexibility and adaptability of campaign strategies to meet shifting 
opportunities (McCammon et al. 2008).  In the Moudawana case in Chapter 4, Moroccan 
activists at ADFM encountered numerous political and institutional challenges due to the 
contentious nature of reform. A good example was after the 2000 Rabat march, when the 
countermovement framed the campaign debate in terms of Moroccan identity and 
nationality. Facing charges that the movement was elitist and not representing the 
average Moroccan, women’s rights activists regrouped to address this crucial setback and 
to strategize around ways to reach and mobilize the grassroots in support of Moudawana 
reform. Ultimately, it seems this adaptiveness allowed activists the opportunity to 
reframe discourses in a manner that was more resonant to the broader public.  
In 2003, another critical moment occurred after the Casablanca bombings. 
Women’s rights activists quickly responded to the broader political context by 
immediately mobilizing the public and taking to the streets denouncing the attacks 
(Sadiqi 2008). They also used this period to reiterate the necessity of gender equality as 
the state and public were distancing themselves from Islamist rhetoric. Activists drew on 
their organizational resources and strengths and re-strategized in the face of these 
problems. The climate precipitated activists to shift to a two-pronged grassroots and 
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lobbying mobilization strategy that could be sustained in the politically volatile 
environment.  Such an adaptive approach requires flexibility, close attention to the 
context, and analysis of broader environmental factors, possibilities, and limitations in 
order to achieve one’s stated goal. It is feasible that these adaptive tactics strengthened 
the campaign’s sustainability in light of domestic contention as flexibility and 
adaptability have been linked to positive social movement outcomes (McCammon et al. 
2008).  
The importance of political timing was integral to both the Moudawana and 
Nationality campaigns. The period after the terrorist acts in 2003 affected the political 
climate and moved King Mohamed VI to quickly act, providing an opportune moment for 
progressive reform. The terrorism acts of 2003 in part also affected the Nationality 
reform as the national conversation shifted to discussions on anti-terror regulations. The 
Nationality case is interesting as it illuminates how setbacks can occur despite political 
will and support for reform at the highest levels. Activists had the support of King 
Mohamed VI and the Islamists, who had been the major political opposition to the 
Moudawana reform. Yet, political opportunities and activist innovations in adaptively 
responding to the social movement context were not necessarily conducive to immediate 
reforms. Rather the issue “sat idle” in the legislative system until 2007. The absence of 
action in the face of opportunities and the successful activists’ leveraging of the 
campaign issue demonstrate the interaction of political timing and opportunities (Carmin 
et al. 2003). Despite the lack of official political response to reform, ADFM activists 
continued reacting to potential openings, such as Morocco’s bid for a seat at the United 
Nations Human Rights Council. While the effects of their actions were not immediately 
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apparent, the activist strategy laid the groundwork for reform and ensured that nationality 
reform was on the national agenda. Thus when the political timing shifted, reforms could 
more easily be passed through parliament.  Given the dynamic influence of constraints on 
movements, the results suggest that it is useful to reintegrate analyses of constraints into 
the social movement literature (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; King 2007). Envisioning 
constraints as potentially be permeable may provide spaces for important movement 
innovation. 
In contentious reform contexts with strong ideological divides, bridging framing 
strategies may make a difference  
 This research contributes to the social movement literature on political 
opportunities and framing by highlighting important components of MENA feminists’ 
strategy for navigating oppositional ideologies and constraints stemming from the 
politicization of the legal context (Alimi, Gamson and Ryan 2006; Amenta et al. 1992; 
2005; Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 2004).  
Given the contentious Moroccan reform context, ADFM activists focused their attention 
on bridging the religious and secular ideological divide. Though these discourses are not 
mutually exclusive, the public spread of these politicized frames created ideological 
impasses. Moroccan reformist activists developed dynamic discursive innovations to 
neutralize and counter seemingly intractable oppositional constraints in the Moudawana 
law reform campaigns.  
Specifically, the Moroccan activists responded by reframing their campaign 
messages to counter negative frames lodged by the countermovement, namely the “anti-
Islamic” nature of the women’s movement. In order to dismantle seemingly intransigent 
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religious discourses opposing reform, Moroccan feminist NGOs began calling for ijtihad 
and pointed out the long history of equality between men and women in Islam. Meena 
Sharify-Funk (2008:117) describes the pragmatic function of this strategy: “Using an 
Islamic idiom reduces the likelihood of political backlash, while also providing a basis 
for effecting desired changes in popular social and cultural practices…By engaging in 
rather bypassing the authoritative Islamic discourse, they can participate more actively in 
local and transnational public spheres.” This was also a way to counter the opposition’s 
claim, while affirming their role as authentic cultural actors. The activists’ crafted 
bridging frames that honored both secular and religious principles. The activists achieved 
this by interweaving various discourses. They highlighted the old Moudawana’s 
disconnect with the culturally lived realities of the average Moroccan. The activists 
showed how the state had made international commitments to women’s equality through 
ratifying CEDAW and domestic commitments to gender equality in the constitution, yet 
were not in alignment with those commitments made at the legal level. Finally, these 
consciousness-raising arguments were linked to fundamental religious principles of 
ijtihad, to justify the mutability of Islamic law and equality and justice. Activists wove 
together resonant pieces of global rights and democracy discourses and melded them with 
local norms (Levitt and Merry 2008). Through this marriage, the discourse was no longer 
“foreign” or “imported,” but rather a localized cultural discourse.  Moreover, in bridging 
the secular and religious frames, Moroccan activists contributed to a nuancing of feminist 
strategy in the region.  
In the Nationality case, the framing strategy was slightly different since the law 
was secular in nature.  However, the activists chose not to focus heavily on women’s 
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equality in marriage, but rather the equality and rights of the family. This shift in framing 
could also be perceived as a means to bridge more liberal and traditional perspectives 
within society. By focusing on the strength of the family unit and the rights of children 
and women in the process, the argument’s appeal was broadened. Moreover, by drawing 
from a rights framework activists could effectively argue for the necessity of reform 
based on pragmatic arguments of needing to align and update the Nationality Code with 
other fundamental rights that were secured by the state, such as constitutional rights to 
equality.  
Of course, there are a variety of discourses in play in any social movement field, 
which can be diversely drawn from in a given historical period. But it is important to note 
that activists select them due to their relevance, their strategic value in light of the 
countermovements’ prevailing arguments and the contribution to public dialogue at the 
time. One way that activists can prioritize frames is by assessing the opportunities and 
constraints in their environment, analyzing the dynamic interactions and framing 
strategies of the opposition, and crafting messages on a strategic basis based on the socio-
historical context. In both of these cases, activists bridged together two diverse 
perspectives, which seemed at odds with one another (Snow and Benford 1998). The 
results have shown that Moroccan feminists seized upon the multivocal nature of 
discourse and created a bridging approach to framing.  
Moreover, activists adapted and vernacularized discourses, drawing from a 
variety of perspectives, including global rights and traditional values, increasing the 
likelihood that messages would appeal to a broader Moroccan constituency (Evans 1997; 
Levitt and Merry 2007, 2008; Tohidi 2002).  This approach was developed largely due to 
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the activists’ strategic insights and reactions to prominent discursive constraints in the 
movement playing field. Future research should further explore the nuanced 
conceptualization of bridging framing and its interaction with major constraints in the 
movement playing field.  
The Importance of Legal Contexts to Movements 
 I have argued, largely through the Moudawana case in Chapter 4, that the legal 
context in which reforms take place can determine the types of political alignments and 
affiliations that take root. This perspective goes above and beyond the mainstream social 
movement literature’s focus on the influence of political contexts and opportunities on 
movements outcomes (Amenta et al. 1992; 2005; Giugni 2008; Meyer and Minkoff 
2004). The implications of the legal context can easily be taken for granted. In the 
Moudawana reform case, it can be easy to become distracted by the contentious political 
alignments and constraints posed by the Islamists and religious conservatives. Yet, 
through the comparison of the Moudawana and the Nationality reforms, a clearer and 
richer narrative begins to develop. In the case of secular reform, the data revealed that 
Moroccan Islamists were not opposed to women’s equality and rights and believed that 
women should have equal rights to men in nationality. This is likely the case since 
nationality and statehood is a historically new phenomenon and as such, it has no 
reference point from an Islamic legal perspective (Afkhami 2009:PI). Indeed, both 
Islamists and liberal feminists held similar political positions on gender equality in the 
Nationality Code.  Drawing implications from comparisons of these two cases, it appears 
that reforms are more politically divisive depending on the legal context in which the 
campaigns are being conducted, e.g., religious or secular.  
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Thus, it is not about religion, per se, but the way in which Islam has been encoded 
into the legal structure and is mobilized by the state and other political actors. Given 
Western colonization and secularization of legal structures in the MENA, the Family law 
is largely seen as the one sphere in which Islamic identity is preserved and maintained 
(An-Na’im 2002; Charrad 2001). The reform of this sphere, for those who are religiously 
conservative or political, appears to be an attack on this very fundamental identity. It 
seems that a primary tactic that the countermovement used in Morocco was to 
consolidate and lay claim to the sphere of Muslim or Moroccan identity. They did this 
through boiling down and essentializing identity claims to “us versus them” binaries. Part 
of this processes included reigniting postcolonial stereotypes related to “Western versus 
indigenous” change, which, as we have seen, quickly developed into an entrenched 
political battle over the hearts and minds of the Moroccan public. In the Moudawana 
case, the discursive divide was intensified as the opposition highlighted the feminists’ 
acceptance of foreign resource support and global human rights norms.  Given these 
discursive challenges, it is uniquely interesting that the feminists’ solution to the 
bifurcation of Moroccan identity was a strategy, which bridged the “secular and 
religious” as well as the “foreign versus local” elements. 
The importance of the legal context in social movements is summarized using the 
following propositions: (1) Legal contexts do matter in MENA law reforms related to 
women’s equality; (2) The institutional sphere within which the reform takes place, e.g., 
Islamic law or secular code, interacts with political contexts; (3) The normative 
dimensions of the legal context are then enacted by political actors; (4) Thus, it is the 
interaction of the legal and political structure and its collective impact on activists’ 
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strategy that more explicitly shapes pathways toward reform. These findings go above 
and beyond research done in the political opportunity and mediation literature (Amenta et 
al. 1992; 2005; See Giugni 2008), which primarily focuses on political contexts as key 
mediators of movement outcomes. Instead, the findings underscore the importance of the 
legal dimension and its interaction with political actors and provide a necessary case for 
analysis outside the Western context. These findings also contribute a newer trend within 
the sociology of law literature that is beginning to examine how the law impacts and is 
used in social movements (McCann 2006).  Future research studies should further 
investigate the applicability of the facilitative influence of legal contexts on political 
structures. Studies in the MENA region would particularly benefit from this additional 
factor in analysis. 
Building Global Movements for the Future   
The broad findings from the WLP Partnership’s work underscore the importance 
of developing adaptive movement strategies that are mindful of potential threats to 
organizational mission and integrity, learning from global and local threats and adapting 
accordingly, bridging diverse ideological discourses, and collaborating with regional or 
domestic actors in advocacy networks to more effectively leverage local reform goals. 
Ultimately, the assessment of political and social conditions and the openness of activists 
to explore different adaptations in order to address global-local opportunities contribute 
to movement learning and development. Activists’ responsiveness to the 
countermovement and the broader environment is particularly important when critical 
events deeply threaten the reality of reform. Assessing and analyzing the reform context 
and the movement strategies during these movement moments may reveal new 
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innovative pathways for navigating and addressing movement issues in difficult political 
contexts. Moreover, adapting to environmental shifts when appropriate can be the key to 
keeping a movement fresh, relevant, and alive. The results point to the importance for 
movement actors to think more flexibly and innovatively about how to effectively 
respond to and leverage constraints in their settings.  Finally, the importance of national, 
regional, and international allies and coalitions cannot be overstated. When relationships 
are built on mutual trust and respect, these allies can offer crucial support in broadening 
the influence and reach of campaigns. More importantly these spaces facilitate the 
sharing of movement strategies that cumulatively strengthen global women’s movements.   
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Table 1. International Donors in Sample by Funding Type (2005)  
 
Type of Foundation Name N 
   
Bilateral/Multilateral  7 
 European Commission/EU  
 UNDP  
 CIDA  
 UNFPA  
 European Youth Foundation  
 UNICEF  
 UNIFEM  
   
   
Private Foundations 5 
 Open Society Institute  
 Sigrid Rausing Trust  
 Ford Foundation  
 Heinrich Boll  
 Local Foundations   
   
INGOs  4 
 Oxfam  
 HIVOS  
 CORDAID  
 Equality Now  
   
Women's Funds  2 
 Global Fund for Women  
 Mama Cash  
Individuals  1 
 Individual Giving  
    
* Data derived from 2007 Kerr Report on "Where is the Money for Women's Rights?" Initiative. 
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Table 2. Thematic Typology of International Funders’ Major Approach to Social Change 
According to the Mission and Vision Statement  
 
Approach to Gender Equality   
Donor 
Frequency 
Human Rights  
 
11 
(64.7%) 
Empowerment 
 
3 
(17.6%) 
Governance 
 
7 
(41.1%) 
Donor n=17 
 
*Percentages do not equal 100 as the categories are not mutually exclusive categories.  
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Table 3. Thematic Typology of NGOs’ Major Approach to Social Change According to 
the Mission and Vision Statement  
 
Approach to Gender Equality   
NGO 
Frequency 
Human Rights 
 
6 
(45.4%) 
Empowerment 
 
9 
(81.8%) 
Democratic Development 
 
5 
(27.2%) 
NGO n=11 
 
*Percentages do not equal 100 as the categories are not mutually exclusive categories. 
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Table 4. Keyword Frequency in Mission and Vision Statements by Incidence Level 
across Funders and NGOs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funder Keywords Incidence  NGO Keywords Incidence 
Women 
10 
(58.8%) 
Women 
10 
(90.9%) 
World 
7 
(41.2%) 
Society 
8 
(72.7%) 
Poverty 
7 
(41.2%) 
Participation 
6 
(54.5%) 
   Human/Women’s Rights 
6 
(35.2%) 
Human/Women’s Rights 
6 
(54.5%) 
Economic 
5 
(29.4%) 
Decision Making 
5 
(45.5%) 
Justice 
5 
(29.4%) 
Community 
5 
(45.5%) 
Democracy 
5 
(29.4%) 
Justice 
5 
(45.5%) 
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Visual 5. Kenza Case. Developed by Printemps d’Egalité 
Right to Reprint from ADFM (2005) 
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Visual 6.Yamna Case. Printemps d’Egalité 
Right to Reprint from ADFM (2005) 
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Visual 7. ADFM Moudawana Awareness-raising Campaign Media Spot  
Right to reprint by ADFM (2005)    
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Appendix 1 Dissertation Methodology 
 
Participants: The Women’s Learning Partnership 
  
Mahnaz Afkhami, a prominent Iranian women’s rights activist, founded the Women’s 
Learning Partnership (WLP) in 2000. Afkhami was the Secretary General of the 
Women's Organization of Iran and the first Minister for Women's Affairs in Iran before 
the 1979 Iranian revolution. At this time, she was exiled and came to United States. 
Previous to WLP’s founding, she was the Executive Director of Sisterhood is Global 
Institute, which is now headquartered in Jordan. Due to her extensive political and 
feminist connections across the MENA and her decades of experience working on 
women’s rights, Afkhami saw a need to form an NGO which brought prominent activists 
across the Global South together, particularly those in Muslim-majority countries, for the 
shared purpose of transforming the architecture of gender relations, empowering women 
as agents of change, and building stronger cross-national feminist movements. 
 
What does the WLP do? 
 
The vision of the WLP Partnership is “to strengthen a feminist movement in order to 
transform power relations and promote justice, equality, peace and sustainable 
development.”113 The WLP Partnership works in three primary areas: in building 
grassroots capacity, in participatory leadership curriculum development and training, and 
in building sustainable organizational capacity and advocacy efforts in order to develop 
effective and responsive local feminist organizations and movements.  The WLP 
Partnership believes:  
 
To achieve lasting change, women must be empowered to shape the 
transformation of their own societies.  They need leadership skills to 
negotiate at the family, community, national, regional, and international 
levels for conditions that are more favorable to their personal and social 
development as free and equal human beings. They need technology skills 
to access information on their political, economic, and social rights, 
engage in dialogue with women around the world, and build communities 
of action.  To succeed, empowerment projects for women must be adapted 
to the unique socio-economic, cultural, religious, and political conditions 
in each society. WLP’s programs are grounded in partnerships with 
established grassroots women’s organizations in the Global South and 
empower women by providing leadership training, organizational 
development support and the promotion of advocacy and movement 
building (WLP 2006a:2).  
 
                                                 
113
 Source: WLP Charter. 2007. 
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Partners work together to develop and implement culturally adaptable curriculum for 
women’s empowerment at the family, community, and political levels. Specifically, WLP 
builds the capacity of women and women’s organizations in the Global South in order to 
increase women’s status and in order to organize for gender equitable norms, legislation, 
and policies. NGOs involved in the WLP Partnership share the common belief that in 
order to make a just and inclusive world where rights are respected, they need to mobilize 
the largest number of people, relate to the grassroots, and link to other movements (WLP 
2008a). 
 
How are WLP partner organizations chosen? 
 
WLP partners are autonomous NGOs from around the world. While the NGOs share 
common aspirations, they are organizations with their own histories, visions, missions, 
and strategies for social change. Partners are selected to enter the Partnership by the WLP 
International executive leadership based on a variety of factors, the most important of 
which is shared values. The organization promotes a vision of participatory leadership 
based on individual’s unique skills. Partner organizations are established and credible 
feminist NGOs that are respected members of their local communities. Typically these 
NGOs are elite advocacy groups in the country with political influence. However, the 
efforts are not only aimed at the policymakers, rather the primary foundation of their 
work is aimed at empowerment and mobilization of the grassroots.  
 
How does the WLP Partnership work? 
 
WLP has developed a framework and methodology for transnational cooperation between 
the 20 women’s rights organizations that involves intensive communication and 
relationships based on trust, respect, and extensive collaboration, which mobilizes and 
leverages financial resource development with accountable oversight processes. At the 
heart of the WLP Partnership is the intense focus on communication and frequent face to 
face interaction. There is ongoing attention to and nurturing of individual relationships 
through phone meetings, conference calls, emails, and personal notes. At the very least, 
partners gather annually to reflect on the accomplishments and challenges of the past year 
as well as strategize on collective projects for moving forward.  
 
We consider our greatest strength to be the solidarity, resilience, and 
dynamism of our Partnership, based on relationships of trust, respect, and 
cooperation.  The synergy created by these relationships has made the 
astonishing growth of our programs possible. Our shared vision, nurtured 
through more than five years of collaborative effort and sustained 
communication, has enabled 18 autonomous and independent 
organizations on three continents, functioning under diverse conditions, to 
work closely together, thereby significantly increasing their impact on 
their socio-political environment  (WLP 2006a:1).114 
 
                                                 
114
 There were 18 partners at the time that the 2006 annual report was written. As of 2009, there are 20 
partners in WLP. 
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The network believes that through solidarity and partnership they will be able to face the 
surmountable challenges in their contexts, which includes a legacy of patriarchy, 
increasing fundamentalism, closing political spaces, and more widespread conflict.  
 
The Foundational Curriculum: Leading to Choices 
The WLP Partnership developed a participatory leadership program in 2001, the Leading 
to Choices (LTC) program. The curriculum, collaboratively designed by the WLP 
Partnership with a group of Moroccan, Nigerian, and Palestinian activists,115 cultivates 
individual capacities and collective leadership skills in order to foster, elicit, and develop 
each participant’s unique strengths and collective contributions to the women’s 
movement. LTC aims to “empower” participants and to foster leaders who aspire to 
create more egalitarian, democratic, and pluralistic societies based on collaborative 
decision-making and coalition-building. The LTC program forms the core curriculum 
that is implemented in all of the partner countries. Activists have trained over 8000 
women and men across the Global South. The curriculum has been adapted based on 
culture and translated into 16 languages, English, Maghreby-Arabic, Shamy-Arabic, 
Assamese, French, Hausa, Malay, Meiteilon, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Shona, 
Spanish, Swahili, Turkish and Uzbek. Editions in Bahasa Indonesian, Kokborok, and 
Tagalog editions are all under development. 
The first section of the LTC program is primarily aimed at the facilitators and is entitled: 
“The Building Blocks of the Leadership: Leadership as Communicative Learning,” in 
which the foundations of a horizontal, participative, and democratic leadership are 
outlined. The second part, “Communicating in a Workshop: Guidelines for Facilitating” 
provides practical, technical, and methodological instructions essential for addressing the 
case studies within the handbook. The second section of the handbook is intended for the 
participants and focuses on three different themes: (1) Developing the Self for 
Leadership; (2) Communicating with Others; and (3) Creating Learning Partnerships. 
Within each section, different elements of leadership are focused on, such as identifying 
alternative forms of leadership, creating a shared vision, communicating in diverse 
situations, establishing allies, and mobilizing a constituency.  
Alternative forms of leadership and key concepts to strengthen women’s organizing are 
presented through twelve case studies from around the world. Examples of some of the 
real world cases included are: Jordan, where the human rights lawyer, Asma Khader, 
organized a campaign to eliminate honor killings; Bangladesh, where Muhammed 
Youniss created a vision for a world without poverty and founded the Grameen Bank; 
and Nigeria, where humans rights organization BAOBAB utilized technology to increase 
communication between women in Sub-Saharan Africa for the purpose of increased 
community participation. These cases are provided to stimulate conversation around 
important topics related to democratic leadership and building gender equitable 
societies. The dialogic and participatory method of learning creates a foundation from 
                                                 
115
 Organizations include Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), BAOBAB for 
Women’s Human Rights, and Women’s Affairs Technical Committee 
 
203 
 
which participants can explore personal and collective levels of leadership as well as 
develop strategies for social change in their communities.   
Indeed, local adaptation is seen as a critical component of the leadership program’s 
success. Afkhami et al. (2000) note that it is important that the manual be “… adaptable 
for any community, to enhance women’s participation and leadership in various spheres 
of social interaction and decision-making. Our ultimate goal is to play a part in creating 
conditions for the fair and balanced treatment of both men and women worldwide” 
(Afkhami et al. 2000: 2). Below I provide two examples of local adaptations used in 
Rabat, Morocco and Istanbul, Turkey. The adaptations are based on Session 2: How am I 
a Leader in my Own Life, particularly focusing on the parts of the session that deal with 
gender roles and its impact on how women envision leadership.  
In Rabat, Morocco, ADFM draws on a humorous cultural text to illuminate gender roles 
and biases in their society. The NGO plays a short video clip entitled, Al Baghla, The 
Indignant Mule.  The woman depicted in the film is shown busily working and providing 
for her family and husband during a day they travelled to town. She buys food, cleans, 
handles the money, while her husband plays games and enjoys the day with his friends. 
When the couple is getting ready to travel back home, the husband gets on the mule, 
while the wife walks next to him. The mule, indignant, bucks him onto the ground.  
At this point, the facilitator of the LTC program typically notes the paradox in Moroccan 
society depicted in the movie between the derogatory status of women compared to her 
roles and responsibilities: “She buys, sells, and works—she has a productive role in the 
house— she takes care of the house and the children. In this instance, the woman has 
three roles: productive, social, and reproductive. Is that not enough to be a leader?” 
(Haddouche 2006). By noting this dichotomy, the cultural permutations of women’s roles 
are brought to the fore, while also questioning traditional forms of leadership. 
Participants then engage in a discussion to further explore the ways in which gender 
biases and roles influence their lives. 
In Turkey, the Foundation for the Support of Women’s Work (FSWW) also adapt 
Session 2 using a reading entitled, A World Overturned, taken from an Oxfam exercise. 
Specifically, FSWW uses a scenario, which reverses gender stereotypes in order to 
facilitate an open discussion. The session starts out with a reading that questions why 
notions like honesty, bravery, and honor are all attributed to men in Turkish society. The 
reading moves on to set up another reality where these are common stereotypes of 
women and it is women who hold the majority of powerful positions in the country. 
Close your eyes and when you read the papers, when you listen to the 
radio or watch television, you constantly see female politicians, labor 
unions, corporate leaders, imagine you see them face to face and hear 
them speak. Imagine that all the heroes of all the important books and 
poems that emotionally move you that you’ve read, all the plays, movies 
you’ve watched, and songs are about women…Moreover, imagine that all 
the biological explanations developed about women enable them to 
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become centers of power and leaders. As a result the body of a woman is a 
miracle. 
The text addresses the roots of gender stereotypes from a reverse perspective, men are 
raised to be protected because they are deemed weak and their bodies must be protected 
because they are vulnerable. This reversed world offers participants the freedom to 
question existing gender stereotypes without being constrained by traditional and existing 
norms.  
These examples of cultural adaptations demonstrate how the WLP Partnership 
implements its agentic brand of feminism, as described in Chapter 2. Specifically, local 
adaptations illuminate the importance of context when working on grassroots social 
change. Women that participate in the LTC programs are provided with a wide range of 
domestic and international examples of leadership from which they develop 
communication and mobilization strategies to alter their family, work, or political 
relations. Moreover, these interpersonal skills are built upon and transformed to broader 
organizational or political goals where broader collective efforts of social change can be 
initiated based on one’s personal preferences and individual circumstances.   
 
Dissertation Methods 
 
I use a mixed method feminist-activist approach, drawing from both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. My goal in the first section on resources that social movements 
encounter is to explore spaces of connection and disconnection between feminist and 
international funders’ discourses. I was particularly interested in the predominant use of 
rights discourses and specifically believed that funders would pay less attention to 
contextual specificities, such as religious reaction to human rights, and their own impact 
on local events on the ground. I look closely at how the interactions between these two 
actors shape local NGO discourses of equality on the ground. In the second section on 
legislative reforms, I am interested in exploring how activists’ interaction with the 
context, political actors, and particular historical events can shape movement strategy and 
particularly the development of equality discourses.  
  
International Resources and NGO Strategy 
 
The main research questions I explore in Chapter 2 include the following. (1) What are 
the main discourses used to frame gender equitable social change?  (2) How, if at all, do 
international funding priorities align with MENA women’s rights NGO priorities? (3) In 
what ways are global discourses adapted to local settings by NGOs?  
 
As described, the women’s rights NGOs in the sample are all members of the WLP 
Partnership. I include the 10 organizations located in the MENA and the coordinating 
organization, WLP International, as previously described. I selected the funding sample 
by drawing from a list of the top 20 global funders in the MENA region found in a recent 
report by Association for Women in Development (AWID) (Clark et al. 2006). The 
funding organizations included in the sample are The European Commission, United 
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Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), European Youth Foundation, United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nation’s Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM), Open Society Institute (OSI), Sigrid Rausing Trust, Ford Foundation, 
Oxfam, HIVOS, CORDAID, Heinrich Boll, Equality Now, Global Fund for Women 
(GFW), and Mama Cash.  
 
Since I wanted to explore the types of discourses that were most prominent for funders 
and NGOs, I explore how international donors and NGOs present themselves to the 
public through their “public face” in their mission and vision statements on their 
websites. While it would have been useful to conduct in-depth interviews with funders, it 
was outside the scope and timeline for this project.116 Organizational documentation 
reveals important aspects of an organization’s bureaucratic process and identity 
(Espeland 1993). As such, this analysis strategy will unearth important strategic choices 
about how organizations publically frame and present their priorities.  Drawing from 
Ferree and Pudrovska’s (2006) model for analyzing the identities of women’s rights 
groups in the Global South, I content coded the NGO and funder mission and vision 
statements and transformed data to a quantitative format117 (Weber 1990; Bauer 2000; 
Boyatzis 1998). For data organization and coding purposes, I used Atlas.ti and Excel. The 
codes were developed generatively from the data. The only codes that I identified a priori 
were human rights discourses, the rest emerged as I read and developed codes from the 
data. 
 
In total, I identified three main underlying emphases in the funders’ mission and vision 
statements, which describe how they conceptualize funding gender equality. These 
include rights-based, good governance, and empowerment approaches. In the NGO 
analysis, I found nearly replicable themes to the funders, including rights-based, 
empowerment, and democratic development models. The only difference was a slightly 
different focus for NGOs on establishing democratic processes and institutions in 
comparison to the funders’ focus on governance and rule of law, but overall they are 
merely describing different dimensions of a similar overall approach. Descriptions and 
examples of these themes are outlined in more depth in Chapter 2.  
 
Next, I conducted a frequency analysis of the keywords in the missions and visions of 
international funders.118 I did this as I believe word choice in mission and vision 
statements provide an important indicator of organizational priorities and strategic 
messaging. These public messages will be read and interpreted by international and 
domestic actors such as state allies and opponents; thus, they contain crucial discursive 
information. I report both the frequency and incidence of keyword use in order to rank 
the most frequently highlighted keywords across the sample as well as to track the 
                                                 
116
 Still wanting to keep this line of inquiry, I thought it would be useful to compare the language in the 
mission and vision statement. Interestingly, this did allow me to get at differences related to local nuance in 
funders’ and NGOs’ missions. I then supplement these findings with NGO interview data to gain deeper 
insight into these issues. 
117
 UNDP, Sigrid Rausing, and Open Society Initiative (OSI) did not have an easily accessible mission or 
vision statement on their websites.  In these cases, I analyzed the ‘About Us’ section of the website.  
118
 I used the program HyperPo to conduct these keyword frequency analyses. 
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relative frequency based on how many NGOs used the word. A full chart detailing the 
keywords appears in Chapter 2. 
 
To conclude Chapter 2, I analyzed interview and meeting data to shed light on how 
activists make meaning of public discourses, such as human rights, in their local context. 
My main research questions for this section include: (1) What are the strengths and 
weaknesses of using human rights approaches in the local setting? (2) In what ways have 
NGOs addressed women’s rights using different global and local perspectives? I analyze 
participant observation data and hand-written notes and transcripts of the meeting 
interactions between 18 activists during roundtable discussions at two WLP meetings in 
September 2006 and April 2008 in Potomac, MD. I restricted analyses of focus group 
sessions and only coded the MENA NGO responses in the sample. I also drew data from 
in-depth interviews. I used thematic coding approaches with the data (Boyatzis 1998), 
focusing on the themes that emerged as I read across meeting and interview transcripts. 
The main issue activists highlighted was the need to contextualize global frames, such as 
human rights, democracy, or empowerment. In order to bring to life diverse modes of 
discourse localization, I use a locally-developed curriculum, Claiming Our Rights, for 
women in Muslim societies to explore connections between Islamic texts and human 
rights. This section emphasizes the diverse and dynamic adaptations developed for 
bridging local and global concepts, such as human rights and Islam. 
  
Next, in Chapter 3, I take a closer look at the intricate discursive negotiations between 
transnational NGOs in the international development sphere. I explore the different ways 
in which power and agency are exercised by NGOs in asymmetrical relationships with 
their funding allies. My main goal is to explore how even within opportune relationships 
there are constraints that activists must manage. I explore the following research 
questions: (1) What are the opportunities and constraints of NGO partnership with 
international funders for activists in local contexts? and (2) In what ways are power and 
agency being exercised by NGOs in the funding relationship?  
  
The data used to answer these questions were derived from participant observation data, 
written transcripts, and notes from roundtable discussions between 18-24 activists from  
four WLP meetings I attended that focused on the opportunities and constraints related to 
receipt of international funds. The meetings took place in 2005 in Bangkok, Thailand, in 
Potomac, MD, in 2006, and in April and September 2008. Portions of these meetings 
were devoted to international funding, capacity building, and feminist social change. I 
also include pertinent information from key interviews and numerous informal 
discussions with key members of the WLP Partnership.119  
  
I analyze the meeting and field notes using an emergent thematic coding scheme 
(Boyatzis 1998). Through reading and analyzing my notes, I began to notice two major 
themes running throughout activists’ commentary—power and agency. Given these 
themes, I structured Chapter 3 around these two issues. I then conducted interviews with 
                                                 
119
 Since issues of funding are extremely delicate issues to discuss due to NGO’s reliance on funding, issues 
that could potentially threaten future funding for any NGO are not included in this study.  
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the executive leadership of WLP International to further illuminate issues related to these 
themes in the international funding community in order to produce a more holistic theory. 
In some ways, this analytic approach draws from grounded theory analysis, specifically 
allowing major theories to emerge from the data and then conducting subsequent 
interviews in order to refine that theory (Strauss and Corbin 1994). The data highlight the 
many challenges and opportunities that international funding brings to the movement, as 
well as underline the strategic choices that autonomous NGOs made in regards to their 
relationships with funders. In particular, the analysis sheds light on the strategies and 
practices that NGOs in the WLP network have pursued to assuage potential threats 
associated with mission or goal drift.  
 
Contentious Domestic Reform Contexts: Bridging Global and Local Discourses 
 
Given the previous focus on the resource dimensions associated with NGO work, this 
next section analyzes how NGO apply their social change missions, namely through 
efforts of legislative reform. In Chapter 4, I turn to an in-depth analysis of the 
evolutionary discourse development process in the case of Moudawana reform. The goal 
is to explore the Moroccan reformist movement’s process of crafting an effective social 
change discourse based on a variety of global and local constraints.  I pay particular 
attention to answering the following questions. (1) In what ways, are global and local 
norms used to frame issues of Moudawana reform? (2) In what ways, do the legal and 
political contexts influence the Moroccan reformists’ discursive framing and mobilization 
efforts? (3) What roles do domestic constraints and opportunities play in the Moroccan 
campaign to reform the Moudawana? (4) Finally, in what ways does activists’ 
engagement with constraints augment feminist and social movement scholarship? 
 
In order to answer these questions, I constructed an in-depth case study of the Moroccan 
feminist campaign to reform the Moudawana.  The case study was crafted based on three 
months of fieldwork in Rabat, historical analysis, in-depth interviews, and textual 
analysis of the Moroccan women’s rights movement strategy and legal documentation. I 
draw on fieldwork and personal interactions with WLP and ADFM between the years of 
2004-2008.  I initially gathered data related to the Moudawana reform while working 
with activists at ADFM on a two year collaborative evaluation of a women’s leadership 
program in 2005. I spent 3 months in Rabat throughout 2005-2006, working with ADFM. 
In April 2005, I attended a press conference on the Moudawana reform held at ADFM 
headquarters in Rabat, where I gathered detailed information on the media and 
communication strategies.   
 
Additionally, I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews, which included the 
executive leadership and activists at ADFM, a strategist to a regional Maghrebian 
coalition for Islamic Family Law, a member of the Royal Commission to reform the 
Moudawana, and regional partners. All interviews were transcribed and thematically 
coded (Boyatzis 1998). In the process of coding interviews, I began to see activists’ 
acknowledgement of the need to shift their framing strategies based on strong opposition 
from religious conservatives and Islamists. Moreover, I found that references to the 
political context and opportunity and constraints were frequent. I use historical data and 
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secondary data analysis to describe the Moroccan reform context at the time, painting a 
better picture of the types of shifting political opportunities and constraints available to 
women’s rights activists.  
 
Next, I began constructing my arguments on the importance of the legal and political 
contexts and its influence on shaping discourses for reform. In order to better understand 
the specific types of discourses that the movement was generating, I analyzed legal and 
textual sources, such as the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité’s, Guide to Equality in the 
Family in the Maghreb and the French and English translation of the reformed 
Moudawana (2004). I use this data to target specific discursive strategies that the activists 
developed from 1999-2004. Through these analyses, the way that activists bridged the 
secular versus religious public debate is evidenced. Specifically, Moroccan activists 
navigated a shifting and contentious reform context by drawing from multiple discursive 
claims, including human rights, democratic, sociological, and religious discourses. 
 
Finally, I have drawn from a sample of newspaper articles, which were published after 
King Mohamed VI made his speech announcing the Moudawana reform. The articles 
appeared in the popular press from October 10-October 31, 2003 (67 in French and 82 in 
Arabic). These articles were collected by ADFM in order to document the press coverage 
of the reform. ADFM systematically collected articles from the most popular and widely 
distributed newspapers in Morocco. I specifically look to see if there were any major 
differences in how reformists or opponents framed their messages after the Moudawana 
reform.    
 
Alliances and Coalitions for Global Feminist Movement Building 
 
Building on the previous chapter, which looks at an example of domestic Personal Status 
Code reform, I turn to an example of regional strategizing for reform of the secular 
Nationality Code in Chapter 5. Having explored the Moudawana reform, which 
underlined the importance of adaptive movement strategies that responded to the political 
context, opponents, and allies, I wanted to see if similar movement strategies were also 
applied in a coalitional setting with diverse NGO actors. My goal is to understand how 
international and local resources and strategies are used to build regional movements for 
increasing women’s nationality rights. The following research questions guide this 
chapter. (1) In what ways are NGOs drawing from collective resources to strategize for 
increasing women’s nationality rights domestically and in the MENA region?  (2) What 
types of strategies contribute to movement strengthening across the MENA? In order to 
answer these questions, I profiled the multi-lateral and regional partnerships between 
WLP International, CRTDA, and ADFM in the Campaign to Reform Arab Women’s 
Nationality (CRAWN), initiated by six MENA NGOs in 2001.  
 
I have drawn from fieldwork with the WLP network from 2004-2008 and analyzed 
participant observation field notes and written transcripts from two WLP meetings in 
2006 and 2008 in Bethesda, MD. I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews in 2008 
and 2009 with the executive leadership of ADFM, WLP International, and CRTDA. I 
analyzed internal organizational documents and reports from the three organizations, 
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including campaign reports, annual reports, and reports to funders. I analyzed data from 
two Nationality campaign websites, hosted respectively by CRTDA and WLP.  
Throughout the data analysis process, I focused on coding the data in terms of the 
collective strategies and resources developed. I selectively coded interviews and textual 
campaign data according to my goal to highlight regional, local, and international 
contributions to the collective campaign (Maxwell 1996).  
 
I primarily used an historical analytic approach, trying to create a snapshot of how 
collective strategy development took place between these three NGOs in the WLP. 
Broadly, I have drawn from interviews and strategy documents with the leadership of 
CRTDA to describe the collective strategy development process. I then used historical 
and political developments, interview data, and secondary sources to give a brief 
overview of local implementations in Morocco. I have drawn data from the international 
website that supports the CRAWN campaign and from interviews with WLP 
International executive leadership in order to show the importance of international 
campaign visibility. The results of the study suggest a model for movement building that 
starts with grassroots regional organizing and that reaches out to international networks in 
order to gain greater visibility and wider reach.  
 
A Digression on Feminist Research 
 
Feminist research aims to unearth perspectives on women’s experiences and is often 
designed by and for women. Typically, there has been a break in epistemologies between 
feminist research and the traditional social sciences that stems from primary underlying 
research assumptions of objectivism, also referred to as the “view from nowhere” by 
Thomas Nagel (1986). Feminist research does not aim to replicate positivistic forms of 
social science by producing objective or even experimental accounts of social 
phenomenon and people’s experiences.  Part of the conflict between traditional science 
research and feminist research can be traced to the epistemological reality that feminism 
is a politicized movement that aims to transform gendered power hierarchies and 
relations (Harding 1987). Typically, feminist researchers embrace subjectivity and its aim 
to bring multiple perspectives to light, particularly those that have been marginalized. 
Since one’s socio-political positioning impacts understanding of social events or relations 
(Harding 1987), often the goal of feminist projects is to attempt to represent these 
complex multi-faceted truths (Fine 1992; Harding 1987; Maguire 2001).   
  
The attempt to represent truth(s) can be intensified and obscured in cross-national 
research projects.  Chandra Mohanty (1988) cautions against “Western eyes” 
essentializing the experiences of women in the Global South. Western feminists can gloss 
over important realities in the Global South, such as how their privilege has been built on 
postcolonial legacies of economic and socio-political control, which have greatly 
impacted societies in the Global South. Thus, the subjectivities that stem from one’s 
experiences may also be constraining; particularly, if one’s positioning shrouds clarity of 
privilege.  
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Subjectivity is indeed important in cross-cultural projects and becomes heightened when 
negotiating insider/outsider dilemmas (Naples 1996; Joseph 1996).  Yet, Naples 
(2003:49) describes the role of subjectivity and shifting relations throughout the research 
process:  
 
Outsiderness and indersiderness are not fixed or static positions. Rather, 
they are ever-shifting and permeable social locations that are differentially 
experienced and expressed by community members. By recognizing the 
fluidity of outsiderness/insiderness, we also acknowledge three key 
methodological points: ... we are never fully outside or inside the 
“community”; our relationship to the community is never expressed in 
general terms but is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated in 
particular, everyday interactions; and these interactions are themselves 
enacted in shifting relationships among community residents. 
 
This reflexive analysis of the researcher within the research process is a distinctive 
feature of feminist research: “…it insists that the inquiry her/himself be placed in the 
same critical plane as the overt subject matter, thereby recovering the entire research 
process for scrutiny in the results of research” (Harding 1987:9). The connection between 
the researcher’s interests and the subject matter is thus uncovered. This process of critical 
analysis of the interaction between the subject and research object is referred to as the 
“reflexivity of social science” (Harding 1987). Weedon (1997) suggests that by bringing 
subjective and political selves to the theory making table, patriarchal practices of 
knowledge production are transformed. This broadens opportunities for more nuanced 
and situated theory making, inclusive of a diversity of women’s experiences and 
perspectives.  
 
However, these epistemological differences related to feminist research do not 
necessarily transfer to methodological differences (Harding 1987; DeVault 1996). Of 
course, the range of methodological tools that scholars have at their disposal is limited. 
Many feminist researchers may prefer qualitative methods in order to more deeply 
explore women’s experiences and meaning making (Harding 1987; Naples 1998; Taylor 
1998).  I draw from a broad range of mixed qualitative and quantitative methods as 
described above. I also follow Naples’ (1998) methodological approach, which suggests 
the central purpose of activist research is: “Presenting scholarship that supports an 
activist campaign or progressive organization and that chronicles the lessons of 
organizing against oppression in its many guises…” (Naples 1998:8).120 For feminist 
researchers, being part of a community or working with an organization, while also 
conducting research is not rare (Naples 1996; Naples 1998; Ostrander 2004) as many 
scholars create relationships with activists as a means to bridge the activist-scholar chasm 
(Naples 1998).  
 
                                                 
120
 Activist research has links to action research (Lewin 1948).  Action research involves “comparative 
research on the conditions and effects of various forms of social action, and research leading to social 
action” (1948: 202). 
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The insider/outsider dilemma was particularly relevant in my Moroccan fieldwork as I 
constantly negotiated shifting spheres of inclusion as the facilitator of a joint evaluation 
project and a Western graduate student who was interested in learning more about 
ADFM’s role in the Moudawana reform. Since I was part of the evaluation group at 
ADFM, I gained some credibility and access to more information regarding the 
Moudawana reform. But, due to my nascence in the field at the time, it took time and 
continued relationship building with the experienced activists to gain greater entry and 
insight into their strategic movement building processes. Things shifted in 2007 when 
Rakhee Goyal, Executive Director of WLP connected me with an Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) project on national policy reforms. This gave me the unique 
opportunity to work with Rabéa Naciri, then President of ADFM, on a chapter on the role 
of the Moroccan women’s movement during the Moudawana reform. I was able to work 
with and learn first-hand from this prominent feminist, who led ADFM during the 
Moudawana reform efforts. Relational breakthroughs like this were integral to shaping 
the dissertation and to further deepening my knowledge of activism in the region.   
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Appendix 2 List of Interviews 
Amina Lemrini. 2005. Founder of ADFM.  Personal Interview. April 27, 2005, Rabat, 
Morocco. 
 
Amina Lemrini. 2006. Founder of ADFM. Personal Interview. Rabat, Morocco. 
 
Caroline Brac de la Pérrière. 2007. Member of the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité. Personal 
Telephone Interview. March 8, 2007. USA-France. 
 
Khadija Oueldammou. Member of Nationality Campaign Committee. Personal Interview. 
Rabat, Morocco. September 12, 2008.  
 
Lina Abou-Habib. 2008. Executive Director of CRTDA Lebanon and Key Coordinator 
for Regional Nationality Campaign. Personal Interview. September 3, 2008. Maryland. 
USA. 
 
Mahnaz Afkhami. 2009. Founder and President of WLP. Personal Interview. USA. 
February 3, 2009.  
 
Mahnaz Afkhami. 2009. Founder and President of WLP. Personal Interview. USA. 
March 26, 2009.  
 
Nouzha Guessous. 2007. Member of the Commission to Reform the Moudawana. 
Personal Interview.  March 13, 2007. Rabat-USA. 
 
Rabéa, Naciri. 2007. Interview with Rabéa Naciri. February 14, 2007. Rabat, Morocco.  
USA.  
 
Rachida Nafaa. ADFM Board Member. Dean at Hassan II University-Mohammedia. 
September 13, 2008. 
 
Raja El Habti. 2007. Key Religious Strategist to ADFM and Collectif 95. Personal 
Interview. USA. March 14, 2007.  
 
Rakhee Goyal. 2009. Executive Director of WLP. Personal Interview. USA. February 3, 
2009.  
 
Rakhee Goyal. 2009. Executive Director of WLP. Personal Interview. USA. March 26, 
2009.  
 
Saïda Idrissi. Vice President of ADFM. Personal Interview. September 12, 2008. Rabat, 
Morocco. 
 
Vera Hayek. 2008. Coordinator of Regional Nationality Campaign. Personal Interview. 
September 2, 2008. Maryland. USA. 
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Appendix 3 Frequency and Incidence of Keywords in Missions/Visions of Funding 
Community and MENA NGOs  
 
Keyword Activist Frequency 
Activist 
Incidence 
(n=11) 
Donor 
Frequency 
Donor Incidence 
(n=17) 
women  49 10 20 10 
society 8 7 5 3 
participation 7 6 4  
community 9 5 2 2 
decision making 5 5 1 1 
just/justice 7 5 6 5 
democratic 4 4 5 5 
empower/empowerment 5 4 2 2 
discrimination against women 3 3 1 1 
equality 4 3 5 4 
human rights/women’s rights 10 6 27 6 
public 4 3 4 3 
training 4 3 . . 
activists 2 2 1 1 
capacity 3 2 1 1 
capacity building 3 2 . . 
children 4 2 2 2 
citizens 2 2 2 2 
feminist 2 2 . . 
grassroots women  4 2 . . 
international 5 2 4 4 
leaders/leadership 7 2 . . 
local 5 2 2 2 
network/ing 2 2 . . 
power 2 2 . . 
solidarity 3 2 . . 
strategic 2 2 . . 
world 2 2 13 8 
abuse 1 1 2 2 
abilities 2 1 . . 
advocacy 5 1 1 1 
civil society 1 1 . . 
social change 2 1 1 1 
collaboration 1 1 1 1 
defend 2 1 . . 
development 1 1 4 4 
diversity 1 1 1 1 
economic 1 1 6 5 
egalitarian 1 1 . . 
education 2 1 1 1 
environment 1 1 2 2 
family 1 1 . . 
gender equality 2 1 1 1 
grassroots 5 1 . . 
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global 1 1 5 5 
human development 2 1 . . 
marginalized 1 1 1 1 
local governments 2 1 . . 
movement 2 1 2 2 
Muslim majority 2 1 . . 
organizational development 1 1 . . 
oppressed 1 1 . . 
opportunities 2 1 2 2 
policies 1 1 2 2 
peace 1 1 4 4 
political 2 1 5 4 
poverty 1 1 8 6 
research 1 1 . . 
resources 1 1 2 2 
respect 1 1 2 2 
reform 1 1 1 1 
skills 3 1 2 2 
social justice 1 1 . . 
sustainable 1 1 3 3 
violence against women 1 1 . . 
violence 1 1 2 2 
business . . 3 3 
choices . . 2 2 
challenges . . 3 3 
free . . 4 4 
future . . 3 3 
gender  . . 1 1 
governance . . 2 2 
HIV/AIDS . . 3 2 
human . . 3 2 
injustice . . 3 3 
poor . . 2 2 
solutions . . 2 2 
violations . . 3 1 
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Appendix 4 A Women’s Rights Organizing Model for Funding Relationships  
 
 
Model replicated from Kerr 2007. Designed by Lydia Alpizar Duran and Ellen Sprenger.  
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Appendix 5 Example of Moroccan Country Case Analyses for Nationality Reform 
Source: http:crtda.org.lb 
 
Constitution 
 
The Moroccan Constitution of October 7, 1996 declares that men and women have equal 
rights. The first section consecrates freedom of all Moroccan citizens, which is then 
cemented in Article 5, which states that all Moroccans are equal. Article 8 of the 
constitution certifies this equality regardless of gender; “men and women enjoy equal 
political rights." 
 
Nationality Law 
 
Moroccan nationality law denies women the right to pass on their nationality to their 
children, with the exception of cases whereby the father is unknown or without a 
nationality in order to uphold the universal right of a nationality to all the children. 
 
However, Moroccan women married to non-nationals can confer their nationality on their 
children. To this end, children should be Moroccan residents and should apply for the 
nationality two years before reaching consensual age. 
 
Commitment and Reservation to the Treaties 
 
Morocco joined The International Pact of Civil and Political Rights in May 3, 1979 and 
did not register any reservations. In 1993, Morocco also joined The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and expressed some 
reservations. Upon its amendment of the CEDAW treaty, Morocco had reservations 
regarding Clause 2 of Article 9, which declares: The participant countries provide women 
the same rights   as men regarding the children's nationality. 
 
Morocco also held reservations to Article 2 (arrangements took by the states), Clause 4 of 
Article 15 (freedom of movement and the right to choose a residence), Clause 2 of Article 
9 (right to pass on nationality), Article 16 (equity in marital rights and duties between 
men and women) and Article 29 (solving crises). 
 
Morocco argued that all its reservations were due to the treaty's discordance with 
Islamic Jurisprudence. 
 
Personal Story 
 
X is a Moroccan woman aged 40 who married her husband, an Egyptian in 1990. 
 
“My husband and I first met at university. Initially my parents opposed the marriage but 
eventually they consented when they realized we would stay and live here. When we 
married we had no idea my husband’s status as a foreigner would be a problem. Naively 
we assumed he would automatically receive Moroccan citizenship and he applied very 
217 
 
soon after the wedding. We’ve been waiting now for fourteen years to hear back from the 
authorities. They just delay and delay.  
 
Perhaps if I had known how hard life would be without my husband having my 
nationality I might have reconsidered marrying him even though we’ve had a strong 
relationship. Without citizenship he has never been able to get the sort of job he deserves 
given his qualifications. After all, he has a university degree, training and a 
specialization. Instead he’s been lucky to find occasional part time work. This has had a 
huge impact on our income.   
 
The biggest shock however was when my daughter was born.  I didn’t think twice when I 
went to register her name in the civil status registry but once the officials realized my 
husband was a foreigner, they wouldn’t accept her. I was overcome with distress. Here 
was my newborn baby daughter and yet the state wouldn’t recognize her. This tragedy 
continues. My daughter is now 15 and the government security department says she has 
to apply for a ‘residence permit’ and that I have to prove she’s my daughter.  Can you 
imagine that?  She was born here, she’s lived here all her life, her mother is Moroccan 
and yet she isn’t recognized by the state as a citizen. It’s very unfair because if my 
husband was Moroccan and I was a foreigner the State would recognize our children 
without question.  As it is my children have suffered a lot.  They are constantly reminded 
of their reduced status at school, at the doctor’s, wherever there is a need for official 
paperwork.  This leaves them feeling as if they don’t belong, as if they are alienated and 
unwanted.         
 
It’s been a very lonely experience.  There is no one in my family who can help because 
I’m the only one who has ever experienced such a thing. I have had to shoulder these 
responsibilities alone.  Luckily, the relationship that binds me to my husband is a source 
of inner peace which smoothes these material problems away.  
 
Thanks to ADFM (ADFM is a Moroccan based local NGO that advocates for women’s 
rights), I started to participate in a working group that advocates for changes in the 
Nationality Law. This has helped me see that I’m not alone and that there are many other 
Moroccan women married to non-nationals.  Of course the solution lies in changing the 
law. The Nationality Law must allow Moroccan women married to non-nationals to 
transmit their nationality to their children. In the interim we have suggested a few 
measures to alleviate the sufferings of children, such as reducing the naturalization age 
from 19 to 15 and ensuring the process becomes automatic.”  
 
Recent developments in the Nationality and Law – efforts of the campaigners  
 
In Morocco, several women's groups have been working with some political parties on 
the issue of nationality to ensure women the right to transfer nationality to their children.  
Consequently a bill will be debated in parliament in October 2005. 
In July 2005, the Moroccan authorities held the government charged for the amendment 
of the Nationality Legislations.  
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The ratification of the family code in Morocco was an important step as regards women’s 
rights and allowed women to acquire fundamental rights in terms of equality with men in 
catering for the needs of the family as well as other matters that rehabilitated the 
Moroccan woman. 
 
Nevertheless, ADFM is still campaigning for the revision of article 6 of the Moroccan 
Law 1950, to grant women their right to pass the nationality to her non-national husbands 
and children. 
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Appendix 6 Musawah Campaign Framework for Action 
Source: Musawah Framework for Action. www.musawah.org 
We hold the principles of Islam to be a source of justice, equality, fairness and dignity for 
all human beings. We declare that equality and justice are necessary and possible in 
family laws and practices in Muslim countries and communities.  
RECOGNISING THAT: 
• The teachings of the Qur’an, the objectives of the Shari‘ah, universal human 
rights standards, fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees, and the 
realities of our lives in the twenty-first century, all demand that relations between 
Muslim women and men in both the private and public spheres be governed by 
principles and practices that uphold equality, fairness and justice;  
• All Muslims have an equal right and duty to read the religious texts, engage in 
understanding God’s message, and act for justice, equality and the betterment of 
humankind within their families, communities and countries;  
• Many laws and practices in Muslim countries are unjust, and the lives of all 
family members, especially women, are impaired by these injustices on a daily 
basis; 
• Human affairs constantly change and evolve, as do the laws and social practices 
that shape relations within the Muslim family; 
• Islam embodies equality, justice, love, compassion and mutual respect between all 
human beings, and these values provide us with a path towards change; 
• The reform of laws and practices for the benefit of society and the public interest 
(maslahah) has always been part of the Muslim legal tradition; and  
• International human rights standards require dignity, substantive equality and 
non-discrimination for all human beings;  
We, as Muslims and as citizens of modern nations, declare that equality and justice in the 
family are both necessary and possible. The time for realising these values in our laws 
and practices is now. 
 
 
 
 
220 
 
References 
 
Abou-Bakr, Oumaima. 2001. “Islamic Feminism. What’s in a Name? Preliminary 
Reflections.” MEWS Review Articles 15(4) and 16(1). Retrieved March 3, 2007 
(http://www.amews.org/review/reviewarticles/islamicfeminism.htm). 
 
Abou-Habib, Lina. 2006. Interview from Women Learning Partnership’s, Claiming Equal 
Citizenship website. Retrieved October 21, 2007 
 (http://www.learningpartnership.org/citizenship/2006/08/lahinterview030406). 
 
Abu-Lughod, Lila. 1998. Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle 
East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
ADFM. 2003. Rapport Parallèle des ONG au Rapport Périodique du Gouvernement du 
Maroc.  Sur la mise en œuvre de la Convention CEDAW.  Retrieved September 
14, 2008 (http://www.learningpartnership.org/docs/adfmcedawfrenchrep.doc). 
 
ADFM. 2005.  Stop Aux Violences Contre les Femmes. Campagne d’information sur les 
Nouvelles Dispositions du Code de la Famille.  Media Public Awareness 
Campaign Message. Press Conference, April 27, 2005. 
 
Afkhami, Mahnaz and Haleh Vaziri. 1996. Claiming Our Rights: A Manual for Women's 
Human Rights Education in Muslim Societies. Bethesda, MD: Sisterhood is 
Global Institute. 
 
Afshar, Haleh. 1998. Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World. 
Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Ahmed, Leila. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam. New Haven, London: Yale  
University Press 
 
al-Hibri, Azizah. 1999. “Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy.” Pp. 
63-87 in Border Crossings: Toward a Comparative Political Theory, edited by F. 
Dallmayr. Maryland: Lexington Books. 
 
Alimi, Eitan, William Gamson and Charlotte Ryan. 2006. “Knowing your Adversary: 
Israeli Structure of Political Opportunity and the Inception of the Palestinian 
Intifada.” Sociological Forum 21(4):535-557. 
 
Alvarez, Sonia. 2000. ‘‘Translating the Global: Effects of Transnational Organizing on 
Local Feminist Discourses and Practices in Latin America.’’ Cadernos de 
Pesquisa 22. Retrieved November 3, 2007  
(www.sociologia.ufsc.br/cadernos/Cadernos%20PPGSP%2022.pdf). 
 
221 
 
Amenta, Edwin, Bruce G. Carruthers, and Yvonne Zylan. 1992. “A Hero for the Aged? 
The Townsend Movement, the Political Mediation Model, and U.S. Old-age 
Policy, 1934-1950.” American Journal of Sociology 98:308-39. 
  
Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, and Sheera Joy Olasky. 2005. “Age for Leisure? Political 
Mediation and the Impact of the Pension Movement on U.S. Old-Age Policy.” 
American Sociological Review 70(3):516-538. 
 
An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed. 2002.  Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global 
Resource Book.  London, UK:  Zed Books. 
 
AWID and GFW. 2008. “Resource Mobilization for Women’s Rights Organizations and 
Movements in the Middle East and North Africa.” Retrieved March 3, 2009 from 
(http://awid-org.sitepreview.ca/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/Resource-
Mobilization-for-Women-s-Rights-Organizations-and-Movements-in-the-MENA-
region-Final-report). 
 
Baderin, Mashoud. 2005. “Human Rights and Islamic Law: The Myth of Discord.” 
European Human Rights Law Review 2:163-183.       
 
Baderin, Mashoud. 2007. “Islam and the Realization of Human Rights in the Muslim 
World: A Reflection on Two Essential Approaches and Two Divergent 
Perspectives.” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 4: Article 5:1-27. 
 
Badran, Margot. 1999. “Toward Islamic Feminisms: A Look at the Middle East.” In  
Hermeneutics of Honor : Negotiating Female “Public” Space in Islamicate 
Societies, edited by A. Afsaruddin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center 
for Middle Eastern Studies. 
 
Badran, Margot. 2005. “Between Secular and Islamic Feminism: Reflections on the 
Middle East and Beyond.”  Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 1(1):6-28. 
 
Bandy, Joe. 2004. “Paradoxes of a Transnational Civil Society in a Neoliberal World: 
The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras.” Social Problems 51(3):410–431. 
 
Bauer, Martin W. 2000. “Classical Content Analysis: A Review.” Pp. 131-151 in 
Qualitative Researching with Text, Image & Sound: A Practical Handbook, edited 
by M. W. Bauer and G. Gaskell. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social 
Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26:11-
39. 
Bobo, Kimberly, Jackie Kendall, and Steve Max. 2001. Organizing for Social Change. 
Third Edition. Santa Ana, CA: Seven Locks Press. 
222 
 
Boli, John and George M. Thomas 1997. “World Culture in the World Polity: A Century 
of International Non-governmental Organization.” American Sociological Review 
62:171-190.  
Bordat, Stephanie Willman and Saida Kouzzi. 2004. “The Challenge of Implementing 
Morocco’s New Personal Status Law.” Arab Reform Bulletin   
Boyatzis, Richard E. 1998. Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and 
Code Development. 2nd Edition. Sage Publishing. 
 
Brilliant, Eleanor L. 2000. “Women’s Gain: Fund-Raising and Fund Allocation as an 
Evolving Social Movement Strategy.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 
29(4): 554-570. 
 
Buskens, Leon. 1993. “Islamic Commentaries and French Codes: The Confrontation and 
Accommodation of Two Forms of Textualization of Family Law in Morocco.” 
Pp. 65-100 in The Politics of Ethnographic Reading and Writing. Confrontation 
of Western and Indigenous Views, edited by H. Driessen. Saarbrücken & Fort 
Lauderdale: Verlag Breitenbach Publishers. 
 
Buskens, Leon. 2003. “Recent Debates on the Reform of Family Law in Morocco. 
Islamic Law as Politics in an Emerging Public Sphere.” Islamic Law and Society 
10:70-131. 
 
Buskens, Leon. 2008. “Sharia and National Law in Morocco.” Paper presented at Law 
and Society Conference. Montreal, Canada. May 29, 2008.  
 
Carmin, Joann, Barbara Hicks, and Andreas Beckmann. 2003. “Leveraging Local Action. 
Grassroots Initiatives and Transboundary Collaboration in the Formation of the 
White Carpathian Euroregion.” International Sociology 18(4):703-725. 
Claiming Equal Citizenship Campaign. Retrieved September 7, 2006. 
(http://www.learningpartnership.org/citizenship/). 
Clark, Cindy, Ellen Sprenger, Lisa VeneKlasen, Lydia Alpizar Durán, and Johanna Kerr. 
2006. “Where is the Money for Women’s Rights? Assessing the Resources and 
the Role of Donors in the Promotion of Women's Rights and the Support of 
Women's Rights Organizations.” Retrieved October 1, 2006 
(http://awid.org/go.php?pg=where_is_money).  
Charrad, Mounira. 2001. States and Women’s Rights. The Making of Postcolonial 
Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
 
Christiansen, Carrie. 2003. “Women’s Islamic Activism. Between Self-practices and 
Social Reform Efforts. Pp. 145-165 in Modernising Islam: Religion in the Public 
223 
 
Sphere in Europe and the Middle East, edited by J. Esposito and F. Burgat. 
London, UK:  Hurst and Company. 
 
Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité 2000. Women in the Maghreb Change and Resistance. 
Bonn: Germany. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
 
Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité. 2003.  The Guide to Equality in the Family in the 
Maghreb. Rabat, Morocco: Editions Collectif 95. 
 
Cornwall, Andrea.  2003. “Whose Voices? Whose Choices? Reflections on Gender and 
Participatory Development.” World Development 31(8):1325-1342. 
------. 2007. “Pathways of Women’s Empowerment.” Retrieved October 5, 2007 
(http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/pathways_of_womens_empowerment). 
Conway, Lucian III, and Schaller, Mark. 2007.  “How Communication Shapes Culture.” 
Pp.107-127 in Social Communication, edited by K. Fiedler. New York: 
Psychology Press. 
 
Cress, Daniel M. and David A. Snow. 2000. “The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: 
The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing.” 
American Journal of Sociology 105:1063-1104. 
 
CRTDA 2004. “Denial of Nationality: The Case of Arab Women.” Retrieved March 14, 
2007 (www.pogar.org/publications/gender/nationality/CRTDAesum.pdf). 
 
DeFeyter, Koen. 2006. “Localizing Human Rights.” Retrieved October 26, 2007 
(http://www.ua.ac.be/download.aspx?c=.IOBE&n=38975&ct=39693&e=89771). 
 
Denoeux, Guilain. 2001. “Morocco's Economic Prospects: Daunting Challenges Ahead.” 
Middle East Policy 8(2):66-88.  
 
Denoeux, Guilain and Maghraoui, Abdeslam.  1998. “King Hassan's Strategy of Political 
Dualism.”  Middle East Policy 5(4):104-131. 
 
DeVault, Marjorie L. 1996. “Talking Back to Sociology: Distinctive Contributions of 
Feminist Methodology.” Annual Review of Sociology 22:29-50. 
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited” Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American 
Sociological Review 48:147-160. 
Edwards, Michael. 2002. “Organizational Learning in Non-governmental Organizations: 
What Have We Learned?” Pp. 331-346 in The Earthscan Reader on NGO 
Management, edited by M. Edwards and A. Fowler. London, UK: Earthscan 
Publications. 
224 
 
Edwards, Michael and David Hulme. 1998. “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of 
Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations.” Current Issues in Comparative 
Education 1:6-28.  
Elahi, Maryam. 1997. “International Human Rights Organizations and Advocacy 
for Change.” Pp.123-127 in Muslim Women and the Political of Participation: 
Implementing the Beijing Platform, edited by M. Afkhami and E. Freidl. 
Syracuse: NY: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Esacove, Anne.  2004. “Dialogic Framing: The Framing/counterframing of ‘Partial-birth’ 
Abortion.”  Sociological Inquiry 74(1):70-101. 
 
Espeland, Wendy. 1993. “Power, Policy, and Paperwork. The Bureaucratic 
Representation of Interests.” Qualitative Sociology 16(3):297-317. 
 
Espeland, Wendy N. and Mitchell L. Stevens. 1998. “Commensuration as a Social 
Process.” Annual Review of Sociology 24:313-343.  
 
Esposito, John and Natasha DeLong-Bas. 2001. Women in Muslim Family Law. Second 
Edition. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Evans, John. H. 1997. “Multi-Organizational Fields and Social Movement Organization 
Frame Content: The Religious Pro-Choice Movement.” Sociological Inquiry 
67:451-469. 
 
Ewick, Patricia and Susan Silbey. 1998. The Common Place of Law: Stories of Popular 
Legal Consciousness. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
------. 2002. “The Structure of Legality: The Cultural Contradictions of Social 
Institutions.” Pp. 149-165 in The Study of Legality: Essays in Honor of Philip 
Selznick, edited by Kagan, Kryger, and Winston. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
 
Ferree, Myra Marx and David A. Merrill. 2004. “Hot Movements, Cold Cognition: 
Thinking About Social Movements in Gendered Frames.” Pp. 247-261 in 
Rethinking Social Movements. Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, edited by J. 
Godwin and J. M. Jasper. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Litlefield Publishers. 
 
Ferree, Myra Marx and Tetyana Pudrovska. 2006. “Transnational Feminist Networks on 
the Web. Networks and Identities in the Global North and South.” Pp. 247-272. in 
Global Feminisms. Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human 
Rights, edited by M. M. Ferree and A. M. Trip. New York City, NY: NYU Press.  
 
Fine, Michelle. 1992. Passions, Politics, and Power: Feminist Research Possibilities. Pp. 
205-231 in Disruptive Voices: The Possibilities of Feminist Research. Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press.   
225 
 
Friedman, Elisabeth. 1999. “The Effects of 'Transnationalism Reversed' in Venezuela: 
Assessing the Impact of UN Global Conferences on the Women's Movement.”  
International Feminist Journal of Politics 1:357-381. 
Gamson, William A. [1975] 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. 2nd edition. Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth. 
 
------ 1998. “Social Movements and Cultural Change.” Pp. 57-77 in From Contention to 
Democracy, edited by M. Guigni, D. McAdam, and C. Tilly. Langham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Gamson, William and David Meyer. 1996. “Framing Political Opportunity.” Pp. 275-290 
in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by D. McAdam, J.D. 
McCarthy, and M. Zald. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ghazalla, Iman. 2001. “Sculpting the Rock of Women’s Rights: The Role of Women’s 
Organizations in Promoting the National Plan of Action To Integrate Women in 
Development in Morocco.” Retrieved November 14, 2008 
(http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/wpp/pdf/case_studies/sculpting_the_rock/sculpt
ing_rock_women_rights.pdf). 
 
Goldstone, Jack and Charles Tilly 2001. “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and 
State  Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action.” Pp. 179-194 In Silence 
and Voice in the Study of  Contentious Politics, edited by R. Aminzade, et. al. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Goodwin, Jeff and James M. Jasper. 2004a. “Caught in a Winding Snarling Vine: The 
Structural Bias of Political Process Theory.” Pp. 3-30 in Rethinking Social 
Movements. Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, edited by J. Godwin and J. M. 
Jasper. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Litlefield Publishers. 
 
 ------ 2004b. “Trouble in Paradigms.” Pp. 75-93 in Rethinking Social Movements. 
Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, edited by J. Godwin and J. M. Jasper. Oxford, 
UK: Rowman & Litlefield Publishers. 
------ 2006. “Emotions and Social Movements.” Pp. 611-629 in Handbook of the 
Sociology of Emotions, edited by J. E. Stets and J. H. Turner. New York, NY: 
Springer. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 
78(6): 1360-1380. 
 
Grewal, Inderpal and Caren Kaplan. 1994. Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and 
Transnational Feminist Practices. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
226 
 
 
Guigni, Marco. 2008. “Political, Biographical, and Cultural Consequences of Social 
Movements.” Sociology Compass 2:1582-1600. 
 
Haddouche, Nabia. 2006. Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc” Rabat 
Leadership Training Institute. Rabat, Morocco, April, 2006. 
 
Harding, Sandra. 1987. “Introduction. Is there a Feminist Method?” Pp. 1-14 in Sandra 
Harding. Feminism and Methodology:  Social Science Issues. IN: Indiana 
University Press. 
 
Haut-Commisariat du Plan (HCP). Royaume Du Maroc. 2006. Les Indicateurs du Maroc 
en 2006. 
 
HCP. Royaume Du Maroc. 2008.  La Femme Marocaine en Chiffres. Tendances 
d’évolution des Caractéristiques Démographiques et Socioprofessionelles.  
 
Hirsch, Susan 2006. “Islamic Law and Society post-911.” Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 2:165-186. 
 
Howe, Marvin. 2005. The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Jad, Islah. 2003. “The NGOization of Arab Women’s Movements.” In Gender Myths and 
Feminist Fables: Repositioning Gender in Development Policy and Practice. IDS, 
University of Sussex, 2-4 July 2003. Retrieved July 7, 2007 
(www.siyanda.org/docs/jad_ngoization.doc).  
 
Joseph, Suad. 1996. “Relationality and Ethnographic Subjectivity: Key Informants and 
the Construction of Personhood in Fieldwork.” Pp. 107-121 in Feminist Dilemmas 
in Fieldwork, edited by D. L. Wolf. Boulder, CO: Westview.  
 
Joseph, Suad. 2002. “Gender and Citizenship in the Arab World.”  United Nations 
Development Program. New York. Retrieved November 15, 2007 
(http://www.undp-pogar.org/publications/gender/suad/gender.pdf). 
 
Kabeer, Naila. 2001. “Reflections on the Measurement of Empowerment.” In Discussing 
Women’s Empowerment-theory and Practice. Sida Studies No. 3. Novum 
Grafiska AB: Stockholm. 
 
Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1991. Women, Islam and the State. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Karam, Azza. 1997. “Women, Islamisms, and State: Dynamics of Power and 
Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt.” Pp. 18-28 in Muslim Women and the Politics 
of Participation. Implementing the Beijing Platform, edited by M. Afkhami, M. 
and E. Freidl. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
227 
 
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Kerr, Joanna. 2007. “The Second Fundher Report. “Financial Sustainability for Women’s 
Movements Worldwide.”  Retrieved November 3, 2008 
(http://www.awid.org/eng/About-AWID/AWID-News/Financial-Sustainability-
for-Women-s-Movement-s-Worldwide-Second-FundHer-Report). 
Kessem, Fatima. 2005. “The Status of Women in the Middle East.” Occasional Paper 
Series. Woodrow Wilson Center. Retrieved November 13, 2007 
(http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/mepopwinter%20051.pdf). 
 
Khalifi, Mounia. “La vision d’Al Adl Wal Ihssane.” Le Journal Hebdomadaire. October 
18-24, 2003.  
 
King, Leslie. 2007. “Charting a Discursive Field: Environmentalists for U.S. Population 
Stabilization.” Sociological Inquiry 77:301-325. 
 
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1986. “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-
Nuclear Movements in Four Countries.” British Journal of Political Science 
16:57-85.  
 
Kleidman, Robert and Thomas R. Rochon. 1997. “Dilemmas of Organization in Peace 
Campaigns.” Pp. 47-60 in Coalitions and Political Movements, edited by T. R. 
Rochon and D. S. Meyer. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
   
Kowalchuk, Lisa. 2005. “The Discourse of Demobilization: Shifts in Activist Priorities 
and the Framing of Political Opportunities in a Peasant Land Struggle.” The 
Sociological Quarterly 46(2):237-261. 
 
Kubal, Timothy. 1998. “The Presentation of Political Self: Cultural Resonance and the 
Construction of Collective Action Frames.” Sociological Quarterly 39(4): 539-
 554.   
 
Kurzman, Charles. 1996. “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-
Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979.” American Sociological 
Review 61:153-170.    
 
------. 2004. “Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies.” Pp. 289-303 in Islamic 
Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited by Q. Wiktorowicz, 
editor. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
 
Lang, Sabine. 2000. “NGOs, Local Governance, and Political Communication Processes 
in Germany.” Political Communication 17: 383-387. 
 
228 
 
Lemrini, Amina.  2006. Moroccan Nationality Campaign.  Women as Equal Citizens: 
Advocating for Change in Muslim-Majority Societies. John Hopkins University. 
September 6, 2006. 
 
------. 2008. Plenary Discussion. Women’s Learning Partnership Transnational Partners 
Meeting. August 29- September 4, 2008.    
 
Levitt, Peggy and Sally Engle Merry. 2007. “Making Human Rights in the Vernacular: 
Plural Legalities and Traveling Rights in India, China, Peru, and the USA.” 
Retrieved November 20, 2008 
(http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~mrisse/conferences/papers/merry042008.pdf). 
 
------. 2008. “Human Rights as Global Law and as Transnational Political Resource: 
Unpacking the Vernacularization Process” Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the ISA's 50th Annual Convention, “Exploring the Past, Anticipating the 
Future,” New York City, NY. Feb 15, 2009 Retrieved March 15, 2009 
(http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p310922_index.html). 
 
Lewin, Kurt. 1948. Resolving Social Conflicts; Selected Papers on Group Dynamics, 
edited by G. W. Lewin. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Ltaeif, Wassila. 2005. “International Law, Mixed Marriage and the Law of Succession in 
North Africa:...but Some are More Equal than Others.” International Social 
Science Journal 184:331- 350. 
 
Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power. A Radical View. London: MacMillan Press, Ltd. 
 
Maguire, Patricia.  2001. “Uneven Ground: Feminisms and Action Research.” Pp. 59-69 
  in Handbook of Action Research, edited by P. Reason and H. Bradbury. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Mashour, Amira. 2005. “Islamic Law and Gender Equality: Could There be a Common 
Ground?: A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary 
Legislation in Tunisia and Egypt.” Human Rights Quarterly 27:562-596. 
 
Maxwell, Joseph A. 1996. Qualitative Research Design. An Interactive Approach. 
Applied Social Research Methods Series. Volume 41. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc.  
 
Mayer, Ann E. 2005. “The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. The Political Nature of “Religious” 
Reservations.” Retrieved November 12, 2007 
(http://lgst.wharton.upenn.edu/mayera/documents/frankfurtmay03edit.pdf). 
 
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency, 
1930-1970. Chicago: IL: University of Chicago Press. 
229 
 
 
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing 
 Structures, and Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 McAdam, Doug and William Sewell. 2001. “It’s All About Time: Temporality in the 
Study of Social Movements and Revolutions.” Pp. 89-125 in Silence and Voice in 
the Study of Contentious Politics, edited by R. Aminzade, J. Goldstone, D. 
McAdam, E. Perry, W. Sewell, S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly.  Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
McCaffrey, Dawn and Jennifer Keys. 2000. “Competitive Framing Processes in the 
Abortion Debate: Polarization-vilification, Frame Saving, and Frame Debunking.” 
Sociological Quarterly 41(1):41-61.  
 
McCammon, Holly J. and Karen E. Campbell.  2002. “‘Allies on the Road to Victory:’ 
Coalition Formation between the Suffragists and the Woman's Christian 
Temperance Union.” Mobilization 7:231-251. 
 
McCammon, Holly J., Soma Chaudhury, Lyndi Hewitt, Courtney Sanders Muse, 
Harmony D. Newman, Carrie Lee Smith, and Teresa M. Terrell. 2008. 
“Becoming Full Citizens: The U.S. Women’s Jury Rights Campaigns, the Pace of 
Reform, and Strategic Adaptation.” American Journal of Sociology 113(4):1104-
1147. 
 
McCann, Michael. 2006. “Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives.” 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2:17-38. 
 
McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social 
Movements: A Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 82:1212-1241. 
 
Mernissi, Fatima. [1975] 1987. Beyond the Veil. Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern 
Muslim Society. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing. 
 
Merry, Sally Engle. 2003. “Constructing a Global Law - Violence against Women and 
the Human Rights System.” Law and Social Inquiry 28(4): 941-979. 
 
------. 2006. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into 
Local Justice. Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press. 
 
Messick, Brinkley. 1988. “Kissing Hands and Knees: Hegemony and Hierarchy in 
Shari’a Discourse.” Law and Society Review 22(4):601-622. 
 
230 
 
Meyer, David S. and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity.” 
Social Forces 82:1457-1492.  
 
Meyer, David. S. and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. “Movements, Countermovements, and 
the Structure of Political Opportunity.” The American Journal of Sociology 
101(6):1628-1660. 
 
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. 2000. Marriage on Trial. A Study of Islamic Family Law. 2nd edition. 
I.B. Taurus. 
 
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. 2007. “How the Door of Ijtihad Was Opened and Closed: A 
Comparative Analysis of Recent Family Law Reforms in Iran and Morocco.” 
Washington and Lee Law Review 64:1499-1511. 
 
Mizrahi, Terry and Beth Rosenthal. 1993. “Managing Dynamic Tensions in Social 
Change Coalitions.” Pp. 11-40 in Community Organization and Social 
Administration, edited by T. Mizrahi and  J. Morrison. Binghamton, NY: Haworth 
Press. 
 
Moghadam, Valerie. 2002. “Islamic Feminism and its Discontents: Toward a Resolution 
of the Debate.” Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society 27:1135-1171.  
 
------ 2003. Modernizing Women. Gender and Social Change in the Middle East. Second 
edition. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
------ 2005. Globalizing Women. Transnational Feminist Networks. Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins University Press. 
 
Moghadam, Valerie, M. and Farzaneh, Roudi-Fahimi. 2005. “Reforming Family Laws to 
Promote Progress in the Middle East and North Africa.” Population Reference 
Bureau.  
 
Moghadam, Valentine. M. and Lucie Senftova. 2005. “Measuring Women's 
Empowerment: Participation and Rights in Civil, Political, Social, Economic, and 
Cultural Domains.” International Social Science Journal 57:389–412. 
 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1988. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses.” Feminist Review 30:61-88. 
 
Musawah Campaign. Retrieved April 15, 2009 (http://www.musawah.org/).   
 
Naciri, Rabéa. 1998. “The Women’s Movement and Political Discourse in Morocco.” 
UNRISD’s Contribution to the Fourth Conference on Women. UNRISD 
 
Naciri, Rabéa. 2007. “What’s Next for the Moroccan Campaign: Interview with Rabéa 
Naciri.” President of ADFM. Retrieved August 6, 2008 
231 
 
(http://www.learningpartnership.org/citizenship/2007/02/morocco-bill-naciri-
interview/). 
 
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Naples, Nancy. 1996. “A Feminist Revisiting of the Insider/outsider Debate: The 
‘Outsider Phenomenon’ in Rural Iowa.” Qualitative Sociology 19(1):1573-7837. 
 
Naples, Nancy. 1998. Community Activism and Feminist Politics: Organizing Across 
Race, Class, and Gender. New York: Routledge Press. 
 
Naples, Nancy. 2003. Feminism and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and 
Activist Research. New York: Routledge Press.  
 
Ostrander, Susan. 2004. “Moderating Contradictions of Feminist Philanthropy. Women’s 
Community Organizations and the Boston Women’s Fund, 1995 to 2000.” 
Gender & Society 18:29-46.  
 
Ostrander, Susan, Ira Silver, Deborah McCarthy. 2005. “Mobilizing Money Strategically: 
Opportunities for Grantees to be Active Agents in Social Movement 
Philanthropy.” Pp. 271-289 in Foundations for Social Change: Critical 
Perspectives on Philanthropy and Popular Movement, edited by D. Faber and D. 
McCarthy. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Parpart, J. 2002. “Lessons from the Field: Rethinking Empowerment, Gender and 
Development from a Post-(post-?)Development Perspective. Pp. 41-56 in 
Feminist Post- Development Thought: Rethinking Modernity, Postcolonialism, & 
Representation, edited by K. Saunders. New York: Zed Books. 
 
Pittman, Alexandra. 2007. “The Evolution of Discourse: The Campaign to Change the 
Family Law in Morocco. Pp. 336-352 in Building Feminist Movements and 
Organizations: Lessons from Diverse Experiences, edited by N. Payne. London, 
UK: Zed.   
 
Pittman, Alexandra and Rabéa Naciri. 2007. “Cultural Adaptations: The Moroccan 
Women’s Campaign to Change the Moudawana.” For Institute for Development 
Studies (IDS) ‘Participation and National Policy’ project. Retrieved November 1, 
2007 (http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/Part/proj/pnp.html). 
 
Pittman, Alexandra. 2008. “Democratizing the Legal Reform Process: The Case of the 
Moroccan Women’s Movement.” Paper prepared for CAWTAR, 2008 Arab 
Women and Legislation Report. 
 
Polletta, Francesca. 2004. “Culture Is Not Just in Your Head.” Pp. 97-110 in  
Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, edited by J. 
Goodwin and J. M. Jasper. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
232 
 
 
Razavi, Shahrashoub and Carol Miller. 1995. “From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shifts in 
the Women and Development Discourse.” Occasional Paper 1. United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development. Retrieved January 2, 2009 
 (http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/0/d9c3fca78d3db32e80256b
67005b6ab5/$FILE/opb1.pdf). 
 
Rochon, Thomas, R. and Daniel A. Mazmanian. 1993. “Social Movements and the Policy 
Process.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
528: 5-87. 
 
Ryan, Charlotte. 1991. Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots 
Organizing. Boston, MA: South End Press.  
 
Sadiqi, Fatima. 2008. “The Central Role of the Family Law in the Moroccan Feminist 
Movement.” British Society of Middle Eastern Studies 35(3):325-337. 
 
Sadiqi, Fatima and Moha Ennaji. 2006. “The Feminization of Public Space: Women’s 
Activism, the Family Law, and Social Change in Morocco.” Journal of Middle 
East Women's Studies 2(2):86-114.  
 
Salime, Zakia. 2005. Between Islam and Feminism. New Political Transformations and 
Movements in Morocco. Unpublished Dissertation.  
 
Salhi, Zahia. 2003. “Algerian Women, Citizenship, and the ‘Family Code.’” 
Gender & Development 11(3):27–35. 
 
Senge, Peter. 1990. The Fifth Discipline. NY: Doubleday Books. 
 
Senturk, Recep. 2005. “Sociology of Rights: “I am Therefore I Have Rights: Human 
Rights in Islam between Universalistic and Communalistic Perspectives.” Muslim 
World Journal of Human Rights 2:Article 11. 
 
Sewell, William. 1992.  “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation.” 
American Journal of Sociology 1:1-29. 
 
Sewell, William. 2005. Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Sharify-Funk, Meena. 2008. Encountering the Transnational. Women, Islam and the 
Politics of Interpretation. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.  
 
Silbey, Susan. 1998.  “Ideology, Power, and Justice.” Pp. 272-308 in Justice and Power 
in Law and Society Research, edited by B. Garth and A. Sarat. Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University. 
 
233 
 
Singerman, Diane 2005. “Rewriting Divorce in Egypt: Reclaiming Islam, Legal 
Activism, and Coalition Politics.” Pp. 161-188 in Remaking  Muslim Politics: 
Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, edited by R. Hefner. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Smith, Jackie. 2002. “Bridging Global Divides? Strategic Framing and Solidarity in 
Transnational Social Movements Organizations.” International Sociology 17:505-
528. 
 
Snow, David A. and Robert D Benford. 1988. “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and 
Participant Mobilization.” International Social Movement Research 1:197-217. 
 
Sonbol, Amira. 2003a. Women of Jordan. Islam, Labor, and the Law. Syracuse New 
York: Syracuse University Press. Pp. 19-53. 
 
------ 2003b. “‘The Woman Follows the Nationality of Her Husband’: Guardianship, 
Citizenship and Gender.” Hawaa 1(1):86-117. 
 
Sperling, Valerie, Myra Marx Ferree, and Barbara Risman. 2001. “Constructing Global 
Feminism: Transnational Advocacy Networks and Russian Women’s Activism.” 
Signs 26:1155-1192. 
 
Spillman, Lyn. 1995. “Culture, Social Structures, and Discursive Fields.” Current 
Perspectives in Social Theory 15:129-154. 
 
Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1988. “The Consequences of Professionalization and 
Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement.” American Sociological Review 
53:585-605. 
 
Steinberg, Marc. 1999. “The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic 
Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton 
Spinners.” American Journal of Sociology 105:736–780. 
 
Strauss, Anselm and Corbin, Juliet. 1994. “Grounded Theory Methodology.” Pp. 273-285 
in Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Sunder, Madhavi. 2003. “Piercing the Veil.” The Yale Law Journal 112 (6):1399-1472.  
 
Swidler, Ann. 1995. “Cultural Power and Social Movements.” Pp. 25-40 in Social 
Movements and Culture, edited by H. Johnston and B. Klandermans. University 
of Minnesota Press: MN. 
 
Tajfel, Henri and John Turner. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup 
Behavior.” Pp.  7–24 in Psychology of intergroup relations, edited by S. Worchel 
and W. G. Austin. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. 
234 
 
 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 
Second Edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Taylor, Verta. 1998. “Feminist Methodology in Social Movements Research.” 
Qualitative Sociology 21:357-379. 
 
Taylor, Verta and Nancy Whittier. 1992. “Collective Identity in Social Movement 
Communities.” Pp. 104-129 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by A. 
D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Tohidi, Nayereh. 2002. “The Global-local Intersection of Feminism in Muslim Societies: 
The Cases of Iran and Azerbaijan.” Social Research 69(3):851-887. 
  
------. 2006. “Iran’s Women’s Rights Movement and the One Million Signatures 
Campaign.” Retrieved October 15, 2007 (http://www.we-
change.org/spip.php?article208). 
 
Tsutsui, Kiyoteru. 2006. “Redressing Past Human Rights Violations: Global Dimensions 
of Contemporary Social Movements.” Social Forces 85:331-354. 
 
Wadud, Amina. 1999. Qur'an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman's 
Perspective. Oxford University Press 
 
Warrick, Catherine. 2005. “The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law and Gender in Jordan.” 
Law & Society Review 39(2):315-348. 
 
Weber, Robert P. 1990. Basic Content Analysis. 2nd edition. Newbury Park, CA. 
 
Weedon, Chris. 1997. "Feminism and Theory." Pp. 1-11 in Feminist Practice and 
Poststructuralist Theory. 2nd edition. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
 
WLP. 2005. Women’s Learning Partnership Transnational Partners Meeting.  
 October 25-26, 2005. Bangkok, Thailand. 
 
------ 2006a. Five Year Strategic Plan 2006-2010. 
http://learningpartnership.org/en/about/annualreports 
 
------ 2006b. Women’s Learning Partnership Transnational Partners Meeting.  
 September 3-6, 2006. Potomac, MD 
 
------ 2008a. Women’s Learning Partnership Transnational Partners Meeting.  
 April 1-3, 2008. Potomac, MD. 
 
------ 2008b. Women’s Learning Partnership Capacity Building Meeting.  
 August  30-September 4, 2008. Potomac, MD. 
235 
 
  
Zald, Mayer N. and Roberta Ash. 1966. “Social Movement Organizations: Growth, 
Decay, and Change.” Social Forces 44: 327-341. 
 
